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Foreword
Public private partnerships (PPP) are used extensively in the provision of 
public services. Who actually bears the risk in such schemes?  This new 
research report looks at PPP schemes from a  new and different viewpoint 
by examining financiers’  perceptions of risks and then comparing them to 
the perceptions of their public sector partners.
The project involved three strands of research: a review of the existing 
literature; a survey of providers of equity, senior debt and bond finance 
including follow up interviews; and six mini case studies to examine 
perceptions of risk in the public sector.  
The study investigates how financiers perceive the risks associated 
with PPP; how financiers manage these risks; how changes in the PPP 
industry, including the impact of the credit crunch, have affected financiers’ 
perceptions of risks; and how financiers’ perceptions of risks differ from 
those of their public sector partners.  
The report explains the complex network used in PPP schemes, one 
which may not be understood by the general public and those who are not 
involved in PPP, and therefore contributes to an understanding of how PPP 
operates in practice.  It raises questions about the dispersion of risk both 
within the public sector and multiple organisations within the private sector 
and how these risks are managed.  A clear understanding of these issues, 
especially the balance between risk transfer and costs, is essential to inform 
future policy development. 
The intention with PPP is that risks should be held by the party best 
able to manage them, and that the transfer of risk is priced into any PPP 
contract, yet one of the key findings of this research is that it is possible 
to transfer risk back to the public sector after contracts have been settled. 
The impact of this on value for money to the public sector and ultimately 
taxpayers needs to be assessed.
iv Foreword
The authors identify six recommendations for policy makers to 
consider.  These include considering how bid costs could be reduced as they 
act as a barrier to entry and therefore limit the choice of bidders and the 
need to compare expected versus actual risk transfer.  The authors conclude 
by identifying six areas for future PPP research. 
This project was funded by the Scottish Accountancy Trust for 
Education and Research (SATER) (for further details see page 169).  The 
Research Committee of The Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland 
(ICAS) has also been happy to support this project.  The Committee 
recognises that the views expressed do not necessarily represent those of 
ICAS itself, but hopes that the project will add to existing knowledge on 
how PPP operates in practice and assist in future policy development. 
David Spence
Convener, Research Committee
September 2010
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Executive summary
Introduction
Public private partnerships (PPP) are an established model for governments 
internationally to provide infrastructure-based services. They involve a 
clearly defined project financed by the private sector, which shares the 
associated risks and rewards with the public sector. Typically the public 
sector procurer will sign a contract with a special purpose vehicle (SPV) 
which subcontracts the finance, design, construction, maintenance and 
soft services to companies that are often related to its shareholders. This 
study focuses mainly on the financiers in this network of organisations, and 
examines their perceptions of the risks involved in the investment of equity 
and senior debt in PPP.
Private sector involvement in the provision of public services is 
not new but the PPP model enables and encourages more private sector 
involvement in the provision of public services. The scale of projects 
involving private finance is significant and PPP is used widely across the 
public sector. While a number of advanced Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries now have well-
established PPP programmes, the best developed is the UK’s (IMF, 2004). 
Since the inception of the policy in the 1990s, the total capital value of 
signed deals in the UK reached some £63 billion by the end of 2008.  PPP 
spending currently represents some 10% of total government investment. 
Although the new coalition government is expected to significantly curtail 
investment in infrastructure projects, it is likely that it will favour private 
sector involvement in any such future projects.  Despite the rapid growth 
in the market, very little research has investigated the role of the financiers 
in PPP, although a growing body of research examines the projects from the 
perspectives of the public sector procurers and the private sector contractors. 
The contribution of this study is its focus on the role of financiers. 
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Research objectives and approach 
Risks and risk transfer are at the heart of PPP, and the intention is that 
risks should be held by the party best able to manage them (HM Treasury, 
2003). The implication is that some risks will be contractually allocated to 
the private sector, although others may be retained by the public sector or 
may be shared. Where risks are to be allocated to the private sector, they must 
be identified and assessed in order to be priced into contracts before financial 
close, that is, the point when the contract between the public authority and 
the SPV is signed. The objective of this research is to explore the financiers’ 
perceptions of risks in PPP both before and after financial close.
The research strategy was three-fold. Firstly, a literature review identified 
key themes, from which a questionnaire survey was designed. Secondly, a 
database of financiers was created and the survey was administered to 109 
providers of equity, senior debt and bond finance, from which 43 usable 
responses were received, and follow-up interviews were carried out with eight 
respondents. Thirdly, six PPP projects were selected as mini case studies to 
examine perceptions of risks in the public sector. Semi-structured interviews 
were conducted in five sectors – roads, hospitals, schools, prisons and social 
housing – since risks may differ between sectors.  
Research questions and findings
The research posed four questions and the following summary shows the 
major findings for each question in turn.
Research question 1: How do financiers perceive the risks associated with 
PPP projects?
Respondents perceive that a wide range of factors are important when 
assessing risks but the importance of risks varies at different stages of the 
PPP. In summary, financiers perceive that:
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•	 Risk transfer from the public to the private sector is carried out within 
the framework of standard contracts, even though literature shows that 
these may not offer an optimal allocation of risk.
•	 Risk transfer to the private sector has increased over the last four years.
•	 Sectors with high rates of current or potential future change and hard 
to predict uncertainties are especially risky.
•	 About one quarter of respondents perceive it is possible to transfer 
risks back to the public sector after the project is negotiated or that risk 
transfer may not be agreed until after the contract is awarded.
•	 In terms of overall ranking, design and development was ranked as the 
highest risk in the pre-financial close and construction phases of PPPs. 
Finance risk was ranked as the second highest risk in both these phases 
and in the operations phase.
•	 A significant risk is perceived to be contractor failure during the 
construction phase. Perceptions about this risk in particular drive 
the demand for contract supports, and the importance attributed to 
negotiations around step-in rights.
•	 After construction, one quarter of respondents perceive that PPP is 
very low risk.
The financiers’ perceptions reported here contradict previous findings 
that risk allocation between PPP partners may be unclear, and that the way 
in which risk profiles change over project lifetimes is not well understood 
(Ng and Loosemoore, 2007).
Research question 2: How do financiers manage the risks associated with 
PPP projects?
Risks are managed in a number of different ways, which may be 
summarised as follows:
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•	 Risks may be avoided by selecting familiar project types and partners 
and refusing projects with uncertainties, such as refurbishments, or with 
high reputational implications, such as prisons. 
•	 Risks are passed through the PPP organisational structure to 
subcontractors.
•	 Financial and performance contract supports ensure risk does not revert 
to financiers.
•	 Direct agreements and step-in rights empower senior debt holders.
•	 Purchase of insurance cover and hedges.
•	 Modelling to achieve investment grade rating.
•	 Third party advice.
•	 Project monitoring.
This combination of methods results in multiple entities holding 
elements of PPP risk.
PPPs normally adopt a heavily geared financial structure to minimise 
the return required by equity, with the consequence that the thinly 
capitalised SPV has limited risk carrying capability.  The high levels of 
gearing represent a risk to senior debt, and have two implications for risk 
management.  Firstly, risks are passed through the PPP organisational 
structure to the subcontractors. In order to ensure that risks do not revert to 
financiers, they require financial and performance supports to be provided 
by the subcontractors, ultimately increasing the unitary charge. 
Secondly, the legal structure of the PPP involves a direct agreement 
between the senior debt holders and the procurer, empowering senior debt 
holders to step-in to the contract in the event of poor contractor performance 
or contractor failure. The existence of this agreement may introduce delay 
and cost, or limit flexibility, if contract amendments are required.
Financiers, and indeed procurers, purchase advice from legal, technical, 
insurance and sometimes financial and professional indemnity specialists, 
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so that a huge advice industry has grown up around PPP. Although most 
financiers do not believe that seeking advice transfers risk to their advisors, 
the procurers appear to rely heavily on such advice. 
Research question 3: How have changes in the PPP industry affected 
financiers’ perceptions of risks?
Prior to the credit crunch, industry changes were those associated with 
a maturing industry. Early memories provided by interviewees suggest high 
levels of uncertainty about the risks and the risk-return relationship inherent 
in PPP. As the industry matured, debt products became commodified, the 
size of primary investment funds increased, and importantly a secondary 
market developed enabling exit. Early exit is intended by about 20% of 
respondents and only two thirds report their intention to stay with a PPP 
till contract end.
During the credit crunch, the following changes in the industry are 
essentially imposed by a lack of capacity in the senior debt and bond markets:
•	 Equity investors perceive that there is much less senior debt funding 
available, and that banks are less willing to provide finance for the full 
lifetime of the PPP.
•	 Refinancing has changed from being an attractive opportunity to 
becoming a downside risk for deals written during the credit crunch; 
deals that may need to be refinanced between 7 and 10 years into the 
project. This is essentially a risk for equity investors, but could have 
implications for the public sector.
•	 The banks’ margin has increased and there is pressure to increase the 
proportion of equity to debt. Perceptions about the required level of 
equity vary from 15% to 30%, compared to the previous level that 
was typically 10%. The required rate of return by equity investors is 
perceived to be rising. To the extent that these perceptions are accurate, 
it is possible that if international capital markets stabilise, there will 
be renewed interest in refinancing as the market regains competitive 
pressures.
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•	 Whereas the senior debt market is perceived to be in crisis, this is not 
the case with the primary equity market. However, the secondary equity 
market is perceived to be less buoyant than before the credit crunch 
took effect. 
Research question 4: How do the financiers’ perceptions of risks differ from 
those of their public sector partners?
Williams et al. (2003) and Abednego and Ogunlana (2006) argue that 
risks affect behaviour when their consequences are personally relevant and 
when they materialise. The findings of this study confirm those tendencies. 
Private sector respondents are focused on risks that they are contractually 
allocated and need to transfer, whereas public sector interviewees are focused 
on the risks that they retain. In summary:
•	 In four of the five sectors – the exception is roads – the public sector 
interviewees are concerned about the financial consequences of holding 
demand risk, which can result in making unitary payments for unwanted 
facilities.
•	 The nature of political risks associated with PPP projects varies across the 
sectors but the procurers’ concern focuses on the impacts on service users.
•	 User specificity of infrastructure is a risk factor for financiers (Rodney 
and Gallimore, 2002), as are uncertain lifecycle costs. But potential 
building obsolescence most concerns the procurers.
•	 Conflicting needs, to reduce cost drivers on the part of financiers and 
to increase flexibility in building use to meet changing operational 
requirements on the part of the procurers, create trade-offs between 
flexibility in and affordability of contracts.
•	 Procurer driven changes to contract specifications during negotiations 
are perceived as undesirable and disproportionately costly by the 
financiers. In particular, the need to obtain agreement from senior debt 
holders causes delay and adds costs.
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•	 Whereas the financiers and designers appear content to insure against 
claims arising from incidents such as accidents, there is some evidence 
that contracting equity investors and the public sector are more 
concerned that incidents should be avoided because of the impact on 
service users and employees.
Recommendations for policy makers
The recommendations arising from the research are as follows:
•	 A macro-level review of the PPP policy should be undertaken. There 
is an understanding amongst the financiers that PPP has gone through 
an early stage of learning in which some lessons have been learned. 
At a macro level our recommendation is now that an extensive review 
of the PPP policy should be conducted to compliment the reviews of 
individual projects that have been undertaken by the NAO in particular. 
•	 A macro-level review should focus on the accuracy of risk pricing and 
the practice of risk transfer.
•	 A macro-level review should also consider how government can reduce 
the costs of mitigating its exposure to risks, such as inflation and interest 
rate movements.
•	 Public and private sector partners need to consider how high bidding 
costs can be reduced to encourage new entrants to the PPP market and 
more bidders for individual projects. This research shows that high 
bidding costs lead bidders to select carefully the projects they will bid 
for and to work with known and trusted partners, potentially creating 
barriers to entry.
•	 Procurers should keep under review their policies on the use of third 
party advice and its value for money. This research shows considerable 
reliance is placed upon third party advice, especially in the public sector.
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•	 Greater transparency of contract details is needed to enable scrutiny of 
PPP both at policy and individual project level. The findings of this study 
lead us to repeat the many calls already made for greater transparency, 
and in particular to repeat the Shaoul et al. (2008) argument that all 
public authorities should routinely publish their business cases after 
financial close, and that there should be an agreed time period after 
financial close beyond which commercial confidentiality should not 
be used as a rationale for non-disclosure. 
Conclusions
A complex network of organisations surrounds the two main partners 
to a PPP contract – the procurer and the SPV. Within this network, risk 
passes from the SPV by means of legal contracts to subcontractors, who 
are responsible for construction and operations. Risks may be allocated to 
parties who cannot control them or do not wish to hold them, in which 
case they will be mitigated by various means, including hedges and swaps 
and frequently insurance. Such risks are thus dispersed around the private 
sector, beyond the immediate PPP network. 
Senior debt holders have a powerful position within this network. 
Subcontractors must provide financial and performance supports, which 
are contractual arrangements designed essentially to protect the interests of 
senior debt providers against poor subcontractor performance or contractor 
failure. Crucially, debt servicing costs are covered by these supports during 
any time over-runs on the target completion dates for a project. This 
important protection for the senior debt holders enhances the project’s 
credit rating.
This research report contributes to an understanding of how PPP 
operates in practice. It shows that while the private sector is often described 
in relation to PPP as if it were a single entity, in practice, risks transferred 
from the public sector are dispersed amongst multiple organisations both 
within an immediate PPP network and beyond. This dispersion of risks adds 
cost, raising questions about value for money for the procurer. 
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Public private partnerships (PPP) are an established model for governments 
internationally to provide infrastructure-based services.  Both macro and 
micro-economic justifications support their use.  Proponents credit them 
with providing much needed investment that is otherwise difficult to fund 
and, as is often emphasised in the UK, with introducing more efficient 
private sector management techniques to the bureaucratic public sector, 
thereby improving the cost to quality relationship of service provision.  
PPPs involve a clearly defined project financed by the private sector, 
which shares the associated risks and rewards with the public sector.  While 
PPPs may take a variety of forms, this study is concerned with the time and 
cost specific (English, 2007) long-term contractual arrangements under 
the Private Finance Initiative (PFI).  However, throughout this report the 
term PPP is used, since this terminology is much more widely recognised 
internationally.  In these projects the private sector designs, builds, finances 
and operates assets such as roads, hospitals, schools, prisons and social 
housing, in return for a revenue stream that is used to repay debt, fund 
construction and operations, and provide a return to investors (Pollock 
and Price, 2004).  This revenue stream takes the form of an annual unitary 
charge paid by the procurer.
Typically the procurer will sign a contract with a special purpose vehicle 
(SPV) which is usually formed specifically to undertake the project.  The SPV 
is typically owned by a consortium which, because of the holistic nature of 
the contracts, will normally include two or three companies with the range 
of skills necessary to finance, build and operate the required facilities.  The 
SPV, which is usually a shell company, in turn sub-contracts the finance, 
design, construction, maintenance and soft services to companies that are 
often related to its shareholders.  
This study focuses mainly on the financiers in this network of 
organisations, and examines their perceptions of the risks involved in the 
investment of senior debt and equity in PPP.  This first introductory chapter:
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•	 Describes the background to the study.
•	 Outlines the research approach.
•	 Sets out the structure of the report.
Background to the study
Essentially, PPP is a form of project finance in which traditionally the 
project assets alone provide collateral for a non-recourse loan, repayments 
on which are covered only by the cash flows from the project.  According 
to Project Finance, the project finance industry’s trade journal, during 
2008 the global project finance market size increased by 13% to $315bn 
compared to $278 billion in 2007.  However, the fourth quarter of 2008 
with deals valued at $55bn actually saw a drop of 22% on the same period 
in the previous year, and the decline continued in 2009, when there was a 
31% reduction for the first nine months compared to the same period in 
2008 (Project Finance, 2008 and 2009b).
Although such involvement is not new, the PPP format enables and 
encourages more private sector involvement in the provision of public 
services than previously.  For example, the private sector has built and 
managed toll roads internationally for many years.  But PPPs have two 
distinguishing features from earlier forms of private sector participation. 
Firstly, project risks, which are contractually allocated and may rest with 
the public or private partners or may be shared, are intended to be held by 
the party best able to manage them (HM Treasury, 2003).  Where risks are 
to be allocated to the private sector they must be identified and assessed, 
in order to be priced into contracts before financial close.  The criterion of 
a project’s suitability for financing is whether it is able to stand alone as a 
distinct legal and economic entity with project assets, contracts and cash 
flows that are separate from those of the sponsors (Akbiyikli et al., 2006).
Secondly, the scale of private finance is unprecedented.  Globally, the 
PPP market increased for the second consecutive year reaching a record high 
of $68.6 billion in 2007 compared with $49.2 billion in 2006 and $40.7 
billion in 2005 (Project Finance, 2008).  In the first half of 2008 the PPP 
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volume reached its highest ever half yearly volume of $37.2bn compared 
with $32bn and $30.6bn in the first halves of 2007 and 2006 respectively 
(Project Finance, 2009a).  Although PPP financing continued to be strong 
throughout 2008, by 2009 the impact of the credit crunch began to take 
effect.  The first half of 2009 saw a decline of some 30% on 2008, although 
the trend may have begun to reverse as the first nine months of 2009 saw a 
decline of 26% on the comparable period in 2008 (Project Finance, 2009b).
While funding takes a number of forms, senior debt is an important 
source of finance since deals are heavily geared.  Globally, in 2009 the 
proportion of project finance volume financed by debt was 79% compared 
to 75% in 2008 (Project Finance, 2009b).  Table 1.1 shows the top 10 
global providers of senior debt in 2008.  Dexia recovered its number one 
ranking, which it lost to the Korea Development Bank in 2007.  Of the 
top ten in 2007 only five – Dexia, Korea Development, HBOS, RBS and 
UniCredit – retain that status in 2008.
Table 1.1  Global PPP project finance loans 2008
Mandated lead arranger
Value 
$m
No. of 
deals
Dexia 3,124 29
Korea Development Bank 2,298 15
DePfa Bank 1,857 15
State Bank of India 1,857  7
HBOS 1,845  8
Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) 1,815 18
Santander 1,601 14
BBVA 1,570 14
Fortis 1,416 12
UniCredit Group 1,272  7
Source: Project Finance, 2009a.
In 2007 transactions closed at an all-time high of 196 deals, compared 
to 159 deals in 2006 and 138 deals in 2005.  Infrastructure projects dominate 
with values of $64.2 billion (£40.6 billion), representing 93.5% of the total. 
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The remainder is energy projects.  The urban railway, airport and water/
sewage sub-sectors recorded the highest percentage growth rates at 1,927%, 
558% and 422%, respectively, whereas defence dropped 86% from the 
previous year.  Although the Indian subcontinent saw the highest levels of 
growth in 2007, Western Europe dominated the PPP market closing 109 
of the 196 projects valued at $34.1 billion (£21.5 billion), despite a 7% 
reduction from the previous year (Project Finance, 2008).  
The UK is recognised as a global leader in the use of PPP, and it was 
the biggest player in Western Europe in 2007 with 69 signed deals worth 
$16.3 billion (£10.3 billion), although this represented a $1.3 billion 
decrease from 2006 (Project Finance, 2008).  In the first half of 2008 the 
UK continued to lead Western Europe with 23 deals at $8.1bn, an increase 
of 5%.  Since the inception of the policy in the 1990s, the total capital 
value of signed deals in the UK had reached some £63 billion by the end of 
2008.  Under the Labour government, PPP spending represented some 10% 
of total government investment, and while the new coalition government 
is expected to significantly curtail investment in infrastructure projects, it 
is likely that it will favour private sector involvement in any such future 
projects.  In the UK, equity typically represents about 10% of projects’ total 
finance.  Equity investors may be project sponsors or third party investors, 
investing via an equity fund.  To match the global demand for PPP finance, 
the Treasury noted in 2008 that:
A substantial worldwide pool of capital has become available 
for investment in infrastructure through specialist managed 
infrastructure funds.  It is estimated that globally, dedicated 
infrastructure funds have some $130 billion under management 
and that 77 percent of this was raised in 2006 and 2007.  
(HM Treasury http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/bud08_
procurement_533.pdf.  accessed 20th April 2009)
When the first PPP projects were signed it was uncertain whether 
investors would be able to exit these investments, but more recently a 
reasonably assured market has developed enabling sales of shares to both 
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existing investors and secondary market specialist equity funds (PwC, 2008). 
By 2005 over £700m of equity stakes had been traded (DLA Piper, 2006).
Despite the rapid growth in the market since the inception of the 
PPP policy in the mid 1990s, very little research has investigated the role 
of the financiers in PPP, although a growing body of research examines the 
projects from the perspectives of the public sector procurers and the private 
sector contractors.  The contribution of this study is its focus on the role 
of financiers.  
Research questions and approach 
The objective of this research is to explore the financiers’ perceptions 
of risks.  The research poses four questions relating to these key players:
•	 Research question 1: How do financiers perceive the risks associated 
with PPP projects?
•	 Research question 2: How do financiers manage the risks associated 
with PPP projects?
•	 Research question 3: How have changes in the PPP industry affected 
financiers’ perceptions of risks?
•	 Research question 4: How do the financiers’ perceptions of risks differ 
from those of their public sector partners? 
The nature of these questions led to the use of a combination of research 
methods in order to gain both the breadth of responses that a questionnaire 
offers and the depth of understanding that is possible from interviews and 
mini-case studies.  Financiers’ perceptions of risk were ascertained through 
a questionnaire survey and semi-structured interviews.  Six projects were 
selected as mini case studies in order to examine perceptions of risks in the 
public sector.  These cases were chosen to cover five sectors – roads, hospitals, 
schools, prisons and social housing – since risks may differ between sectors. 
Literature was reviewed to guide the design of the survey instrument 
and the framework for the interviews.  Interviews were coded into Nvivo, 
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a qualitative data analysis computer software package used by researchers 
to aid investigation into data requiring deep analysis.  The questionnaire 
responses were analysed using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences 
(SPSS) one of the most popular computer programs used for the statistical 
analysis of quantitative data.  
Structure of the report
The report is organised in seven further chapters.  Chapter two provides 
background information about expenditure across government departments 
in the UK, explains expectations about the role that private finance might 
have in the provision of public infrastructure, and describes briefly some 
sources of finance and the possibilities for refinancing and equity sales as 
the market matures.
Chapter three is a literature review, which discusses: general definitions 
and concepts of risk; the risky nature of large scale public projects; risk 
as it specifically relates to PPP including some contractual issues; risk 
identification and management strategies; and risks of refinancing.  
Chapter four outlines the research methods used.  It provides details of 
data collection processes, survey response rates and data analysis methods.
Chapters five, six and seven present the empirical evidence.  Chapter 
five reports the results from the questionnaire survey, administered to senior 
and subordinate debt providers and equity investors.  Chapter six provides 
details about the case studies, and reports findings about risk mainly from 
the perspective of public sector interviewees for comparative purposes. 
Chapter seven shows that the nature of the PPP organisational structure 
requires the transfer of risk between the private sector contributors to the 
deal.  This creates the need for project supports, risk mitigation packages 
and professional advice that add cost and so increase the unitary charge. 
The consequent implications for risk transfer between the public and private 
sectors are then discussed.  
The final chapter presents the conclusions, describes the limitations of 
the work, makes policy recommendations and identifies areas for further 
research.  
2background to PPP financing
Introduction 
This chapter provides a brief background to the financing of PPP in the 
UK.  It is intended to assist readers with no or limited knowledge of the 
financing arrangements that surround PPP.  This chapter briefly describes:
•	 The size of the PPP sector in the UK.
•	 Expectations about the role of private finance in the provision of public 
infrastructure.
•	 Sources of finance.
•	 Refinancing and equity sales.
Size of the PPP sector in the UK
After a modest start in the late 1990s a wave of PPPs began to sweep 
the world in the early 2000s, and while a number of advanced OECD 
countries now have well-established PPP programmes, the best developed 
is the UK’s (IMF, 2004).  The size of the business opportunity in the UK 
is significant, with PPP capital expenditure totalling £62.8 billion by the 
end of 2008 across the UK’s regions, as shown in Table 2.1.  
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Table 2.1 Signed PPP deals as at November 2008 by region  
Region £m %
England       55,609.59 88
Scotland         5,377.99   9
Northern Ireland         1,283.30   2
Wales            535.16   1
Total       62,806.04 100
Source: HM Treasury, 2008, PFI statistics (compiled from www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/
ppp_ppp_stats.htm – accessed 20 April 2009).
In 2009 the Treasury reaffirmed its commitment to the use of private 
finance, noting that there were 110 PPP projects in the pipeline, and that 
PPP would continue to account for typically 10 percent of public capital 
spending (HM Treasury, 2009b). At that time Government departments 
recognised the importance of managing a steady and certain flow of projects 
seeking funding into the market place, and published pipeline information. 
However, with the change of government there is market uncertainty about 
this pipeline flow. While the Labour government had announced intentions 
to bring forward capital spending to counter the recessionary downturn, 
such spending is not necessarily easy to accelerate, especially in sectors such 
as roads where planning permission is often contested.  The June 2009 
announcement of additional spending on housing focuses spending on an 
area that is generally relatively easy to accelerate.  The intention of the new 
government and the impact of public spending cuts on PPP is uncertain, but 
politically the coalition favours private sector involvement in the provision 
of public sector services.
In terms of the annual spending commitment, the unitary charge 
payments made to the private sector for signed PPP deals has increased 
from £621million in 1998-1999, to £6 billion in 2008-2009 (HM Treasury, 
2009a).  Figures from the Comprehensive Spending Review (HM Treasury, 
2007) show that future estimated payments will continue to rise as new 
projects come on stream – see Table 2.2.
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Table 2.2 Estimated PPP payments – September 2007 (signed deals)
Projections
Year £m Year £m
2007-08 7043 2020-21 6686
2008-09 7663 2021-22 6335
2009-10 8133 2022-23 6430
2010-11 8482 2023-24 6381
2011-12 8664 2024-25 6399
2012-13 8807 2025-26 6166
2013-14 9001 2026-27 5981
2014-15 9037 2027-28 5869
2015-16 9147 2028-29 5530
2016-17 9244 2029-30 5242
2017-18 8635 2030-31 4617
2018-19 6775 2031-32 3990
2019-20 6861 2032-33 3621
The figures between 2007-08 and 2017-18 include estimated payments for the London 
Underground PPP contract.  These contracts contain periodic reviews every 7.5 years and 
therefore the service payments are not fixed after 2009-10.
Source: 2007 Pre-Budget Report and Spending Review: the economy and public finances – 
supplementary charts and tables.  HM Treasury, October 2007.
Thus for the private sector, PPPs present ongoing business opportunities 
in areas from which it was previously largely excluded (IMF, 2004).
While the vast majority of the expenditure has been in England, 
Scotland has had a higher percentage of its capital investment funded in this 
way.  Fraser (2005) quotes an estimate in the Public Private Finance Journal 
that 30% of public capital investment in Scotland has been undertaken 
through PPP in most years since 1999, considerably higher than the journal’s 
estimate of 10-15% of such investment in England.  However, since Fraser’s 
report, the Scottish National Party (SNP) was elected in 2007 and some 
change in policy direction has become evident.  The SNP advocates the 
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Scottish Futures Trust to provide alternative models to PPP.  The SFT will 
work with budget holders to identify affordable solutions using public and 
private finance as appropriate, and will advise on funding and financing 
approaches (SFT, 2010).
In Northern Ireland the Strategic Investment Board Limited (SIB) 
plays a key role in supporting the Northern Ireland Executive (the executive 
arm of the Northern Ireland Assembly) and government departments in 
delivering the Investment Strategy for Northern Ireland (ISNI).  This strategy 
involves procurement worth £20 billion, primarily through PPP projects, 
during the period 2008 to 2018.  Roads, schools and hospital projects 
will respectively account for £4.0 billion, £4.1 billion and £3.7 billion of 
the total expenditure (Strategic Investment Board, 2008).  Funding will 
flow from the Department of Finance and Personnel, one of 11 Northern 
Ireland Executive Departments whose role is to prioritise the use of resources 
available to Northern Ireland, ensuring that these are used efficiently and 
to secure the reform and modernisation of public services.
By way of contrast Wales has been relatively unenthusiastic about PPP, 
as evidenced by the small value of £535m signed deals, representing just 
1% of UK signed deals.  
The role of private finance in the provision of public 
infrastructure
Two rationales for the use of PPP by government may be identified. 
Firstly, a macro-economic argument that the use of private finance enables 
investment that the government could not otherwise afford, and secondly, 
a micro-economic argument that the involvement of the private sector 
introduces to an overly bureaucratic public sector a range of efficient 
management practices and techniques which should increase value for 
money.  
Table 2.3 shows an assessment from PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) 
(2008) of the intended roles of the private sector debt and equity providers 
in this process, together with their assessment of the actual outcomes in 
practice.  This table shows their assessment that the macro role has been 
fulfilled, although without any specific public policy purpose having been 
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served.  It also shows micro-level expectations that senior debt providers 
would bring discipline to the process of providing infrastructure in terms of 
their requirements for due diligence, subsequent monitoring of the contracts, 
and expectations that equity involvement would create integrated projects 
and enhance long term management and performance.  Their assessment 
of the micro-level outcomes may be described as mixed.
PwC provide detailed explanations of some of their assessments, 
however as PwC admit, these assessments are arguable, and the tables in their 
report summarised above provide a rather more positive view than might be 
expected from a close reading of the detailed analysis.  For example, despite 
the ‘yes’ assessment shown above in relation to ‘early warning of failing 
projects during the construction period’, PwC admit that early warning 
has not been given on all failing constructions.  They cite the National 
Physical Laboratory project as an example where early warning did not 
occur (PwC, 2008).
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Table 2.3 Intended and actual roles of debt and equity
Intended roles: debt and 
equity Actual outcomes debt Actual outcomes equity
Provider of finance Yes – but no public policy 
purpose served
Yes – but no public 
policy purpose served
Losses incurred if project fails Yes, but very limited Yes – several examples
Intended roles: senior debt Actual outcomes debt
Discipline in risk analysis/
allocation
Definitely.  Major cultural 
change in public sector 
procurement and risk
Due diligence Yes.  Stark contrast with 
non-privately financed 
projects
Ongoing Monitoring of 
project throughout contract
Omitted from PwC tables
Early warning of failing 
projects
Construction period: Yes
Operational period: 
Insufficient data
Step in and sort out failing 
projects
Banks have not stepped 
into projects even though 
allowed under the Direct 
Agreements, therefore rather 
disappointing
Intended roles: equity Actual outcomes equity
Integration of design/build/
operate/maintain skills
Yes – but to different 
degrees in different 
sectors
Long term performance 
management
Too early to conclude.  
With some notable 
exceptions, the early 
evidence is positive
Long term client management Jury still out, but some 
good signs
Dealing with emerging 
problems
Some signs
Source: Table adapted from PwC (2008).
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Sources of finance
The private sector can raise finance for PPP type investments in a 
number of ways (IMF, 2004).  First, where services are sold to the public or to 
the government, the private sector can go to the market using the projected 
income stream from a concession as collateral.  Second, financing is often 
provided by an SPV, although the International Monetary Fund (IMF) warns 
that these can be used as a veil behind which the government controls a PPP, 
via direct involvement of public financial institutions, explicit guarantees 
of borrowing, or a presumption that the government stands behind the 
project.  Third, where the government has a claim on future project revenues 
it can contribute to the financing of a PPP by securitising that claim (IMF, 
2004).  In the UK, financing for most PPP projects is raised via an SPV, 
which uses projected income streams as collateral.  Financing may take a 
number of forms, the most important of which are senior debt and equity. 
Senior debt
Senior debt is generally provided by investment or commercial banks 
and for larger projects by a bond issue.  PPP deals are typically highly 
geared, so that senior debt is usually about 90% of the total finance.  The 
commercial banks lend their own rather than third party money but, prior 
to the credit crunch, these banks were also showing interest in developing 
a bond capacity.  Usually, bonds are raised by the project in its own name 
and will be rated accordingly (Moody’s, 2007a).  Typically PPP projects are 
designed to attract a low investment grade rating, either triple B minus or 
triple B.  As such paper is very expensive to raise, credit enhancement will 
be purchased by using a wrap from a triple A rated mono-line insurer, who 
carries the credit risk of the project.  Prior to the credit crunch the number of 
these insurers, who are mainly American and European, was relatively small, 
although the market was growing.  The PPP project could benefit because 
there was sufficient arbitrage between the price charged by the mono-line 
and the reduced cost of debt.  In the credit crunch era the mono-lines can no 
longer provide this advantage, and the market for new deals has essentially 
collapsed although there is ongoing monitoring of existing deals.  
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A further impact of the credit crunch is that debt costs are rising but 
since yields are falling, the net impact on cost to the public sector remains 
unclear.  A major constraint in the UK market is a lack of lending capacity, 
which has seen the number of active PPP lending institutions reduce, as 
well as reluctance on the part of the remaining players to finance deals. 
Recent deals have relied on a pre-financial close syndication of banks each 
lending a proportion of the total, where previously it was more likely that 
a lead bank would have provided the senior debt, perhaps seeking some 
syndication post financial close.  The lack of capacity in the UK market 
caused the Labour government to intervene.  
In its pre budget report the Treasury noted that:
The government is encouraging the European Investment Bank 
to continue lending more, to lend faster and to take on more risk. 
(Treasury, 2008, p. 69)
But more dramatically, in March 2009 Yvette Cooper, Chief Secretary 
of HM Treasury, announced the Labour government’s intention to lend 
public money to PPP projects that cannot raise sufficient debt finance on 
acceptable terms and for which appropriate funding is not available from 
the market (House of Commons, 2009).  
The intention was that loans would be made available to all PPP projects 
in procurement.  While the Treasury statement did not estimate the cost of 
this intervention, Leitch (2009) suggested a value of between £1bn and £2bn 
over 12 months, while Millett (2009) argued that it secured the future of a 
£13bn pipeline.  The initiative was described as a temporary intervention 
(House of Commons, 2009), but proved politically controversial.  
Equity
In the context of PPP, equity is normally defined as any kind of financial 
instrument junior to senior debt, including subordinated and mezzanine 
debt.  Equity may be provided either by the project’s sponsors, usually 
members of the group of companies that will provide the construction 
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and facilities management services, or by third party investors, normally 
independent private equity funds.  Pure equity is often a very small 
percentage of the typical 10% total equity in the deal, and is often described 
as pinpoint equity.  Subordinated debt, which is often conflated with 
equity because it is at risk before senior debt, represents the balance of the 
required finance.  
During the credit crunch the availability of equity has been perceived 
in the UK as much less of a constraint than debt, although this perception 
is inconsistent with the global evidence cited in chapter one that senior 
debt has risen and equity fallen as a proportion of total funding for PPPs 
in 2009 compared to 2008.  
In terms of background to the study it is also important to note that 
the requirements of Basel II came into effect in the European Union in 
January 2007 and are mandatory for all lenders covered by the Capital 
Requirements Directive from January 2008.  There has been a considerable 
amount of debate about the impacts of Basel II (CML, 2008), which may 
affect not only the availability but also the pricing of senior debt, although 
the intention is that the aggregate level of capital requirements should be 
broadly maintained (BIS, 2004).
Basel II
Basel II (BIS, 2006) is a framework that describes the measurement of 
and sets a minimum standard for capital adequacy of internationally active 
banks.  The objective of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
was to revise the 1988 Accord, Basel I, ‘to develop a framework that 
would... promote the adoption of stronger risk management practices 
by the banking industry… and arrive at significantly more risk-sensitive 
capital requirements’ (BIS, 2004, p. 2).  However, it is also important to 
recognise that this committee also aimed to ensure that ‘capital adequacy 
regulation will not be a significant source of competitive inequality among 
internationally active banks’ (BIS, 2004, p. 2).  The revised framework, 
which consists of three Pillars, covers the measurement of capital, supervisory 
review processes and market discipline and disclosure.
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In terms of measurement of required capital, Pillar 1 offers banks 
the opportunity to use either a foundation or advanced internal ratings 
based approach as distinct from the required standardised approach to 
measurement of Basel I.  It is expected that banks will see a modest release 
of regulatory capital in moving from the standardised approach through 
the foundation and advanced mechanisms (CML, 2008).  However, Pillar 
1 includes a new category of operational risk that arises from inadequate 
internal processes, which is likely to raise the minimum capital requirement. 
In addition, Pillar 2 identifies further risk factors and allows regulators to 
adjust capital requirements.  For most lenders the Pillar 2 process is expected 
to result in a higher regulatory capital than that calculated under Pillar 1 
(CML, 2008).  Pillar 3 aims to increase transparency by requiring banks to 
make disclosures about risk management and risk distributions.
Refinancing and equity sales
Initially there was uncertainty about whether investors would be able 
to exit PPP investments.  However, as the PPP market matured and the 
early deals moved out of the construction phase into the operating phase, 
over time two developments occurred: refinancing and equity sales.
Refinancing
The construction phase is usually considered to be more risky than the 
operating phase of PPP projects from the financiers’ perspective, and as the 
market gained experience of PPP it became possible to refinance successful 
projects.  This generally accelerates the benefits for investors – although the 
cash over the full project may decrease – increasing the internal rate of return. 
The National Audit Office (NAO) (2006, p.5) found that in most early 
PPP projects, the investors had received a range of internal rates of return 
from less than 10 to over 70% after refinancing.  In a fifth of these projects 
the investors’ internal rate of return following refinancing had risen to over 
50%.  These refinancing deals became very controversial when the public 
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became aware of the size of the gains made by the private sector, especially 
in the politically sensitive health sector.
As a consequence of this controversy a voluntary code of practice was 
agreed between the Treasury and the private sector, which would provide a 
30% share of refinancing gains for the public sector, although not all projects 
did benefit: three projects led by the Highways Agency did not participate 
in gain sharing (NAO, 2006).  Deals signed after July 2002 incorporate a 
50:50 sharing arrangement in the contract, and future deals will be subject 
to more stringent requirements, effectively increasing the benefit to the 
public sector.  While noting that the public sector had acquired the right 
to refinancing gains of £137 million, £72 million coming from voluntary 
sharing, the NAO also noted that these gains were significantly less than 
the original estimate from the Office of Government Commerce (OGC) of 
potential benefits as refinancing activity has slowed (NAO, 2006).  
This reduction in refinancing activity may be attributable in part to 
a maturing market in which the commodification of finance products 
results in a smaller differential between the cost of finance pre and post the 
construction phases, and in part because the need to share the benefits with 
the public sector rendered the high fixed costs of refinancing uneconomic, 
especially for smaller deals (NAO, 2006).  
Equity sales
The second development was the growth of a secondary market, 
enabling investors in the original project SPV to sell their shares to financial 
investors who were attracted by the potential return on investment available 
over the remaining term of the project (NAO, 2006).  
With their revenue streams emanating from government agencies, such 
PPP investments might be expected to be attractive to pension funds seeking 
long dated cash flows against pension liabilities.  However, this potential 
market is relatively untapped.  In practice, buyers in the secondary market are 
existing investors and specialist secondary market equity funds established 
to build portfolios in PPPs.  Specialist secondary funds were mainly set up 
to buy 100% of the equity of operational projects, becoming active asset 
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class managers specialising in specific sectors, although some funds have 
acquired minority interests as passive partners.  
Potentially there are two benefits to portfolio building.  The first is that 
investors achieve operational efficiencies, and the second is that they improve 
financing terms.  While theoretically investors could seek to improve the 
financing of the whole portfolio as opposed to individual projects, there is 
little evidence of this type of action (NAO, 2006), possibly because most 
contracts require permission from all equity holders and the public sector 
procurer to change the financing arrangements.
The secondary market is becoming increasingly significant and there is 
now a reasonably assured market to sell shares in successful projects, since 
the levels of return in this type of project have been attractive relative to 
other asset classes (NAO, 2006).  There has been a significant amount of 
equity churn, and also some apparent reluctance to be transparent about 
selling of equity interests.  In a survey of 123 PPP projects by the NAO, no 
response was given about sales of equity interests in relation to 45 projects. 
For those projects about which a response was received, the NAO reports 
that 40% had seen a change in investors (NAO, 2006).
Since the contract to buy and sell shares is between two private sector 
parties, any profits or losses need not be disclosed.  However, noting that 
an in-depth understanding of financial modelling in PPP transactions can 
enable secondary market players to realise significant refinancing gains, the 
NAO (NAO, 2006, p.8) calls for the Treasury to monitor these transactions 
to ensure that their purpose is not to avoid sharing refinancing gains. 
Furthermore, the NAO argues (NAO, 2006, p.32) that disclosure of profits 
or losses on equity sales would increase transparency, and provide insight into 
the risks and rewards that the private sector experiences from PPPs, together 
with a better understanding of the dynamics of PPP equity investment.
Summary
This chapter provides a brief introduction to the size of the PPP market 
in the UK and the value of future annual unitary charges.  It explains that 
the rationale for using PPP is both the macro-economic need for finance, 
and also expectations that this finance would generate other micro level 
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benefits.  The chapter explains that as the PPP market matured, initial fears 
that primary investors might be unable to exit the market were not realised, 
due to refinancing and the growth of the secondary market.  During the 
credit crunch era, sources of finance especially senior debt have become 
so restrained that ironically the government was forced to provide public 
money to support an initiative aimed at using private finance.  

3literature review of risks in PPP contracts
Introduction 
The previous Labour government’s reliance on PPP contracts in the public 
sector shifted traditional responsibilities for providing public services from 
central and public control to private sector institutions.  The more business-
like approach is part of an ongoing and wide ranging reform of the public 
sector that is intended to make the public sector more like the private sector, 
thereby enabling the two sectors to work more closely together (Bennett 
and Krebs, 1991).  However, PPPs remove expenditure from the direct 
control of the public sector (Grout and Stevens, 2003), and the available 
evidence shows that perverse consequences may occur from using private 
sector measurement systems in the public sector (Demirag and Khadaroo, 
2008).  Other examples of perverse consequences include the privileging 
of activities that are measured and rewarded, and the driving out of those 
that are unrecognised, invisible and unbudgeted (NAO, 2006).
Prior studies have mostly examined PPP projects from the perspectives 
of the public sector and the private sector contractor (Broadbent and 
Laughlin, 2002, 2003, 2005; Edwards and Shaoul, 2003a, 2003b, 2004; 
Froud, 2003; Broadbent et al., 2003 and 2004; Demirag, 2004; Edwards et 
al., 2004; Bing et al., 2005a&b; Demirag et al. 2005; Khadaroo, 2005, 2008; 
Shaoul, 2005a, 2005b; Shaoul et al., 2008).  The findings of these studies 
indicate a complex set of relationships between the state, the contractors 
and the financiers of PPP projects.  Very little research exists which explores 
PPP financiers’ perceptions of risks, although Gallimore et al. (1997) argue 
that the construction industry has a significantly different perception of 
the risks, returns and structures necessary for PPP compared with other 
stakeholders, particularly financiers.  
This project focuses on the financiers’ perceptions of risks, and the 
following sections review the relevant literature using the following structure: 
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•	 General definitions and concepts of risk.
•	 The risky nature of large scale public projects.
•	 Risk in the context of PPP.
•	 Contractual issues – risk allocation, risk transfer and pricing.
•	 Generic risk identification and management techniques and strategies.
•	 Public and private sector approaches to risk assessment.
•	 Risks of refinancing.
General definitions and concepts of risk
Although PPP was not originally devised as a policy for managing risk, 
risk has emerged as a key feature that legitimates the shift in public services 
management (Froud, 2003).  This section therefore briefly examines the 
concept of risk.  
In project management and operations research disciplines, it has 
long been common to make a distinction between risk and uncertainty. 
The Treasury (HM Treasury, 1997, p.36) describes risk as ‘referring to the 
likelihood of something going wrong’, and uncertainty meaning that ‘the 
outcome of a course of action is indeterminate or subject to doubt’.  This 
distinction has also moved into accounting literature, although PPP may rest 
on a conceptual conflation of risk and uncertainty (Froud, 2003).  Froud 
(2003, p.569) indicates there is little agreement on what these terms mean, 
although the distinction is centrally concerned with ‘calculable probabilities’. 
Where there is no possibility of placing a numerical probability on whether 
an event will occur or not, the unclear future state is referred to as an 
‘uncertainty’.  Risk, therefore, involves the possibility of placing some 
‘calculable probability’ on a future event occurring (Broadbent et al., 2008).
While in psychological literature, risk is generally believed to be a multi-
dimensional construct that comprises a number of perceptual dimensions 
(Williams et al., 2003), risk is taught in financial textbooks with a focus on a 
single number, such as the variance of the possible outcomes that may arise 
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in the future (Helliar et al., 2001).  However, in practice Helliar et al. argue 
that managers tend to ignore probabilities and do not calculate expected 
values for different decision outcomes.  Instead, they argue, managers focus 
on the size of any possible loss; they exhibit loss, rather than risk, aversion. 
Gallimore et al. (1997) argue that this restricted interpretation is closer to 
the view of financial investment taken by the public sector.  In particular, 
psychological literature suggests that behaviour will be impacted on by the 
extent to which people believe the consequences of risky decision making 
will be personally relevant (Williams et al., 2003).
The risky nature of large scale public projects
Shen et al. (2006) make a general point that large scale public works’ 
projects are more risky than other business activities because of the 
complexity of co-ordinating a wide range of disparate and inter-related 
skills and activities.  They also argue that this complexity is compounded 
because public sector projects tend to have multiple stakeholders whose 
objectives and interests are different.  Furthermore, public projects are 
more risky because the infrastructure is user specific, for example, a road 
or hospital.  While it may be possible to minimise such risks by flexible 
building designs, there remains the potential for financial loss related to 
user specificity (Rodney and Gallimore, 2002), that may be less relevant to 
private sector projects.  
In addition, projects of national importance are particularly subject to 
the dangers of entrapment, that is, increasing commitment to an ineffective 
course of action, because of managerial motivations, social pressures, 
organisational inertia and political forces (McElhinney and Proctor, 2005).
Risk in the context of PPP
It is recognised that risk transfer is a critical element of PPP, and its 
proponents argue that it brings benefits including improved delivery of 
projects and maintenance of infrastructure, elimination of over-specification, 
and better delivery of services (Dixon et al., 2005).  Thus risk management 
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is an important element of PPP.  Although the intention is to transfer 
risk from the public to the private sector, in practice some risks cannot be 
transferred and some risks must be shared.  Consequently both sectors must 
work together, and there must be ‘agreement of the minds’ (McKim, 2005, 
p.604) about how risks are to be transferred and managed.  In practice it 
is not clear that organisations have achieved such agreement.  Partners 
typically have different perceptions of proper risk allocation (Abednego and 
Ogunlana, 2006), and private partners may be reluctant to carry certain 
risks (Singh and Kalidindi, 2006).  Thus Nisar (2007) argues that the public 
sector needs to place more emphasis on strategies to transfer risk, for the 
successful conclusion of PPP projects.  
There is concern that public sector organisations are not sophisticated 
in risk management processes, with the consequence that the standard 
form of PPP contract does not generally offer an optimal allocation of risk 
(Quiggin, 2005).  However, the lack of sophistication may also extend to 
the private sector.  For example, Rodney and Gallimore (2002) conclude 
that private developers use simple sensitivity analysis, which they describe 
as a limited technique incapable of measuring risk.  As a consequence risk 
may be mis-priced, and in relation to Australian PPP deals, Keating (2004) 
argues that this may occur because there is keen competition for deals and 
the government equates low cost with value for money.  
Edwards et al. (2004) examine the structure and performance of PPP 
in roads and hospitals.  In particular, they examine the costs of PPP to the 
public sector and the profitability of PPP to the SPV, but do not include an 
examination of the returns made by the financiers.  They conclude that PPP 
appears to be an expensive proposition for the public sector, and argue that 
more transparent financial reporting is essential to assess the performance 
of PPP contracts.  Broadbent et al. (2004) examine the role of management 
accounting in the processes of PPP decision making, post-implementation 
monitoring and evaluation in the National Health Service.  They conclude 
that ‘discourse’ with PPP stakeholders is required to arrive at ‘periodic’ 
judgment about VFM and that the management accounting system, and its 
subsequent audit by the NAO, is important for assessing VFM.   Broadbent 
et al. (2004) suggest that although the financiers of PPP contracts are one 
of the more important stakeholder groups, their perceptions may vary from 
those of other key players.  
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Contractual issues – risk allocation, risk transfer and 
pricing
In the case of PPP, project risks can be minimised, shared, transferred, 
and managed by the contracting parties (Akintoye and Chinyio, 2005).  The 
Treasury’s general principle of risk transfer is that risks should be transferred 
to the parties best able to manage them (HM Treasury, 2003).  There are 
many types of risks in PPP projects, including political, operational and 
financing – see appendix one for a comprehensive list.  Not all are appropriate 
for transfer to the private sector.  For example, McDowall (2003) shows 
how risks might be allocated between partners using an operational facilities 
management risk allocation matrix, which illustrates how PPP partners 
consider risk.  
Bing et al. (2005b) argue that the allocation of PPP risks between the 
public sector and private sector is not always obvious.  A number of studies 
have examined how risk is allocated in practice.  In their paper examining the 
lessons learned from pilot PPP projects in Ireland, which is also one of the 
few published studies covering PPP financing risk, Reeves and Ryan (2007) 
describe the complex allocation process in the schools’ sector.  Complexity 
arose firstly because some risks, such as statutory planning approval and 
business risks, are shared.  Secondly, risk allocation may be re-negotiated 
part way through the contract, as was the case for information technology 
obsolescence, which was allocated to the private sector for the first three 
years only.  Thirdly, the allocation of finance risks may be dependent on 
performance.  Although the private sector is responsible for raising all 
required finance, in the event of SPV default the public sector becomes 
liable for the senior debt payments (Reeves and Ryan, 2007, p.334).
Although he provides very little empirical evidence, Keating (2004) 
argues that in Australia the government is trying to transfer to the private 
sector a lot of risk which the banks in turn shift to the construction 
contractor.  He also points out that the structure of deals insulates debt 
investors from holding as much risk as possible.
Pollock and Price (2004), in a study carried out on behalf of UNISON, 
show that the structure of PPP deals obscures the relationship between 
risk and the risk premium for two reasons.  Firstly, as the SPV is only a 
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shell company, it transfers risks to other companies through subcontracts. 
Secondly, risk transfer is carried out through a variety of complex financial 
mechanisms which make it difficult to assess its value.  They show that the 
government’s claim that the higher costs of private finance are due to risk 
transfer is largely unsubstantiated.  
Furthermore, Pollock et al. (2007) argue that the Treasury’s claim of 
improved efficiency in terms of project delivery to time and budget is not 
substantiated by empirical evidence.  Demirag and Khadaroo (2008) found 
that in practice VFM is a much more complex and obfuscated concept than 
is presented in the Treasury’s publications.  Pollock et al. (2007) conclude 
that the Treasury’s Green Book which compares PPP with other methods 
of procurement is biased to favour PPP.
Other studies have examined how risks ought to be allocated.  In 
general, Bing et al. (2005b) argue that most macro-level risks – for example: 
political, legal, social and economic risks – and other risks which are 
‘exogenous’ to the project should be borne by the public sector, but that 
project related risks should be allocated to the private sector.  However, these 
authors recognise that a high risk premium may lead the public sector to 
reschedule risks by sharing or retaining more of them (pp. 26-27) to reduce 
the contract price.  Shen et al. (2006) argue that an ‘effective’ risk allocation 
occurs if: site acquisition, and legal and policy risks are allocated to the 
public sector; design and construction, operation and industrial action risk 
are allocated to the private sector; and development, market, financial and 
force majeure risks are shared between the two partners.  
Abednego and Ogunlana (2006) argue that because parties involved 
in PPP projects have different perceptions of risks, good project governance 
systems are essential for proper risk allocation and ultimately for the projects’ 
success – inadequate specification of requirements and improper allocation 
of responsibilities among the contracting parties are the main problems 
faced by the public sector.  Risks are considered only when they materialise, 
and solutions are sought in response to the threats posed to minimise 
losses.  The contracting parties are satisfied with risk allocation so long as 
its consequences are minimised.  Moreover, the risk management strategy 
adopted is geared towards problem-solving rather than taking preventive 
actions (Abednego and Ogunlana, 2006).
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Generic risk identification and management techniques 
and strategies
When it is impossible to eliminate risk, some form of risk management 
is needed.  To manage risks effectively they must be identified, analysed and 
controlled (Akintoye and Chinyio, 2005), and it is necessary to measure 
and respond to the risks associated with exposure to loss (McKim, 2005). 
Risk management may involve minimising, sharing or transferring risks 
to another organisation.  In the context of PPP, the cross-organisational 
management of transferred and shared risks is especially relevant.
There are many generic techniques available for the identification of 
risk.  These include the use of intuition, personal experience including the 
benefit of hindsight, investigative interviews, surveys, research, checklists, 
brainstorming, consultation, event and fault trees, HAZOP studies, and 
risk and safety reviews (McKim, 2005).
Various approaches have also been developed to appraise risk, and 
there is balance to be sought between cost and effectiveness.  Rodney and 
Gallimore (2002) note that certain primary healthcare projects are subject 
to particular risks, and recommend the use of a common and systematic 
format for the appraisal of projects.  Their paper examines three approaches 
to decision making under uncertainty (sensitivity testing, scenario analysis, 
and simulation), but concludes that simple sensitivity, if used properly, is 
sufficiently robust to identify the most important variables in a development 
appraisal.  This technique is recommended by the Treasury for PPP risk 
appraisal (HM Treasury, 1997).  Other techniques include scenario analysis 
– which examines the interaction of changes in critical variables, and 
simulation – a development of probability analysis which the Treasury only 
recommends for large or complex projects (HM Treasury, 1997).
Akintoye and Chinyio (2005) find that a number of risk assessment and 
management techniques are used in healthcare PPPs, but that experience 
is the prime risk assessment technique employed.  Risk prompts such as 
risk registers or checklists are useful to identify risks, and insurance cover 
and sub-contracting are the most prominent strategies for managing risk. 
Those authors conclude that risk management techniques in use are generic 
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in nature but that there is a lack of evidence that these are appropriate for 
PPP projects.
Not every risk identified will be captured in decision making 
processes.  For example Broadbent et al. (2008) argue that because of the 
pervading power of ‘accounting logic’, which aims to capture everything of 
importance through measurement technologies and thereby marginalises 
anything which cannot be measured, quantitative risk estimation is given 
more consideration than ‘qualitative uncertainties’ in PPP decision making 
processes.  Furthermore, Ng and Loosemore (2007) argue that risk allocation 
and management are difficult tasks in PPP projects primarily because of 
the technical, legal, political and economic complexity of infrastructure 
projects, and the many different stakeholders involved.  
Ng and Loosemore (2007) posit that the complexity of PPP 
arrangements and the high tendering costs may increase public sector risk 
rather than reduce it.  These authors argue that financial institutions and 
service providers will demand high risk premiums to compensate for the 
risks and uncertainties assumed over the life of the contract, especially as 
the way that risk profiles change over the duration of PPP projects is not 
well known.  They conclude that political pressure may motivate policy 
makers to disregard these processes.  Broadbent et al. (2008) state that the 
main issue with project procurement is a contradiction between providing 
‘flexible’ services and the macro-economic need to provide immediate 
capital investment.  They suggest that the Government sees the sunk costs of 
conventional procurement as no more flexible than those of PPP contracts, 
but has made the political decision to choose the latter.  
Public and private sector approaches to risk assessment 
It has been argued that the public sector has little knowledge of how 
risks are modelled and valued in PPP.  For example Ahadzi and Bowles 
(2004) find that, compared to the private sector, the public sector does 
not have adequate financial capabilities.  Hood and McGarvey (2002) find 
that local government councils in Scotland are ‘ill-prepared’ to negotiate 
and manage risks in PPP contracts, that there is a lack of continuity of staff 
involvement with projects, and risk management is limited to concerns about 
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insurance.  Furthermore, these authors argue that the private sector possesses 
substantial advantage over the public sector in ‘risk negotiation’, so that the 
risks assumed by the public sector are increased, adversely affecting VFM. 
Gao and Handley-Schachler (2004) find that public sector 
organisations are risk averse, reflecting their main concerns of safeguarding 
public funds and providing public service.  Risk aversion is demonstrated 
by the willingness to pay a higher price for the use of assets, so long as the 
price is guaranteed or stable.  The public sector is reluctant to get involved 
in income-generating activities by using PPP assets because public sector 
organisations have little knowledge or experience about how the risks 
associated with these activities can be assessed and managed, especially when 
these activities are not related to their core businesses.  
English and Guthrie’s (2003) work confirms the powerful position 
of the private sector.  They find that Australian state governments are not 
as successful as private sector consortia at identifying and transfering risk. 
However, they argue that governments and private consortia have become 
over time more practised at optimising VFM and risk sharing, to drive 
down project costs and remove PPPs from public sector balance sheets and 
budget papers.  
Bloomfield (2006) argues that trust in dealing with the private sector will 
not solve the challenges posed by the risks of uncontrollable circumstances, 
the impact of resource constraints and barriers to transparency in long-term 
contracts.  He argues that performance contracts to commit the private 
sector to achieve specific results and transparency are essential for successful 
risk allocation and to reduce the risks to the public sector.  However, the 
actual implementation of these performance contracts can be problematic 
and require independent, unbiased specialists to protect the public interest 
in managing, monitoring and enforcing these contracts.  
Dixon et al. (2005) argue that there is a direct relationship between 
PPP project risks assumed by the SPV and the cost of finance.  Therefore 
one of the main objectives of the SPV is to minimise risks in order to 
minimise the costs of finance.  The SPV will therefore attempt to pass risks 
to subcontractors, thereby limiting its own risks.  These authors posit that 
financiers should be involved at the early stages of PPP projects to ensure 
that their criteria for funding can be met and to avoid high financing costs.
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However, one impact of the financiers’ involvement may be that some 
risks revert to the public sector through government guarantees to senior 
debt holders in respect of contractor obligations or liabilities (Hood and 
McGarvey, 2002; Alonso-Conde et al., 2007).  Alonso-Conde et al. (2007) 
conclude that such guarantees may reduce uncertainty when estimating 
project cash flows, although the valuation of such options is fraught with 
difficulties.  Furthermore, they argue, the cost and risks of such guarantees 
seem neither transparent to nor well understood by the PPP stakeholders, 
including the financiers.  
Credit assessment, cost and pricing procedures may lack validity.  For 
example, Cheng et al. (2007) posit that credit scoring models used to assess 
creditworthiness of loan applicants are subjective.  Dixon et al. (2005) note 
that their interviewees were concerned that the true cost of PPP was being 
disguised by over-generous assumptions about risk transfer and discount 
rates that are too high, and call for the use of whole life costing techniques 
that cover the costs and benefits over the full contract and not just the 
procurement and development stages.  
There is a need for decision making models to continually evolve to 
take account of the ever-changing business environment.  In this respect, 
Cheng et al. (2007) posit that the various assessment criteria and their relative 
weights need to be carefully monitored and adjusted regularly to improve 
their reliability.  Moreover, the authors state that once PPP financing has 
been approved, it is essential for banks to monitor the financial performance 
of borrowers and their ability to meet their financial obligations during the 
concession period.  
Risks of refinancing  
Two NAO reports (NAO, 2000 and 2005) draw attention to the 
outcomes of the refinancing of the Fazakerley prison and the Norfolk and 
Norwich hospital projects, which raised serious concerns from a public 
interest perspective about the significant gains made by financiers from these 
projects.  More general reports (NAO, 2002 and 2006) have examined a 
wider range of issues about the PPP debt refinancing and equity market. 
These reports note that there are potential disadvantages for both the public 
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and private sectors associated with refinancing, as well as the opportunities 
for the financiers.  Refinancing can generate new uncertainties and risks 
because the future flow of income cannot be predicted with certainty if the 
partners take their gains and move away from the projects.  The following 
risk related issues were raised in the NAO report of 2006:
•	 additional risks may fall on the public sector.
•	 the extension of the contract period may create additional risks for the 
public sector.
•	 taking benefits early may reduce incentives for the private sector to 
provide the same quality of service delivery as before the refinancing.
•	 after refinancing, the repayment of debt may be adversely affected by 
any poor service performance, although equity investors argue that as 
the private sector expects to gain future benefits from the projects there 
is an incentive to ensure that contractors continue to perform.
Summary 
Although the literature makes a ‘calculable probabilities’ distinction 
between risk and uncertainty, this chapter notes that in practice probabilities 
may be ignored, as decision-makers focus on the size of expected losses. 
While there are a range of risk assessment and management techniques 
available, in practice decision-makers may lack sophistication.  There is some 
evidence that in the private sector decision-makers have more financial and 
negotiating capabilities than their public partners.  
Although PPP was not originally devised as a policy for managing 
risk, risk has emerged as a key feature that legitimates the shift in public 
services management (Froud, 2003).  This review of literature identifies 
the following themes:
•	 Financial models that assess risk may be subjective.
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•	 Not all risks can be captured in decision making models, but those that 
are will usually be quantitative in nature.
•	 Risk allocations between contracting parties are not obvious and may 
be complex in practice.
•	 Macro-level and exogenous risks should be retained by the public sector.
•	 Standard contracts may not provide an optimal allocation of risks.
•	 Mispricing of risk may occur under competitive pressures.
•	 There is a need for unbiased and independent specialists to protect the 
public interest.
Most of the literature examines PPPs from the perspectives of the public 
sector or the contracting entities but does not examine the perceptions of 
the financiers.  The next chapter describes the research methods adopted 
for the present study of financiers’ perceptions of risk.
4research methods
Introduction
The methods used to explore the research questions and achieve the research 
objectives include a survey and interview-based case studies supported by 
information in the public domain.  This chapter describes how empirical 
data were collected and analysed for the:
•	 Survey of PPP financiers.
•	 Interview based case studies.
Survey of PPP financiers
The initial stages of the research involved the creation of a database of 
PPP financiers, and the design of a general survey questionnaire that was 
central to understanding the financiers’ perceptions of risks.  Thereafter this 
section describes the survey administration and data analysis.
Creation of database and design of survey questionnaire
A database of equity and senior debt financiers was created by 
drawing from the PartnershipsUK’s database of PPP projects – see www.
partnershipsuk.org.uk.  The key players involved in the PPP projects 
were identified and contact details of 109 heads/directors of PPP project 
finance were added.  The survey database also included the contact details 
of 69 pension fund managers and directors, which were obtained from the 
Institute of Pension Managers.
A survey questionnaire was developed from a preliminary literature 
review and three pilot interviews conducted in June 2006.  The questionnaire 
was revised on the basis of feedback from a sample of PPP equity and senior 
debt financiers, PPP consultants and academics.  The survey questions are 
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summarised in the tabulations of responses in chapter five, but a copy of 
the original survey may be obtained from the researchers if required.
Administration of the survey
The first round of the survey was administered to 109 equity and senior 
debt financiers and 69 pension fund managers towards the end of July 2008. 
A total of 30 positive replies and 37 negative replies were received by the 
middle of October.
A second round survey was posted in late October 2008.  Follow-up 
telephone calls were conducted towards the end of October and in November. 
These telephone calls revealed that 39 of the original 178 contacts had left 
their companies.  Revised contacts were invited to participate in the survey 
and 15 additional replies were received.  Overall the response rate was 
45/178 = 25.3%.  
However, this overall response rate requires further explanation.  Of 
the total of 69 pension fund managers, ultimately only two responses were 
received resulting in an unusable response rate.  Therefore, the analysis in 
chapter five is based only on the 43 responses from equity and senior debt 
financiers, representing a response rate of 43/109 = 39.4%.  Feedback 
suggests that the very low response rate from the pension funds is due to 
the lack of relevance of the questions to these potential investors.
Survey – data analysis
The 43 responses received from the equity and senior debt financiers 
were coded into SPSS for analysis.  Each question was numbered and 
coded.  For example, replies to the first question, question 1.1, which asked 
respondents about the type of finance they mainly provide to PPP projects, 
were coded as Q1.1finprovequity, Q1.1finprovsenior, Q1.1finprovsubor, 
Q1.1finprovbond, Q1.1finprovother, to identify the type of finance 
provided.
General descriptive statistics including frequencies and measures of 
central tendency were produced where appropriate.  As chapter five shows, 
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the response rate varied throughout the questionnaire although most 
questions were answered by the majority of participants.  
In order to gain an overall picture of responses, in some sections of 
the questionnaire the variables were grouped and recoded into smaller 
categories.  For example, the original classifications of 1 = very important, 2 = 
important, 3 = of little importance, and 4 = not important, were conflated to 
two categories: important and not important.  Similarly, categories strongly 
agree and agree, and strongly disagree and disagree were grouped into agree 
and disagree respectively.
Follow-up interviews with survey respondents
A total of eight follow-up interviews were conducted with survey 
respondents who were selected at random from those respondents who 
provided their contact details.  Follow-up interviews were carried out 
between February and June 2009.  The objectives were to discuss some of 
the issues examined in the questionnaire in greater depth and to determine 
the rationale for the respondents’ replies.  
Interview based case studies
Six projects were developed as mini case studies in order to examine 
perceptions of risks in the public sector for comparison purposes.  These 
cases were chosen to cover five sectors – roads, hospitals, schools, prisons 
and social housing – since risks may differ between sectors.  The cases are 
located in three regions of the UK.  The housing case is in England, the 
prison and health cases are in Scotland, and the two schools and the roads 
cases are in Northern Ireland.  
Case studies and respondents
The interviews relating to the case studies were carried out between June 
2006 and May 2009, and overlapped with the administration of the survey. 
A total of 18 interviews were conducted with 19 respondents involved in 
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the case studies.  Table 4.1 shows the job title of the interviewees, and the 
type of organisation.  
Table 4.1 Interview schedule 
Case studies No.
Job title of
interviewees Organisations
The prison case 1. Commercial director Facilities management
2. PPP team leader & director Bank
3. SPS contracts manager Public authority
The hospital case 4. Managing director Equity provider
5. Head of project finance Bank
6. Director of capital planning 
and investments
Public authority
7. Assistant director of capital 
planning and investments
The first school 
case
8. Managing director and head 
of infrastructure
Equity provider
9. Associate director and head 
of infrastructure
Bank
10. Project manager Public authority
The second school 
case
11. Commercial Director Equity provider
12. Director – Corporate and 
Business Banking 
Bank 
13. Head of PPP procurement Public authority
The housing case 14. PPP project coordinator Equity provider
15. Corporate banking manager Bank 
16. Senior policy officer Public authority
The roads case 17. Managing director, strategic 
developments
Equity provider
18. Associate director and Head 
of project finance
Bank
19. Project leader Public authority
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For each case, the equity partner, senior debt provider and public sector 
partner were identified for interview using the snowballing technique and 
from the PartnershipsUK projects database.  Most of the private sector equity 
partners interviewed were managing directors of the SPVs.  The senior debt 
providers interviewed were senior directors from banks.  The public sector 
interviewees were senior staff close to the projects.
A cover letter summarising the research objectives was provided to all 
potential interviewees.  To allow interviewees to answer fully and reduce 
interviewer effect or reactivity (Hammersley, 2008), a semi-structured 
interview questionnaire was provided and/or follow up questions were 
asked as appropriate.  On average, interviews lasted between one and a half 
to two hours.  A copy of the interview schedule may be obtained from the 
researchers, if required.
Data analysis
Interviews were tape recorded (with permission), transcribed, coded 
and keyed into software package Nvivo for analysis.  Codes are attached 
to segments of data, so that all segments of data with the same coding can 
be retrieved quickly and easily.  Interview data were coded drawing on key 
themes initially identified from the literature, for example, codes for risk 
transfer and refinancing.  These themes were expanded to incorporate new 
issues raised by the interviewees, for example agents who offer advice, and 
sector specific risks.  
The coding structure shown in appendix two was designed to enable 
the identification of themes relevant to the industry and individual projects, 
and to separate responses from different players in the field.  To analyse the 
data, all interviews were read in full several times and themes were extracted 
from the coding process, being mindful, by checking back to the full 
interview, of the context in which each coded section was provided.  Sample 
quotations were retrieved from the codes.  The interpretation presented 
draws on common perceptions provided by many interviewees, but also 
draws attention to alternative perspectives, as appropriate.  To reduce the 
potential for bias and to identify contrasting viewpoints, the key themes 
were triangulated across interviewees and secondary data sources.
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In order to protect the confidentiality of our interviewees, the following 
codes are used to identify their backgrounds.  Interviewees from banks or 
financial institutions providing mainly senior debt are coded SD 1–8, those 
from institutions that provide mainly equity are coded E 1–7, interviewees 
from organisations that provide equity but also are contractually responsible 
for the construction of the infrastructure or the provision of operating phase 
facilities management services are coded CE 1-8.  Finally, interviewees based 
in the public sector are coded PS 1-8.  
In total, including the pilot, questionnaire follow-up and case based 
interviews, 31 people participated in 29 interviews.  All codes have been 
allocated at random so that there is no relationship between the code 
numbers and the order in which the cases are presented.  Furthermore all 
interviewees are described using the male gender.  
Summary
This chapter discusses how data were collected and analysed using 
the survey and interview methods.  The next three chapters discuss the 
empirical findings.  
5survey findings
Introduction   
This chapter primarily focuses on the quantitative aspect of the study.  It 
briefly explains the structure of the questionnaire, and reports the results of 
43 responses from senior debt and equity financiers of PPP infrastructure 
investments.  For illustrative purposes, a few quotations from the follow-up 
interviews are included.
The purpose of the questionnaire was to capture the perspectives of 
PPP financiers regarding the risks involved in PPP projects.  Its emphasis 
was on the private sector.  
More specifically the questionnaire attempted to answer two of the 
four research questions posed in chapter one:
•	 How do financiers perceive the risks associated with PPP projects? 
•	 How do financiers manage the risks associated with PPP projects?
The questionnaire is divided into five sections, which this chapter replicates, 
as follows:
•	 Section one includes general information about the type of finance the 
respondents’ companies provide, the extent of their involvement in 
PPP projects and sectors, and whether they have dedicated PPP units.
•	 Section two addresses attitudes to risk.
•	 Section three concentrates on cost of capital.
•	 Section four reports information about the financing criteria used.
•	 Section five examines the role of independent advisors/ consultants.
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General information 
Tables 5.1 to 5.7 provide information about the nature of investments 
made by the responding financiers.  Although respondents were asked to 
indicate which type of finance they mainly provide in PPP, many respondents 
ticked both equity and subordinated debt.  This is a function of the norm 
in the industry, as explained in chapter two, that equity is usually provided 
by way of very little pure equity and a majority of subordinated debt. 
Approximately one third of respondents mainly provide senior debt or bonds 
and a small number ticked both senior debt and bond finance.
Table 5.1 Type of finance mainly provided to PPP projects 
Type of finance %
Equity 76.7
Subordinated debt 67.4
Senior debt 27.9
Bond finance  7.0
Others  4.7
Total responses n =43 100.0
Mode Equity
Of the respondents, who mainly provide debt, Table 5.2 shows that 
57% indicated that they also hold an equity stake in all of the projects for 
which they provide debt.  Approximately one fifth do not hold equity in 
any such projects.
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Table 5.2 Equity stake held by debt providers in PPP projects 
Equity stake held %
Yes, in all of them 57.2
Yes, in most of them  0.0
Yes, in some of them 10.7
Yes, in a few of them 10.7
No, not in any of them 21.4
Total responses n=28 100.0
Mode Yes, in all
One of the interviewees explained that such an alignment of the 
interests of the financiers in a project is beneficial:
One thing I have learned, for example in construction, is that and 
it makes a lot of sense that there can be a very different position 
when a construction contractor is actually just a sub-contractor 
and is not in that equity vehicle... if they are in the equity box 
then their interests are aligned and if they are not they can create 
issues. (SD2)
While Table 5.3 shows that the precise values vary between equity and 
senior debt providers, in general terms respondents are most likely to have 
financed fewer than 10 projects in the last 10 years, with between 8% and 
9% of respondents being very active in each of the equity and debt markets.
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Table 5.3  Approximate number of PPP projects, based in the UK, to 
which the organisation provided finance in the last ten years 
Number of PPP projects Equity % Debt %
Not applicable  2.6 15.6
Less than 10 57.9 43.7
Between 10 – 20 13.2 18.7
Between 21 – 30 10.5  6.3
Between 31 – 40  5.3  0.0
Between 41 – 50  2.6  6.3
More than 50  7.9  9.4
Total responses (n=38 equity, n=32 debt) 100.0 100.0
Mode Less than 10 Less than 10
Table 5.4 shows the majority of financiers make a relatively small 
contribution to the total debt and equity in the SPV.  Just over half of debt 
and equity investors invest less than 30% of the total debt and equity in 
the SPV.  However, 30% of debt providers finance 90% or more of the 
total debt in the SPV.
Table 5.4  Average percentage of total equity and total debt finance 
provided to a SPV 
Percentage of finance provided to an SPV
Total equity 
%
Total debt 
%
Not applicable   5.1 12.1
Less than 5% 23.1 18.2
5% to less than 10% 17.9 24.2
10% to less than 30% 12.8  9.1
30% to less than 50% 20.6  0.0
50% to less than 70% 12.8  3.0
70% to less than 90%   0.0  3.0
90% or more   7.7 30.4
Total responses (n=39 equity, n= 33 debt) 100.0 100.0
Mode Less than 5% 90% or more
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The majority of equity investors (59%) report in Table 5.5 that their 
intention is to remain with the project for over twenty years.  However, a 
significant minority of debt and equity providers expect to finance projects 
for less than five years.
Table 5.5 Expected duration of financing a PPP project, on average 
Duration of financing a PPP project Equity % Debt %
Not applicable  2.6  6.5
Less than 5 years 20.5 22.5
5 years to less than 10 years 10.3 12.9
10 years to less than 15 years  2.6  0.0
15 years to less than 20 years  5.1  9.7
20 years to less than 25 years 12.8 19.4
25 years to less than 30 years 38.4 29.0
30 years or more   7.7  0.0
Total responses (n=39 equity, n=31 debt) 100.0 100.0
Mode 25 to less than 30 25 to less than 30
Tables 5.6 and 5.7 show that schools are the most common sector to 
which respondents provide finance, and it is the most dominant sector for 
the 57% of respondents who indicate that they do have a primary investment 
sector.  The top three preferences exhibited in Table 5.6 – schools, hospitals 
and roads – are also the three largest sectors in terms of total PPP capital 
expenditure, although the order of preference given in Table 5.6 is the 
reverse of expenditure.  
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Table 5.6  Number of respondents’ companies reporting financing of 
PPP projects by sector 
Sector Number
Schools 27
Hospitals 25
Roads 20
Defence 18
Building schools for the future (BSF) 16
Prisons and prison services 16
Waste 14
Other transports such as railways 13
Water/sewage 11
Housing 10
Others 10
Mode Schools
Other responses: care homes, libraries, police/civil justice/police offices, courts, fire 
stations, further education, government and local authority offices, street lights, student 
accommodation.
Fifty seven percent of 35 respondents indicate that their company 
finances projects in a primary sector.  Table 5.7 indicates which these 
sectors are.
Table 5.7 Primary sector organisation is involved with
Primary sector Number
Schools 8
Roads and rail 4
Health 2
Housing 2
Waste 2
Local authorities, HMRC, Gov offices 1
Police offices 1
Total responses n=20
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Chapter six examines risks in different sectors, since their importance 
may be sector specific.  As one of the interviewees explained:
For schools, I think, the construction is the biggest risk.  For 
prisons: I think the operation is the biggest risk because I think 
that there is a lot more to the operational side and the performance 
mechanisms and the things that you can’t afford to get wrong, like 
letting prisoners out accidentally.  There’s an awful lot more to the 
operations than for a school.  For roads, I would say the construction 
period.  In Defence transactions, I would probably swing to the 
operations again, because, normally what you are building for an 
MOD, might be relatively straightforward but it’s the operations 
of perhaps keeping technology refreshed etc. that might be the more 
challenging aspect. (CE6)
Tables 5.8 to 5.11 provide information about how the investors organise 
and control their investments.  Just short of two thirds of those who replied 
to this question indicate that their companies have dedicated PPP units, 
typically with a small number of employees.
Table 5.8 Dedicated unit for PPP finance 
Dedicated unit for PPP
For equity finance 
%
For debt finance 
%
Yes 62.9 65.5
No 37.1 34.5
Total responses (n=35 equity finance, 
n=29 debt finance) 100.0 100.0
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Table 5.9  Number of respondents indicating the size of their PPP unit 
in terms of numbers of employees
Size of PPP unit Number equity Number debt
Less than 10 employees 10 11
10 – 30 8 6
31 – 50 2 0
51 – 70 1 1
Total responses n=21 n=18
Mode Less than 10 Less than 10
A number of respondents cite commercial confidentiality as a reason 
for not answering the questions about performance measurement in Tables 
5.10 and 5.11.  Amongst the respondents to these questions, most report 
specific minimum performance criteria for equity units.
Table 5.10  Number of respondents indicating that minimum financial 
performance criteria are specified for the unit 
Minimum financial performance criteria Equity Debt
Yes 16 10
No  5  7
Total responses n=21 n=17
Mode Yes Yes
Respondents were asked to provide details of these minimum 
performance criteria.  In relation to equity, responses include equity internal 
rate of return, profit/deal flow and return on equity.  For debt, the responses 
include debt service cover ratios and return on subordinated debt.  Table 
5.11 has details of the key performance indicators for the units.
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Table 5.11  Number of respondents indicating the primary indicators 
used to measure the performance of the PPP unit
Performance indicators Equity Debt
Profit 12 7
Revenue   1 4
Budgets   1 2
Market share   0 0
Others   8 4
Total responses n=22 n=17
Mode Profit Profit
Profit is the primary performance indicator used in both equity and 
debt units.  Interestingly market share is not noted as a response for either 
equity or debt units.  There are a variety of other responses including – for 
equity units – internal rate of return, cash flows, portfolio value to internal 
rate of return, number of bids won and the investment value created.  Debt 
service cover ratios and construction turnover are the two most common 
‘other’ measures given for debt units.
Attitudes to risk in PPP projects
Tables 5.12 through to 5.25 summarise the responses about attitudes 
to risk, including the assessment and management of risk.  Tables 5.12 
to 5.14 report the perceptions of equity, senior debt and bond providers 
respectively about the importance of a range of factors when assessing risk. 
The very interesting outcome is that with very few exceptions all factors 
were considered to be either very important or important.  
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Table 5.12 Factors considered important when assessing risk in a PPP 
project – equity finance
Equity finance
%  
1 and 2
%  
3 and 4 N Mean Median SD Range
Risk transfer to 
subcontractors 97.1 2.9 35 1.26 1 0.505 4
Return on 
subordinated debt 
(or quasi equity)
91.4 8.6 35 1.54 1 0.675 4
Target return on 
equity 91.4 8.6 35 1.51 1 0.658 4
Availability of 
insurance on risks 
taken
85.7 14.3 35 1.83 2 0.822 4
Inflation on 
operating costs 77.1 22.9 35 1.94 2 0.873 4
Availability of 
insurance on all 
construction risks
74.3 25.7 35 2.09 2 0.887 4
Inflation on 
construction costs 58.8 41.2 35 2.49 2 0.887 4
Chance of changes 
in tax law 51.4 48.6 35 2.46 2 0.741 4
Contract term after 
debt is paid out 45.7 54.3 35 2.71 3 0.825 4
Key: 1 and 2 very important to important, 3 and 4 little importance to not important
All risks are regarded as very important or important by more than 
half the equity finance respondents apart from the ‘contract term after 
debt is paid out’.  Over 90% of respondents consider ‘risk transfer to sub 
contractors’, ‘return on subordinated debt’, and ‘target return on equity’ 
to be important.  The importance of risks is examined further in chapter 
seven, however, an interviewee stressed that all risks are important because 
of the high costs of missing targets in PPP projects:
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You do have the same uncertainties but the uncertainties actually 
hit you more in this, when they come to roost they really hit you 
badly.  I have just finished a school, £30m just for one school, we 
finished it a day late, it was due to be finished on a Saturday and 
it was finished on Sunday, it was opened for the teachers on the 
Monday but we still have to charge the builder for one day of lost 
rent and so normally you would turn round and say well what a 
good job he has done and let’s just forget about that but it is going 
to cost him nearly £11,000 for being one day late. (E1)
Table 5.13 shows that senior debt providers also consider virtually all 
factors as very important or important when assessing risk.  ‘Availability of 
swaps to mitigate interest rate risks’ and ‘risk transfer to subcontractors’ are 
noted by 100% and 96.9% of respondents respectively.  The only factor rated 
as not important or as having little importance by a majority of respondents 
is ‘availability of bonds to mitigate interest rate risks’.  
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Table 5.13 Factors considered important when assessing risk – senior 
debt 
Senior debt 
finance
% 
1 and 2
% 
3 and 4 N Mean Median SD Range
Availability of swaps 
to mitigate interest 
rate risks 
100.0 0.0 34 1.41 1 0.988 4
Risk transfer to 
subcontractors
96.9 3.1 33 1.36 1 0.895 4
Availability of 
insurance
90.9 9.1 34 1.59 1 0.957 4
Interest margins 
on cost of debt 
(LIBOR)
90.9 9.1 34 1.74 2 0.864 4
Cover  ratios (E.g.  
Loan life cover, debt 
service cover, interest 
cover)
90.9 9.1 34 1.59 1 0.892 4
Technical due 
diligence on financial 
model
87.9 12.1       
34
1.76 2 0.890 4
Availability of 
insurance on all 
construction risks
84.8 15.2 34 1.85 2 1.019 4
Availability of 
insurance on all 
operating and 
maintenance risks
84.8 15.2 34 1.79 2 0.978 4
Inflation on 
operating costs
78.8 21.2 34 1.97 2 0.969 4
Contract term after 
debt is paid out
75.8 24.2 34 2.15 2 0.958 4
Chance of changes in 
tax law
65.6 34.4       
33
2.36 2 0.822 4
Inflation on 
construction costs
58.8 41.2 34 2.29 2 0.970 4
Availability of bonds 
to mitigate interest 
rate risks 
41.7 58.3 32 3.19 3 1.335 4
Key: 1 and 2 very important to important, 3 and 4 little importance to not important
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The risk of changes in the law is likely to be sector specific: 
Government legislation, change in law again, that can be quite 
a big risk depending upon what sector you are in.  Particularly 
in the waste sector where you are seeing many legislative changes 
and let’s face it, there could be one in the prison sector if a law was 
passed saying that, all prisoners in the future must have their own 
cell.  That would be quite a big change to a contract... Now again 
that is a risk that the private sector would see passing back to the 
public sector, but there is still always a debate to be had. (SD2)
However, tax changes may not be important because:
There are usually clauses in the contract that if it is a discriminatory 
specific tax then the council would pay us extra anyway. (E1)
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Table 5.14  Factors considered important when assessing risk in a PPP 
project – bond finance
Bond finance
% 
1 and 2
% 
3 and 4 N Mean Median SD Range
Margins on cost of 
debt (GILTS) 94.1 5.9 23 2.36 2 1.560 4
Availability of 
insurance 88.9 11.1 23 2.26 2 1.602 4
Risk transfer to 
subcontractors 88.9 11.1 23 2.22 1 1.622 4
Bond rating 88.9 11.1 23 2.22 1 1.622 4
Availability of 
insurance on all 
construction risks
88.9 11.1 23 2.43 2 1.502 4
Technical due 
diligence on 
financial model
88.9 11.1 23 2.48 2 1.473 4
Availability of 
insurance on all 
operating and 
maintenance risks
83.3 16.7 23 2.39 2 1.599 4
Inflation on 
operating costs 77.8 22.2 23 2.57 2 1.472 4
Contract term after 
debt is paid out 72.2 27.8 23 2.74 2 1.356 4
Availability of 
swaps to mitigate 
interest rate risks 
66.7 33.3 23 3.04 3 1.718 4
Inflation on 
construction costs 61.1 38.9 23 2.87 3 1.290 4
Chance of changes 
in tax law 61.1 38.9 23 2.87 3 1.290 4
Breakage costs of 
swaps 52.9 47.1 23 3.09 3 1.474 4
Involvement 
multinationals 33.3 66.7 23 3.26 3 1.176 4
Key: 1 and 2 very important to important, 3 and 4 little importance to not important
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With one exception of bond finance respondents, all answers are 
regarded as very important or important by the majority.  ‘Margins on 
cost of debt’ was the most common response.  Other common responses 
include ‘availability of insurance’, ‘risk transfer to subcontractors’, ‘bond 
rating’, ‘availability of insurance on all construction risks’ and ‘technical due 
diligence on financial model’.  The exception which is rated as important 
by less than half the respondents was the ‘involvement of multinationals’.
Tables 5.15 to 5.17 show the importance attributed to allocating a 
range of risks to subcontractors and/or insuring the risks, for design and 
development, operations, and ownership risks respectively.  Again the 
majority of respondents perceive these risk mitigation measures as important 
for all risks listed in the questionnaire.  
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Table 5.15 Importance that the following risks are allocated to 
subcontractors and/or fully insured – design and development
Design and 
development
% 
1 and 2
% 
3 and 4 N Mean Median SD Range
Fitness for 
purpose of the 
projects design
100.0 0.0 42 1.33 1 0.721 4
Delivery of 
design of 
construction 
projects
100.0 0.0 42 1.26 1 0.445 4
Planning 
problems 97.6 2.4 42 1.38 1 0.764 4
Construction 
costs overrun 97.6 2.4 42 1.17 1 0.437 4
Planning 
approvals 97.6 2.4 42 1.43 1 0.770 4
Late delivery of 
detailed design 97.6 2.4 42 1.31 1 0.517 4
Delivery schedule 95.2 4.8 42 1.33 1 0.570 4
Independent 
certification 95.0 5.0 42 1.76 2 0.932 4
Availability of 
construction 
assets to site
92.7 7.3 42 1.49 1 0.637 4
Disruption to 
existing services 90.2 9.8 42 1.63 2 0.662 4
Site preparation 88.1 11.9 42 1.57 1 0.703 4
Environmental 
issues 83.3 16.7 42 1.60 1 0.767 4
Design and 
construction 
variations by the 
SPV
83.3 16.7 42 2.29 2 1.402 4
Archaeological 
issues 78.6 21.4 42 1.72 1 0.864 4
Industrial 
disputes 69.0 31.0 42 1.86 1.5 0.977 4
Key: 1 and 2 very important to important,  3 and 4 little importance to not important
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Fewer respondents identified industrial disputes as important compared 
to the other risks, but even so almost 70% of respondents perceive that this 
risk should be allocated to subcontractors or insured.  
Table 5.16 Importance that the following risks are allocated to 
subcontractors and/or fully insured – operations
Operation % 1 and 2 % 3 and 4 N Mean Median SD Range
Asset/service 
performance 100.0 0.0 42 1.26 1 0.445 4
Asset/service 
availability 100.0 0.0 42 1.19 1 0.397 4
TUPE 
(Transfer of 
Undertakings 
Protection of 
Employment)
92.9 7.1 42 1.43 1 0.703 4
Security 90.5  9.5 42 1.64 2 0.656 4
Change to 
public sector 
partner 
requirements
87.2 12.8 42 2.05 2 1.081 4
Cost of 
keeping latent 
defects in 
existing assets
85.0 15.0 42 1.83 1.5 1.102 4
Staff training 83.3 16.7 42 1.86 2 0.683 4
Repairs and 
maintenance 
cost variations
83.3 16.7 42 1.71 1.5 0.864 4
Latent defects 
in existing 
assets
82.9 17.1 42 1.74 1 1.061 4
Changes in 
demand 72.2 27.8 42 2.39 2 1.358 4
Third-party 
revenue 65.8 34.2 41 2.46 2 1.120 4
Key: 1 and 2 very important to important, 3 and 4 little importance to not important
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Within operations, ‘changes in demand’ and ‘third party revenue’ 
are noted most frequently as the risks it is least important to allocate to 
subcontractors or to insure.  Demand changes, other than in roads projects, 
are generally held by the public authority, which probably explains why this 
risk is one of the least important.
At interview another significant risk is reported by some financiers. 
This is the life cycle risk which remains with the private sector over the long 
term, and may affect the risk profile of the project in the future: 
The private sector has priced what it thinks the fabric of that 
building will require, how much money it will require to keep it 
running at a standard that has been agreed with the public sector.  
It may say there should be no scratches on that wall, that carpet 
should not show wear and tear and they are pricing that on day 
one.  So if you take the very first transactions and we are only ten 
years into thirty years, only now are we able to see if there has been 
enough put aside to pay for those repairs and renewals and that risk 
is definitely a private sector risk.  We can’t go back to the public 
sector and say, sorry we have under priced our lifecycle, can we have 
some money? The answer will be no.  So do I see the risk profile 
changing? If I do it will probably be through that lifecycle. (SD2)
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Table 5.17 Importance that the following risks are allocated to 
subcontractors and/or fully insured – ownership
Ownership % 1 and 2 % 3 and 4 N Mean Median SD Range
Uninsurable loss 
or damage to the 
assets
89.5 10.5 42 1.88 1 1.253 4
Public/third-
party liabilities 85.4 14.6 42 1.81 2 0.969 4
Government 
legislation/
regulation 
changes
85.0 15.0 42 2.02 2 0.975 4
Reputational 82.5 17.5 42 1.88 2 1.064 4
Technology 
change or 
obsolescence
76.3 23.7 42 2.29 2 1.195 4
Force majeure 64.9 35.1 42 2.52 2 1.254 4
Realisation of the 
residual value of 
assets
62.2 37.8 42 2.50 2 1.366 4
Key: 1 and 2 very important to important, 3 and 4 little importance to not important
Within ownership, consistent with the previous pattern the responses 
illustrate that all risks are ranked as important or very important.  Although 
the majority of respondents perceive it is important to allocate or insure 
‘realisation of the residual value of assets’ and ‘force majeure’ risks, over a 
third believe this is of little importance.
Tables 5.18 to 5.20 show the overall importance of four major risk 
categories during three phases of PPP projects.
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Table 5.18 Overall importance of risks – pre-financial close phase (%)
Risks
Pre-financial close
Most 
important Important
Less 
important
Least 
important Mode
Total 
responses
Design and 
development 66.7 25.6 7.7 0.0
Very 
important 39
Finance 35.9 43.6 15.4 5.1 Important 39
Operation 10.3 15.4 43.6 30.8
Less 
important 39
Ownership 5.4 10.8 27.0 56.7
Least 
important 37
During the pre-financial close phase, on a scale from most important 
to least important the risks are: design and development; finance; operation; 
and then ownership.  This pattern is repeated in the construction of 
infrastructure phase, although there are variations in the strength of 
perceptions.  During construction almost 80% perceive design and 
development as most significant.
Table 5.19 Overall importance of risks – during construction of 
infrastructure (%)
Risks
During construction of infrastructure
Most 
important Important
Less 
important
Least 
important Mode
Total 
responses
Design and 
development 79.5 17.9 2.6 0.0
Very 
important 39
Finance 25.6 46.2 23.1 5.1 Important 39
Operation 5.3 28.9 42.1 23.7
Less 
important 38
Ownership 2.8 13.9 25.0 58.3
Least 
important 36
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However, Table 5.20 shows a different pattern after construction is 
complete.
Table 5.20 Overall importance of risks – operational phase (%)
Risks
Operational phase
Most 
important Important
Less 
important
Least 
important Mode
Total 
responses
Operation 90.0 7.5 2.5 0.0
Very 
important 40
Finance 12.5 55.0 32.5 0.0 Important 40
Ownership 7.9 28.9 28.9 34.2
Least 
important 37
Design and 
development  0.0 12.5 35.0 52.5
Least 
important 40
During the operational phase, the order of importance is: operation; 
finance; ownership; and then design and development.  As expected, 
operation has attracted a huge response at the ‘most important’ level.
It is interesting to note that finance risk is the second most important 
risk category in each of these three phases of PPP contracts.
One risk related issue that did not feature in the questionnaire but 
emerges later in a follow-up interview is the risk associated with a breakdown 
in personal relationships: 
I had to go to the public sector body last week and have a very long 
conversation with their senior guy in which I said, and he got upset, 
the reason that I am here is to get some common sense into the 
process because it was being obscured by personality issues. (SD8)
Ultimately the legal documents and possibly arbitration are used 
to resolve conflict between parties in PPP contracts, but a number of 
interviewees speak of the importance of trust in conflict resolution.  If trust 
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does not exist, the danger is that people take a literal interpretation of the 
contract.  However, with trust a resolution may be achieved:
So the suggestion is that this project is going to cost more money 
than we thought it should, because the survey didn’t pick up X, 
so therefore you are going to have to pay for that authority and 
they (the procurers) are saying no that’s your risk... so it’s the trust 
thing. (CE7)
Table 5.21 identifies the numbers of respondents reporting their use 
of various methods to limit risk in the past five years: 
Table 5.21 Methods organisation used to limit risk in PPP over the past 
5 years
Methods of limiting risk Pre-operation Post-operation
Transferring risk to subcontractors 39 25
Insurance 31 35
Spreading risks through syndication 18 11
Transferring risk to public sector 18 8
Spreading risks through a portfolio of 
projects
17 21
Contract renegotiation 7 6
Securitisation 6 8
Sale before contract period expires 4 18
Others:  hedging 1 1
Total responses n=43 n=43
Mode
Transferring 
risk to sub-
contractors Insurance
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During the pre-operation stage, ‘transferring risk to subcontractors’, 
and ‘insurance’ are the most popular methods used to limit risk by 39 and 
31 of the 43 respondents respectively.  During the post-operation stage, the 
same two methods are most commonly used although more respondents cite 
‘insurance’ than ‘transferring risk to subcontractors’ in this stage.  ‘Contract 
renegotiation’ and ‘securitisation’ are not commonly used in either stage.
Although insurance is a common means of mitigating risks, at interview 
concerns were raised that some risks can not be fully insured.  The following 
example relates to the difficulty of extending a normal schools’ insurance 
policy to cover visiting pupils:
They (insurance companies) are willing to provide insurance 
generally, but its extensions that’s the problem.  For example, cover 
for international students in schools may not be available – they 
may not be prepared to cover that risk... you are basically not 
insured. (CE7)
For the small number who did use securitisation, the reasons are shown 
in Table 5.22.
Table 5.22 Reasons for securitising PPP projects
Reasons Number
To realise capital for reinvestment 4
Increase liquidity 3
Private partner request 3
Increase profitability 2
Reduce interest charges 1
Reduce risk exposure 1
Smoothing of returns 1
Total responses n=8
Mode
To realise capital for 
reinvestment
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The extent of and the reasons for refinancing and equity sales of PPPs 
are shown in Tables 5.23 and 5.24 respectively.  
Table 5.23 Percentage of PPP projects refinanced and/or sold on in the 
last 5 years
Refinanced or sold on Refinanced (%) Sold on (%)
None 22.2 19.3
1% to less than 10% 30.5 22.1
10% to less than 20% 11.1 16.7
20% to less than 30% 13.9 5.6
30% to less than 40% 11.1 2.8
40% to less than 50% 0.0 5.6
50% to less than 60% 0.0 2.8
60% to less than 70% 0.0 2.8
70% to less than 80% 5.6 5.6
80% to less than 90% 0.0 0.0
90% to 100% 5.6 16.7
Total (n=36 refinanced & sold on) 100.0 100.0
Mode 1% to less than 10% 1% to less than 10%
The data reveal that more than half the respondents have refinanced 
less than 10% and sold on less that 20% of their PPP projects.  Interestingly 
however, a small number of organisations have refinanced and sold on the 
vast majority of their projects.  It is also noteworthy that while only some 
11% have refinanced more than 50% of projects some 28% have sold on 
more than half.
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Table 5.24 Reasons for refinancing or selling on your equity in PPP 
projects
Reasons Total
Number
refinanced
Number
sold on
Increase your return 29 18 11
Increase your liquidity 24 7 17
To take advantage of lower borrowing costs 14 14 0
Other private sector partner request 12 5 7
To manage your risk portfolio 11 3 8
To lower risk profile of project being refinanced 4 3 1
Smoothing of returns 3 2 1
Public sector partner request 2 1 1
As a result of contract renegotiations 2 2 0
Others 3 0 3
Total responses n=36 n=36 n=36
Mode
Increase 
return
Increase 
liquidity
At the time the questionnaires were received, the primary reasons for 
refinancing projects are to ‘increase return’ and ‘to take advantage of lower 
borrowing costs’.  The primary reasons for selling equity are to ‘increase 
liquidity’ and ‘increase return’.  
However, an interviewee indicates that in the current credit crunch 
market conditions, there is not much opportunity to refinance projects and 
the cost of refinancing is also expensive:
I have to say that the competitive pressure of these transactions from 
a financing point of view on pricing means that they have already 
been priced very, very finely.  And I do not see a huge opportunity to 
refinance in the future.  Take my school’s example at 60 basis points, 
where do you go from there? I guess there is not much margin for 
refinancing.  The cost of refinancing is an expensive exercise, with 
lawyers involved, with running financial models, and the question 
is, is it worthwhile for the private sector and the public sector, doing 
a refinance on a project by project basis. (SD2)
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Finally, in this section of the questionnaire examining attitudes to risk, 
respondents are asked to agree or disagree with a series of statements, which 
are summarised in Table 5.25.
Table 5.25 Attitudes to risk
Panel A - Statements with which the majority agree
Statements
% 
agree Neutral
%
disagree N Mean Median SD Range
Over the last 
four years the 
amount of risk 
transferred 
from the 
public sector 
to the private 
sector has 
increased.
80.4 9.8 9.8 41 3.88 4 0.812 5
Most projects 
would not go 
ahead without 
a direct 
agreement 
between 
the senior 
debt holders 
and the 
government.
75.0 2.5 22.5 41 3.80 4 1.400 5
When 
entering into 
a PPP project 
we intend to 
see the project 
through until 
the end of the 
contact.
67.5 15.0 17.5 41 3.80 4 1.269 5
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Table 5.25 Attitudes to risk (Cont.)
Panel B - Statements with which the majority do not agree
Statements
% 
agree Neutral
%
disagree N Mean Median SD Range
We prefer to 
renegotiate the 
terms of the 
standard PPP 
contract.  
37.9 29.7 32.4 39 3.21 3 1.196 5
Most projects 
would not go 
ahead without 
an implicit 
guarantee by the 
government.
35.9 28.2 35.9 39 3.10 3 1.294 5
Most projects 
would not go 
ahead without 
an explicit 
guarantee by the 
government.  
28.2 20.5 51.3 40 2.80 2.5 1.265 5
The transfer of 
risks is not always 
agreed upon until 
after the PPP 
contract has been 
awarded.
26.8 4.9 68.3 41 2.32 2 1.213 5
Once the 
construction phase 
has ended a PPP 
project is a very 
low risk.
24.4 24.4 51.2 41 2.71 2 0.955 5
It is possible to 
transfer some 
of the risks of 
a PPP back to 
the public sector 
after a project is 
negotiated
22.5 7.5 70.0 40 2.20 2 1.137 5
We securitise 
most of our PPP 
projects
12.5 25.0 62.5 41 2.98 3 1.877 5
It is often unclear 
who bears what 
risks in a PPP 
project.
2.4 7.3 90.3 41 1.88 2 0.640 5
Key: Agree refers to agree and strongly agree, Disagree refers to disagree and strongly disagree
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A significant majority of the respondents perceive that they are clear 
about where risk lies in PPP projects, that they have not overestimated risks 
historically, and that in recent times risk transfer from the public to the 
private sector has increased.   
While the majority of respondents believe that risks are not negotiated 
or passed back to the public sector after the contract has been awarded, it is 
interesting that about one quarter of respondents perceive some flexibility 
in these areas.
Two other issues of note will be examined further in chapter seven: 
the importance of a direct agreement between the senior debt holders and 
the procurer, noted by 75% of the respondents; and the intention of 67% 
to stay with the project.
Cost of capital
Tables 5.26 and 5.27 report information about targets for internal rate 
of return for equity investors and margins on debt, but response rates are 
lower than on many other questions.  
Table 5.26 Target internal rate of return (IRR) in the last financial year 
for equity finance
Target IRR %
Less than 6% 0.0
6% to less than 9% 10.3
9% to less than 12% 24.1
12% to less than 15% 51.8
15% to less than 18% 6.9
18% or more 6.9
Total responses (n=29) 100.0
Mode 12% to less than 15%
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Overall the results indicate that approximately three quarters of those 
who replied are reporting target internal rates of return at between 9 and 
15%.
Table 5.27 Average margin over LIBOR for debt, or spread over GILTS 
for bonds 
Margin over LIBOR, spread over GILTS %
Less than 20 basis points 4.2
20 basis points to  less than 40 basis points 4.2
40 basis points to less than 60 basis points 8.3
60 basis points to less than 80 basis points 25.0
80 basis points to less than 100 basis points 41.6
100 basis points or more 16.7
Total (n=24) 100.0
Mode 80 < 100 basis points
At the time of these responses about two thirds of those who chose to 
respond were reporting margins between 60 and 100 basis points, but at 
the later interviews as the credit crunch takes greater effect, respondents are 
reporting a range between 200 and 250 basis points on LIBOR.
However, at interview when asked to discuss expected rates of return, 
a typical response is that it is project specific:
I wouldn’t want to comment on that to be honest that is very project 
specific.  I would say that you would expect a lower rate of return 
for that simple schools deal transaction that I was talking about 
to what might be a prison transaction where you are taking more 
operating risk.  Within a certain margin there is some movement 
but it is not huge in PPP terms. (SD2)
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Financing criteria
Table 5.28 shows agreement or disagreement with statements about 
the decision to finance a PPP project.
Table 5.28 Factors that influence the decision to participate in a PPP 
project 
Factors 
% 
agree Neutral
% 
disagree N Mean Median SD Range
Familiarity 
with this 
industry
92.9 7.1 0.0 42 4.36 4 0.618 5
Considered to 
be profitable 90.7 7.0 2.3 43 4.21 4 0.675 5
We have 
engaged in a 
similar project 
before
90.5 9.5 0.0 42 4.24 4 0.617 5
Working with 
consortium 
members we 
have already 
worked with 
before
88.1 9.5 2.4 42 4.19 4 0.707 5
Invitation by 
a consortium 
member
80.5 12.2 7.3 41 3.85 4 0.727 5
Preference 
for certain 
geographic 
regions
74.4 20.9 4.7 43 3.86 4 0.743 5
Ability to trade 
in the equity 
or bond of our 
investments
48.7 28.2 23.1 42 3.48 4 1.215 5
A relatively 
small amount 
of private 
sector risks 
involved 
compared with 
our previous 
contracts
42.8 31.0 26.2 42 3.24 3 1.144 5
Decline in the 
number of 
available new 
PPP projects
35.7 38.1 26.2 42 3.02 3 1.000 5
Key: Agree refers to agree and strongly agree, Disagree refers to strongly disagree and disagree
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Reasons for choosing to finance a project include perceptions about 
profitability, organisational competence in terms of familiarity with the 
project type, the industry and a geographical region, and knowledge of 
consortium members.  The findings are mixed in terms of the impact of a 
decline in project pipeline on participation.  Ability to exit the industry is 
an influence for just less than half the respondents.
Respondents were also asked to provide unprompted information 
about the factors that influence decisions to invest in a PPP project.  The 
lists provided are extensive but there were some commonalities as follows:
Financial criteria:
•	 Internal rate of return (IRR) in particular relating to equity. 
•	 Return on equity.
•	 Equity payback period.
•	 Availability of debt finance.
•	 Financially strong subcontractors with healthy balance sheets.
Non-financial criteria:
•	 Reputation.
•	 Familiarity with industry and client relationships.
•	 Risk transfer to sub-contractors.
•	 Quality of and familiarity with the contractor.
•	 Availability of insurance for non-transferred risks.
•	 Good track records and prior experience of all parties involved in a 
project.
•	 Extent of standardisation in the contract.
•	 Compensation on termination.
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The role of private agents/consultants
The fifth and final section of the questionnaire examines the use of 
advisors and consultants, and the findings are shown in Tables 5.29 to 5.33.
Table 5.29 Extent of dependence on advice from third party advisors
Dependence 
on advisors
% 
agree Neutral
% 
disagree N Mean Median SD Range
Independent 
legal advisors 92.8  4.8 2.4 42 4.57 5.0 0.801 5
Independent 
insurance 
advisors
83.4  9.5 7.1 42 4.24 4.5 0.983 5
Independent 
technical 
advisors 
78.6 11.9 9.5 29 4.05 4.0 1.001 5
Independent 
financial 
advisors
73.2 14.6 12.2 41 3.98 4.0 1.151 5
Others 80.0 0.0 20.0 6 4.33 5.0 1.751 5
Key: Agree refers to agree and strongly agree, Disagree refers to disagree and strongly disagree
The majority agree that they are dependent on each of the four 
categories of advisor listed, but this is especially true of legal advice.  About 
one quarter do not agree that they depend on financial advisors.  In the 
others category, advice on project lifecycle costs and the relationship between 
revenue and traffic volume are noted.  
For each of four categories, respondents are asked to itemise two of the 
most significant due diligence items that advisors monitor on their behalf. 
Unprompted common responses are shown in Table 5.30.
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Table 5.30  The most significant due diligence items third party advisors 
monitor 
Financial Insurance
Integrity and sensitivity analysis of the 
financial model or model audit
Completeness and continuing availability of 
insurance cover
Cover ratios Uninsurable risks
Equity return Risks shared with the public sector
Funding structure Indemnities
Legal and contractual Technical
Passing risks through to subcontractors Adequacy of costs and prices
Legal compliance and documentation Appropriate identification and allocation of 
technical risks
Facilities management contracts Design and quality of materials
Termination provisions Adequacy of lifecycle provisions
TUPE
Indemnities
Responses to the legal and contractual and technical categories were 
especially varied.  Table 5.31 shows that advisors are perceived to be more 
expert than, and fill gaps in, the financiers’ in-house capabilities.  
Table 5.31 Reasons for employing independent third party advisors in 
PPP contracts (by number of respondents)
Reasons Number
They have more expertise than our company 33
We do not have in-house expertise in that area 31
To provide independent advice 28
To transfer the risks to them   8
To mitigate our reputational risk if things go wrong   7
To keep the bidding costs down as we only pay them on successful bids   5
To provide cheaper advice than in-house   2
Others   1
Mode
They have more 
expertise than 
our company
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As one interviewee explains:
At the end of the day bankers are bankers, we know our limits in 
terms of trying to provide finance.  I’m not the best man to tell you 
how much it would cost you to provide cleaning services to a school 
for 25 years, you know.  Or how much it would cost to repair or 
keep a school roof whole over the life of 25 years or what the life 
cycle budget should be in relation to that.  So you definitely do rely 
a lot.  Well I’d go as far to say you couldn’t do one of these (PPP 
projects) without external advice. (CE6)
Deviation from the financial model, whether monitored in-house or 
independently, is likely to trigger action as Table 5.32 shows.
Table 5.32 Point of involvement at levels of deviations of operating 
performance from the financial model (%)
Point of involvement %
At less than 5% deviation from the financial model 39.5
Between 5% to 10% deviation from the financial model 44.7
Between 10 to 15% deviation from the financial model 7.9
Between 15% to 20% deviation from the financial model 2.6
After the award of penalty points or payment abatements 
by the public authority 5.3
Total (n=38) 100.0
Mode Between 5% to 10% deviation
The table shows that relatively tight control is maintained over 
projects, as deviation from the financial model by less than 10% will trigger 
intervention by over 80% of respondents’ companies.  It is noteworthy that 
only a small percentage of respondents identify the award of penalty points 
as a trigger for action.  
The final question asks respondents to agree or disagree with two 
statements about their advisors, as shown in Table 5.33.
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Table 5.33 Agreement or disagreement with statements about advisors
Statements
% 
agree Neutral
% 
disagree N Mean Median SD Range
The advisors’ 
reports are 
useful in 
managing/
mitigating 
operating risks 
in PPP
80.0 15.0 5.0 40 3.90 4 0.709 5
Costs of 
monitoring 
PPP by third 
party private 
agents have 
increased
52.6 39.5 7.9 40 3.68 4 0.944 5
Key: Agree refers to agree and strongly agree, Disagree refers to disagree and strongly disagree
Eighty percent agree that advisors’ reports are useful in managing/
mitigating operating risks in PPP.  Over half also agree that costs of 
monitoring are increasing, but a significant proportion record a neutral 
response to this proposition.  
Summary
This chapter reports the findings from 43 respondents to the 
questionnaire, most of whom invest equity and subordinated debt, and about 
a third of whom provide senior debt or bonds.  Their general characteristics 
may be summarised as follows:
•	 Typically they finance relatively small numbers of projects, and hold 
less than 30% of the total equity or debt in the SPV.
•	 About 60% of equity investors and 48% of debt providers expect to 
finance a PPP for more than 20 years, but about one fifth expect to 
finance projects for less than five years.
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•	 Two thirds operate specialist PPP units and assess their performance on 
profitability, but many were reluctant to report performance indicators. 
A wide range of factors are classed as very important or important by 
all financiers when assessing risks.  Attitudes to risk may be summarised 
as follows:
•	 The majority report that most design and development, operations 
and ownership risks listed in the questionnaire should be allocated to 
subcontractors or insured.
•	 The importance of risk factors varies depending on the stage of the PPP 
project.  Design and development is most important pre-financial close 
and during the construction phase.  Unsurprisingly, operations risks are 
of most importance after construction is complete.
•	 Respondents state they have a clear idea of who bears risk in PPP 
projects.
•	 Respondents perceive that more risk has been transferred from the public 
to the private sector in the last four years.
•	 About one quarter of respondents perceive it is possible to transfer 
risks back to the public sector after the project is negotiated or that risk 
transfer may not be agreed until after the contract is awarded.
Refinancing and equity sales are generally reported as not very common 
but are undertaken mainly to increase return on investment or liquidity. 
However, only 67% agree that they intend to stay with a PPP project until 
the end of the contract.  In the last five years some 28% of respondents 
report selling more than half their projects, compared to just 11%, who 
have refinanced more than half.  Essentially, PPP deals need the direct 
agreement between the senior debt holder and the procurer to proceed, 
and contractor performance that deviates from the financial model by less 
than 10% triggers intervention by financiers.
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The most commonly used financial decision criteria include return on 
investment, return on equity and payback period.  Commonly used non-
financial decision criteria include impacts on reputation, and familiarity with 
the industry, the project type and the consortium members.  Respondents 
depend upon a range of independent advisors, whose reports they perceive 
to be useful in managing risk, but just over half the respondents believe the 
costs of third party monitoring by advisors has increased.  
The next chapter introduces the case studies and examines risk mainly 
from the perspective of the public sector PPP partners.

6the case studies: illustrating Public sector PercePtions about risk
Introduction 
Drawing on interview based evidence, this chapter addresses the fourth 
research question posed in chapter one: how do the financiers’ perceptions 
of risks differ from those of their public sector partners? 
The focus is on specific case studies of PPPs in five sectors: transport, 
health, education, housing and prisons.  The first three have been chosen as 
these are the three largest sectors in terms of capital expenditure.  The cases 
include a road and two schools projects in Northern Ireland, and a hospital 
project in Scotland.  Studies of an English housing case and a Scottish prison 
offer the opportunity to investigate two sectors that have attracted little 
attention either in the public domain or in the literature on PPP.  Table 
6.1 shows the values of signed PPP deals in the UK as at November 2008.
Table 6.1 Signed PPP deals as at November 2008 by sector
Sector £m %
Transport      23,448.88 37
Health      12,129.29 19
Education        9,055.48 15
Defence        8,725.33 14
Other        9,447.05 15
Total      62,806.04 100
Source: HM Treasury (2008), PFI statistics, compiled from http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/
ppp_ppp_stats.htm, accessed 20th  April 2009.
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This chapter:
•	 Provides some background information on each of the five chosen 
sectors.
•	 Describes each of the cases, and presents the structure of the companies 
and the legal contracts involved in the PPP.
•	 Identifies three commonalities about perceptions of risks amongst 
public sector interviewees across the five sectors relating to: demand 
risk; flexibility and affordability; and the impacts of risk on service users.
Sectoral background and the case studies 
This section presents some background information about each of the 
five sectors and the case studies.
Background to the roads sector
As Table 6.1 shows, transport is the largest spending department with 
£23.4bn signed deals, which represents about 37% of total PPP capital 
expenditure since the policy’s inception.  By way of context, this total capital 
expenditure, as Table 6.2 shows, is broadly equivalent to current annual 
transport spending estimates.  
Table 6.2 UK transport spending*
£Billion
Estimate (£ bn) Projections (£ bn)
2007-8 2008-9 2009-10 2010-11
20.0 21.9 22.5 23.7
*UK transport measured with international definitions from the UN classifications of the 
functions of government (COFOG).  
Source: HM Treasury http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/pbr_csr07_completereport_1546.
pdf, accessed 20th April 2009.
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Within transport, as of November 2008, the total value of signed 
projects in the roads sector was £2.9bn (HM Treasury, 2008).  These are 
largely design, build, finance and operate (DBFO) contracts.  
The early road schemes were paid for by shadow tolls, a system designed 
by the then government’s advisors, Price Waterhouse, to allay the private 
sector’s fears that direct tolls would arouse political opposition, thereby 
endangering the policy of creating a private road-operating industry (Glaister 
et al., 1998).  In these early schemes the payment mechanism was a volume 
based shadow toll, paid by government rather than the motorist.  But 
more recent schemes also include payments based upon road availability, 
performance, safety and congestion management.  
The roads case study project forms part of Northern Ireland’s scheduled 
£20 billion investment strategy for 2008-2018.  The Strategic Investment 
Board (SIB) intends this investment to be a sustainable programme of 
capital investment in transport, education, health, housing and water over 
the next 10 years (Strategic Investment Board, 2008).  
There are two DBFO packages in Northern Ireland: 
Package 1 – this includes: the maintenance of 44 km of motorway and 
capital works with an estimated overall value of £118m; and the maintenance 
of 117km of motorway and dual carriageway and capital works with 
an estimated construction value of £225m (HM Treasury, 2008).  The 
improvements have been identified as key to fulfilling the Department for 
Regional Development Roads Service’s Regional Transportation Strategy. 
When completed, the projects are intended to ease traffic problems at key 
locations and provide significant enhancements to the Strategic Transport 
Network as a whole.  Furthermore, project objectives include increasing 
the prospects for economic growth in the region, and providing benefits 
in reductions in delays, congestion, pollution and accidents, for both road 
users and non-road users.
Package 2 – this is worth £225m and is for the design, build, finance and 
operation of five separate schemes, which involve: new build of a link road, 
a road extension and new dual carriageway; improvements to existing single 
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carriageways and motorway bridges; and the installation of motorway 
communications equipment (HM Treasury, 2008).  The Northern Ireland 
Road Services Agency maintains close contact with its counterpart in 
England – the Highways Agency – and uses its standard form of contract, 
rather than that developed by the SIB, as it was deemed more relevant to 
the sector.  In roads projects, the whole service is provided by the private 
sector, unlike schools and hospitals where core services are retained by the 
public sector.  Figure 6.1 shows the structure of the project in terms of the 
contracting parties.
Figure 6.1 The roads case 
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The Amey Lagan Ferrovial Agroman (ALF) consortium was appointed 
as provisional preferred bidder for the project in December 2006, and 
reached financial close in December 2007.  The contract period is due to 
run to March 2011.  The parent organisation Ferrovial, one of the largest 
contracting companies in Spain, specialises in integrated infrastructure 
management.  Amey Ventures, which is predominantly UK based, heads up 
the group’s UK PPP projects, and states that it exists to deliver and improve 
services to the public by supporting both public and private organisations 
(Amey, 2009).  Whitemountain Investments is part of the Lagan group, 
which describes itself as one of the largest building materials, engineering and 
construction groups in Ireland (Lagan, 2009).  Within the consortium, the 
construction work will be undertaken by a joint venture between Ferrovial 
Agroman Ireland and Lagan Construction.  Amey will be responsible for 
operations and maintenance.
The project was financed primarily through bond finance.  The total 
bond amounted to £146,423,000 and has an interest rate of 2.267% which 
is index linked (Ambac, 2007; Ashurst, 2007).  Ambac Assurance is the 
financial guarantor, and Société Générale and RBC Capital Markets were 
joint lead managers.  The European Investment Bank has provided a senior 
loan of £121,055,000, and SMBC Equity has provided a mezzanine loan 
of £17,549,514 (Ambac, 2007; Ashurst, 2007).  A unitary payment of 
£29m is expected to be made for the first time in the period 2011/2012 
(HM Treasury, 2008).
In relation to the following cases, it is possible to identify a number of 
organisations that provide advice to each of the public and private sector 
partners from the Partnerships UK database.  However, this database does 
not include any such information about the first case study above.
Background to the hospitals sector
Health is the second largest PPP spending department with £12.1 
billion signed deals, representing about 19% of total PPP capital expenditure 
since the policy’s inception.  
Before 1997, effectively all NHS investment was financed by 
government borrowing, which was subject to an annual cash limit. 
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Thereafter, cash limits do not apply if investment is financed by the private 
sector, creating a strong incentive for NHS managers to seek PPP finance 
(Sussex, 2003).  Since 1997, publicly financed investment has been mostly 
devoted to small schemes, including refurbishments, whereas PPP is 
concentrated on larger, new-build investments (Sussex, 2003).  NHS PPP 
deals cover only the building and non-clinical services, not core activities. 
The public sector retains demand risk.  
Our case study is located in Scotland, where there are two important 
differences compared to the rest of the UK.  Firstly, health expenditure 
per person in Scotland is significantly more generous than the average for 
the UK, for example, it outstrips England by some 20% per person, so 
that Scotland is described as enjoying European levels of health funding 
(Kemp, 2002).  As at November 2008, the value of signed PPP health deals 
in Scotland was £1.1 billion (HM Treasury, 2008).  Secondly, in Scotland 
the NHS health board pays the PPP unitary charge from the health board’s 
revenue budget, which is the same part of the budget used to fund clinical 
services.  This distinction from the rest of the UK places more emphasis 
on the affordability of PPP, since its costs are more likely to impact on 
clinical services.
The health case involves a new build on a greenfield site, where it 
‘excited considerable public interest’ (Scottish Executive, 2006, p. 1), because 
it will provide a 30 bed low secure and a 44 bed medium secure facility for 
mentally disordered offenders (Scottish Executive, 2006).
The capital value is £17.9 million (Partnerships UK, 2009).  In hospital 
projects the unitary charge, which for the case study was forecast as £3.9 
million, is usually fixed for the period of the contract, with an annual uplift 
for inflation.  The services element may vary as a result of benchmarking/
market testing every five or seven years.  An important feature of this case 
is that there is no competition as the project attracted only one bidding 
consortium led by Balfour Beatty and Canmore Partnerships.  To simulate 
a competitive environment, a shadow bid was prepared by Ernst and Young, 
a leading firm of chartered accountants.  The structure of the PPP contract 
is as follows:
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Figure 6.2 The health case
  20%  Equity  40%   40% 
  Project agreement   Loan agreement 
Facilities management       Construction 
agreement          contract 
Public Sector 
Procurer
Dexia Public 
Finance Bank 
Special Purpose 
Vehicle
Parsons
Brinkerhoff
Holding Company 
UME Investment 
Co.  Ltd. 
Quayle Munro Canmore 
Partnerships
Balfour Beatty 
According to its response to the Scottish Futures Trust consultation 
document (Canmore, 2007), Canmore Partnerships is a Scottish based 
specialist promoter of public use infrastructure projects in which the public 
sector continues to provide core services: hospitals, colleges and schools. 
UME describes itself (UME, 2009) as a planner, manager, developer, 
commissioner and operator of hospitals in 23 countries including the UK. 
It acts as an investor and health advisor and has been instrumental in the 
development of PPP.  Quayle Munro is an Edinburgh based independent 
merchant bank, involved in PPPs both as investor and adviser.  It is the 
consortium’s financial adviser and will administer the project company.  
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The public sector was advised by financial, legal and insurance 
specialists, and received advice from Currie and Brown, an international 
asset management and construction consultant firm, for other services. 
The private sector was advised by legal, financial, technical and insurance 
specialists (Partnerships UK, 2009).
Background to the education sector
In education, there are now some £9 billion of signed PPP deals: in 
England £5.2 billion, Scotland £3.2 billion, Northern Ireland £0.5 billion, 
and £0.1 billion in Wales (HM Treasury, 2008).  To provide some context, 
total UK education spending estimates are shown in Table 6.3.
Table 6.3 UK education spending*
£Billion
Estimate Projections
2007-8 2008-9 2009-10 2010-11
Total UK education 77.7 81.8 86.1 92.0
UK education as a proportion of 
GDP (%) 5.5 5.6 5.6 5.6
*UK education measured consistently with international definitions from the UN 
classifications of the functions of government (COFOG).  Actual outcomes are subject to 
spending decisions by local authorities and devolved administrations.  These figures reflect 
HM Treasury’s latest indicative assumptions on the expenditure of local authorities and 
devolved administrations.
Source: HM Treasury http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/pbr_csr07_completereport_1546.
pdf (accessed 20th April 2009).
While the impact of the recent financial crisis on PPP procurement 
is still unclear, there is evidence from the National Audit Office that in 
England, previously announced targets under the Building Schools for the 
Future programme (BSF) are not being met, and that forecasts have been too 
optimistic especially in difficult market conditions (NAO, 2009).  In these 
circumstances, it is interesting that in a variation to other PPP contracts, 
BSF was designed to involve public sector as well as private sector equity.  
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The two case studies are located in Northern Ireland, where education 
is administered by five Education and Library Boards and the Council for 
Catholic Maintained Schools (CCMS).  One case study is currently managed 
by CCMS and the other by an Education and Library Board.  However, 
this will change with the creation of a new organisation, the ‘Education 
and Skills Authority’ in January 2010.  
Local education authorities are primarily responsible for preparing 
investment proposals (or economic appraisals) and establishing priorities 
for their respective geographical area.  Proposals are submitted to the 
Department of Education Northern Ireland for inclusion on a ‘Schools 
Capital Priorities Planning List’, and eventually on a ‘Contenders List’ 
(DENI, 2002).  The SIB works closely with the government departments 
since education forms part of its overall sustainable investment strategy, and 
it will be responsible for taking forward and supporting the building and 
refurbishment of over 100 schools across Northern Ireland in the period 
2008-2011 (Strategic Investment Board, 2008).
This investment aims to address the huge backlog of building work 
estimated at 100 projects, with construction costs of £500 million, which the 
government has argued cannot be addressed by conventional procurement 
means alone.  The first two tranches of this investment include 17 projects 
to be funded under conventional procurement (13 primary, 2 special and 
2 post-primary schools), with a combined capital value of £62 million, 
and up to 8 secondary school projects with a total capital value of £70 
million, funded as PPP projects subject to VFM being achieved (Strategic 
Investment Board, 2008).
The first school case involves the design, construction, maintenance and 
operation of two new schools.  The project was announced in November 
2002 and the contract was signed in 2006.  The two schools became 
operational in February and April 2008.  The capital value of the contract is 
£34.7 million and annual unitary payments, which may fluctuate depending 
on inflation rates, are expected to be £4.4 million commencing in 2009/2010 
(HM Treasury, 2008).  The structure of the PPP contract is as follows:
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Figure 6.3     The first school case
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Hochtief PPP Solutions is based in Essen Germany, with business 
units in several countries including the UK.  As a member of the Hochtief 
Group, in which it describes itself as the competence centre for PPP, it 
focuses on roads and social infrastructure (Hochtief, 2009).  Barclays 
Private Equity Ltd.  is a division of Barclays Capital and ultimately a wholly 
owned subsidiary of Barclays Bank plc.  It describes itself as one of Europe’s 
leading mid-market private equity investors, having raised in excess of £1 
billion across five PPP dedicated infrastructure funds (Barclays Private 
Equity, 2009).  These funds include both primary market investment in 
new development and secondary market investment in operational projects 
(Barclays Private Equity, 2009).  McLaughlin and Harvey is a building and 
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civil engineering contractor, describing itself as one of the largest in Northern 
Ireland (McLaughlin and Harvey, 2009).
The public sector was advised by financial, legal, technical, professional 
indemnity and insurance specialists, and the private sector by legal and 
financial specialists (Partnerships UK, 2009).
The second school case involves the design, construction, finance, 
maintenance and operation of school accommodation and related services. 
The PPP contract was advertised in December 2003, signed in September 
2006, and the school was opened in August 2008.  As is common in schools 
contracts, demand risks remain with the public sector which is also holding 
risk associated with any contractual changes arising from expansion of pupil 
numbers or changes in the curriculum.  The capital value is £31 million 
and the unitary payments which commence in 2009/2010 are expected to 
amount to £4.1 million per annum (HM Treasury, 2008).  The structure 
of the PPP contract is as follows:
Figure 6.4 The second school case
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Interserve plc is a support services group with capabilities in design 
and construction, engineering and facilities management (Interserve, 2009). 
Two group companies have interests in this project.  Interserve Investments 
will manage the group’s equity investment in this PPP, and Interserve 
Facilities Management Ltd., which has experience at three other Northern 
Ireland education PPPs, will provide facilities management services worth 
approximately £16 million over the contract’s 25-year lifetime.  O’Hare 
and McGovern is a chartered building company, describing itself as one of 
Ireland’s leading construction companies (O’Hare and McGovern, 2009).
The public sector was advised by financial, legal, technical and insurance 
specialists, as was the private sector (Partnerships UK, 2009).
Background to the housing sector
As at April 2009, £1.7 billion of housing PPP projects have been 
signed in the UK, all of which are based in England (Partnerships UK, 
2009).  Again, to provide context Table 6.4 shows total housing expenditure 
estimates.
Table 6.4 UK housing spending
£Billion
Estimate Projections
2007-8 2008-9 2009-10 2010-11
Housing UK* 12.0 12.5 13.1 13.7
Of which housing investment 8.1 8.7 9.1 9.5
Housing England 8.8 9.1 9.6 10.0
Of which housing investment 6.0 6.4 6.7 7.0
*UK and England Housing Community Amenities measured consistently with international 
definitions from the UN classification of the functions of government (COFOG).  Actual 
out-turns are subject to spending decisions by local authorities.
Source: HM Treasury http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/pbr_csr07_completereport_1546.
pdf (accessed 20th April 2009).
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This sector is less mature than the three larger sectors.  In the early days 
of PPP, statutory requirements in this sector imposed certain contractual 
restrictions that might have prevented or inhibited its use, especially where 
the scheme was a Housing Revenue Account (HRA) PPP.  For example, 
the Housing Act 1985 has provisions about the delegation of housing 
management, and the Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 has requirements 
about obtaining quotations for maintenance work on leasehold dwellings, 
which are not consistent with the use of PPP.  However, in 1998 local 
government capital funding regulations were relaxed to allow PPP to be 
used for refurbishment projects involving HRA land (Knox et al., 2003). 
One issue that remains is that contracts must accommodate the withdrawal 
of some houses from the PPP if tenants exercise their statutory right to buy 
a property.  
The housing case is located in London.  It involves the design, build, 
operation, maintenance and financing of a grouping of one extra-care 
sheltered housing unit and attached day facility, two resource centres for 
mentally frail older people and one resource centre for physically frail older 
people.  It comprises 40 extra-care housing units, 150 bed places, 120 day 
places and office accommodation for a one-stop dementia service with over 
50 staff (Partnerships UK, 2009).  Due to the nature of the accommodation, 
right to buy is unlikely to be a significant risk in this project.
The capital value of the project is £43.72 million.  It forms part of 
the Department for Communities and Local Government’s third round of 
social housing, which is also funded by the Department of Health’s social 
care PPP programme.  The PPP structure is as follows:
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Figure 6.5 The housing case
50% Equity 25% 25%
Project agreement Loan agreement
Facilities management Construction
agreement contract
Public Sector 
Procurer Allied Irish Bank
Special Purpose 
Vehicle
Eldon Housing 
Association
Geoffrey Osborne 
Ltd.
Geoffrey Osborne 
Ltd.
Holding Company
Eldon Housing 
AssociationUME Group
Geoffrey Osbourne Ltd., one of the UK’s leading family owned 
construction civil engineering and property services companies (Osbourne, 
2009), designed and built the housing.  The contract’s facilities management 
will be delivered by Eldon Housing Association, the registered social 
landlord.  UME, whose interests are mainly in health care, is simply an 
investor in this project.  Allied Irish Bank provided two loans, one to the 
SPV and one to Eldon Housing Association, a registered charity, to provide 
its equity investment.  
The public sector was advised by financial, technical, professional 
indemnity and insurance specialists, and the private sector by legal, financial 
and insurance specialist, while Geoffrey Osbourne Ltd.  provided the 
technical advice (Partnerships UK, 2009).
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Background to the prison sector
The UK has been described as the second largest private correctional 
market in the world (GEO Group, 2004), behind the USA.  The 
government’s rationale for private sector involvement in prisons has been the 
spiralling costs of the prison system and the shortage of places (Coyle, 2007).
As at November 2008, there were 140 prisons in England and Wales 
under the responsibly of HM Prison Service (HM Prison Service, 2009), 15 
prisons in Scotland under the responsibility of the Scottish Prison Service 
(Scottish Prison Service, 2008) and three prisons in Northern Ireland 
under the responsibility of the Northern Ireland Prison Service.  Of these, 
11 prisons in England and Wales and two in Scotland are contractually 
managed by private companies such as GSL, Serco, Kalyx and G4S Justice 
Services.  As with roads, in prisons the private sector provides the full range of 
services, so that it employs all prison staff up to and including the Governor.
Although as in most other sectors the public sector retains demand 
risk, PPP in prisons has been somewhat controversial in the literature in 
both the UK and the USA, because it introduces the concept of prison as 
a marketplace, which will inevitably expand (Coyle, 2005).  In this sector 
there is significant political risk associated with under capacity.  
Our case study prison is located in Scotland, which spends about £340 
million per annum on prisons.  Estimates from the Scottish Consortium 
on Crime and Criminal Justice (SCCCJ) show that including the newest 
prison, Addiewell, Scotland will have 1,400 prisoners in private prisons by 
2009 (Coyle, 2007).  At a level of 17% of Scottish prisoners, this is well 
above international averages.  For example, the Prison Reform Trust estimates 
that prisoners in private facilities account for 11% in England and Wales, 
and 7% in the USA, although it does suggest that the Australian figure is 
also 17% (Prison Reform Trust, 2009).  
This position may change in the future.  Following the election of the 
SNP in 2007, consideration was given to the possibility of terminating 
the PPP prison contracts.  Ultimately it was decided to continue with 
Kilmarnock which opened in 1999, and Addiewell which opened in 
December 2008, as PPPs because of the complexity and prohibitive costs 
of terminating these projects.  But the procurement process for the planned 
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replacement prison at Bishopbriggs was suspended and the project was 
re-tendered on the basis of design and build only.
The prison case  involves the design, finance, build and operation of a 
700 place facility at a capital cost of £65 million.  The project is governed 
by the standard form of contract in SoPC3 guidance, and provides for a 
revision to the unitary payment based on a formula linked to RPI.  The net 
present value of the contract is £369 million, equal to about £15 million per 
annum over the 25 year term.  The structure of the PPP contract is as follows:
Figure 6.6 The prison case
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As in the second school case, two Interserve Plc group companies are 
involved in this case, one as an equity provider and the second Interserve 
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Project Services Ltd.  is the design and build contractor.  Although the Royal 
Bank of Scotland has announced its withdrawal from long term project 
finance, in March 2009 it reaffirmed its commitment to the UK PPP market 
and is to reorganise its PPP structure (Project Finance, 2009a).  The banking 
group is also the senior lender to this project.  The Sodexho group describes 
itself as committed to developing PPP, both as a facilities management service 
provider and as an equity investor (Sodexho, 2009).  Kalyx Ltd., a wholly 
owned subsidiary of Sodexho, is the operator for this project.  
The public sector was advised by financial, legal, technical and insurance 
specialists, and the private sector by legal, financial, technical, professional 
indemnity and insurance specialists (Partnerships UK, 2009).
The description of these five cases shows that the structure of the PPP 
arrangements is complex, so that the procurer needs to manage relationships 
with multiple organisations, and not just the single contracting entity, the 
SPV, which in practice is normally a shell company.  The procurers and 
the private sector also seek professional advice from a range of specialist 
organisations.  It is notable that many of the players in PPP describe 
themselves as leading organisations in their field.
This complex array of relationships is acknowledged by financiers. 
For example, E2 argues that it is important but sometimes difficult for his 
company to be close to the ultimate client, that is, the public authority, in 
order to fully understand the nature of the project.  
The next section of this chapter explores some perceptions of risks 
drawn from these cases.  As explained in chapter four, in order to protect 
the confidentiality of our interviewees, the following codes are used to 
identify their backgrounds.  Interviewees from banks or financial institutions 
providing mainly senior debt are coded SD 1–8, those from institutions that 
provide mainly equity are coded E 1–7, interviewees from organisations that 
provide equity but also are contractually responsible for the construction of 
the infrastructure or the provision of operating phase facilities management 
services are coded CE 1-8.  Finally, interviewees based in the public sector 
are coded PS 1-8.  
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Risk – A public sector perspective and potential impacts
This section examines risk issues from the perspective of the public 
sector interviewees, and considers some contrasting perspectives from the 
financiers.  Procurers often have quite limited experience of PPP, which is 
usually, but not always, gained in one sector.  They are likely to have gone 
down this procurement route through lack of alternatives, rather than 
choice.  The following comment is typical in terms of the selection of PPP 
as a procurement mechanism, although in other sectors there may never 
have been the prospect of public money for projects:  
We thought there was going to be conventional money... then 
it turned out that there wasn’t and you could say the centre 
(government) said you have to go the PPP route. (PS1)
In sharp contrast, the financiers tend to have experience of more 
deals across more than one sector as shown in Table 5.6 (see chapter five), 
although there may be a predominant sector of interest (Table 5.7), especially 
amongst equity investors who are also facilities management or construction 
contractors.  Consequently, at interview the financiers are typically able to 
draw on a wider range of experience than most public sector interviewees. 
Nevertheless, it is possible to identify some common attitudes to risk 
amongst the public sector interviewees and common concerns about risk 
across the five sectors, as well as some differences, even though the specific 
details may be sector dependent.  
Commonalities feature in terms of: 
•	 Managing demand risk, with the exception of the roads case where the 
private sector carries this risk.
•	 The need for, but perceived lack of, flexibility in contracts and in the 
use of buildings during the long operational phase of PPP contracts.
•	 Concerns about the impact of risk factors on service users.  
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Before examining each of these in turn, the next section first considers 
some implications of the lack of PPP experience amongst procurers.  
Inexperienced procurers
In 1999 the Treasury Taskforce (HM Treasury, 1999, p.1) launched 
the first version of its contract standardisation guidance to avoid ‘the 
pitfalls of the past’ and the need ‘to re-invent the wheel at considerable 
expense’.  This guidance, which is the outcome of some two years of work 
and consultation, is intended to be a practical toolkit for the public sector 
to deliver the best value to the taxpayer.  Its introduction, and subsequent 
revision to the current version launched in April 2009, represents a tacit 
admission of a lack of expertise in the public sector and the complexity of 
risk allocation identified by Ng and Loosemore (2007).  While the standard 
format allows for some items to be negotiated, the Treasury’s objective is that 
re-negotiation of the major standard contractual terms should not occur. 
The intention is that these standards are all inclusive, that is, if a risk can 
be identified it should be included.  
As Table 5.25 shows, just less than 40% of questionnaire respondents 
prefer to re-negotiate the terms in these standard contracts, while about 
one third do not.  In practice, interviewees from both sectors agree there is 
very little deviation from these contracts.  One reason for this is provided 
by a public sector interviewee: 
The standard school contract has been carefully balanced, and 
we don’t want to upset that balance and maybe inadvertently 
by changing one aspect of it, it has a knock-on effect to another 
aspect. (PS5)
Thus, the early lack of expertise in the public sector appears to have 
led to the standardisation of contract terms, even though the risk allocation 
may not be optimal (Quiggin, 2005).  
While public sector interviewees now recognise the importance of 
being a knowledgeable or ‘intelligent’ procurer (PS2), their continued 
perceived lack of PPP experience leads to frustration amongst the financiers, 
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especially in relation to their inability to understand basic banking practices 
(E2) and to write definitive project specifications.  The following quote is 
representative of a general conception:
We’re almost in the situation of saying we won’t do business with 
the Ministry... because they’re hard work.  They don’t know what 
they want, they don’t manage the process and they change things 
as you go along.  We’ve been bidding a project... for nearly four 
years because the Ministry... simply cannot get their act together... 
it’s costing us a fortune and what if we lose? (CE3)
The effect over time may be a loss of competition for projects perceived 
to be difficult.  A number of interviewees from construction and facilities 
management organisations argue that, because of the high bidding costs, 
they select carefully between projects before deciding to bid (PS1).  The 
publication by government departments of their forthcoming pipeline 
of projects assists this choice, and is in turn used by the public sector to 
encourage bids.
A further issue regarding inexperienced procurers is the perceived lack 
of seniority of project managers.  This is a source of frustration to contractors 
because it leads to decisions being overturned late in the negotiating process. 
Especially in hospitals there is a perception that projects, which are typically 
large and complex, are likely to be managed by an estates director, who 
lacks sufficient seniority:
Inherently on larger construction projects there is more of a 
likelihood of failing... It (a large hospital) needs an extremely 
sophisticated, excellent project manager, but his (estates manager) 
job is not procuring large infrastructure projects... and if you then 
look at his seniority within the Trust Board, the estates director 
will not be as senior as the medical director... and sometimes the 
estates person is not even on the main board. (E5)
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Smaller projects, especially those with separability of the component 
parts, create less risk:
We regard social housing, where you’ve got 1,500 dwellings, as 
fairly low risk as opposed to one great huge hospital.  If it starts to 
go wrong you’ve got one huge great hospital to finish, with social 
housing you’ve got so many units completed... it’s phased. (SD4)
A related issue is identified by CE3.  He argues that schools projects 
are ‘very, very simple’ especially if there is a strong Local Authority that 
takes decisions on issues like furniture for a group of schools, rather than 
allowing individual head teachers to make separate decisions.  That is, in this 
instance, a strong decisive procurer is preferred.  However, it is also the case 
that an overly knowledgeable procurer may not be desirable.  In relation to 
a project with very specific design requirements that the public sector has 
‘thought about very, very carefully, because that is a very particular service’ 
(PS6), this procurer believes that the private sector company has become 
frustrated by a lack of flexibility in negotiations, but he argues:
 
They tried to change it (the public sector design) without really 
understanding the process and without really understanding 
the service delivery requirements and I think that created some 
tension. (PS6)
Managing demand risk
In four of the five sectors, demand risk is retained by the public sector, 
because the private sector is unwilling to carry this risk.  The exception is 
the roads case, where many investors have significant experience both in 
the UK but especially abroad in holding traffic volume risk.  As one equity 
investor says in relation to the demand for social housing, ‘We wouldn’t 
take demand risk as in population’  (E1), and a banker expressed a typical 
sentiment in relation to hospital projects:
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Clinical is another area that banks avoid, we don’t want to get 
involved in patients and all that stuff.  Patient choice, for instance, 
would be another issue that’s coming up now.  If patients choose 
not to go to that hospital, the hospital’s not going to get the revenue 
– we don’t want to know about that. (SD4)
Consequently in four sectors, demand risk is a huge issue for the public 
sector, given the fixed and legally binding nature of the unitary charge over 
the long term.  
Holding demand risk implies the potential for under or over supply 
of services.  If there is under supply, there is potential for political damage 
since public services are intended to be of a universal nature, especially in 
sensitive services such as health, housing and education, or in the case of 
prisons where capacity shortages may lead to the early release of prisoners. 
However, interviewees deem lack of capacity to be a sector wide problem, 
requiring further investment.  Therefore this tends not to be an area of much 
concern to them; they are much more focused on the risks and performance 
of existing projects.  
The one exception is the prison service, where prisons are built with a 
core capacity, which can be expanded to meet need.  Such expansion tends 
to reduce the cost per prisoner place but implies overcrowding, which 
impacts on the quality of prisoner experience and especially opportunities 
for education and training, and increases the risk of prison incidents:  
There is risk associated with additional prisoner places... so there 
is heightened risk of taking and managing an overcrowded prison, 
but then there is a financial incentive to do so. (PS4)
From the perspective of most public sector interviewees, the greater 
concern is that actual demand might fall below that forecast for a PPP 
project.  In the health sector, this concept is a relatively new phenomenon 
caused by internal market reforms:  
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Ten years ago if you said to the Chief Executive of a Trust, do you 
think you will not have enough patients, he’d say are you mad.  
I always have too many patients, but my problem is treating the 
number of patients who keep coming. (PS6)
From the perspective of a private sector equity investor, concern about 
too few patients is a very real phenomenon amongst procurers, although it 
may have reduced over the past year:
They’re really quite concerned that they’re not going to have enough 
patients, they’re probably less concerned than they were a year 
ago, because a year ago there was more talk than there is now of 
compulsorily having to send a certain amount of their patients to 
the private sector.  At one stage it was thought that 30% of the 
patients, who currently go to a normal district general hospital, 
were going to have to go to the private sector – as it turned out the 
private sector didn’t actually have the capacity or the will to treat 
most of them – just a small political oversight. (E4)
The risk that PPP brings, in the event of low demand, is that the 
procurer will be forced to pay the unitary charges irrespective of use.  In 
this event there is a financial imperative to channel demand from elsewhere 
in the sector.  But such channelling of demand may distort provision of 
services throughout the geographical region, and may be politically sensitive, 
creating a new form of risk for the public sector (Edwards et al., 2004).  The 
school cases illustrate this in two ways.  
Firstly, the school trustees at one of the two cases are required to give 
a commitment that they will manage enrolment in schools over a wide 
geographical area, so that the PPP school is able to fill its capacity.  This 
explicitly is understood to mean that future builds might be reduced from 
their current size to enable the filling of the PPP school.  As this is known 
to be politically sensitive, discussions took place about acceptable travel 
distances for pupils, even before the school opened.  Similar sensitivities, 
about the length of family journeys to visit prisoners, were raised in the 
prisons sector.
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Secondly, the school cases also raise a further demand management 
issue around allocating pupils to schools to meet their religious affiliation 
needs – an especially difficult task in the context of Northern Ireland.  Like 
the grant maintained schools in England, Northern Ireland has a number 
of independent schools that are run by the board of governors with little 
input from outside.  One of these independents is bidding for a replacement 
school but is unlikely to be asked to manage its enrolment in the same 
manner as our case school because there is no other school affiliated to the 
same religion with which to manage the allocation of pupils.  This raises 
the spectre of inequality between schools:
As far as I’m concerned there is inequality in the system... we have 
raised this with the department because we need to get to a basis 
where everybody is being treated the same. (PS5)
Northern Ireland currently has no PPP housing projects but PS7, 
who has knowledge of housing development in the region, raises similar 
concerns about the allocation of tenants to houses in Northern Ireland, 
since tenants have strong preferences about geographical locations that are 
driven by religious affiliation.  
The English housing case also raises two issues around tenant choice 
and equity.  Firstly, while the private sector would prefer to house tenants 
with regular incomes than, for example, homeless emergency cases (PS3), 
for the sake of equity, as PS7 argues, ‘The accommodation policy has to 
have general requirements’.  Secondly, unlike the other sectors examined 
in this study where the service is free at the point of use, tenants pay rents 
that generate the SPV’s income, and therefore housing demand and tenant 
allocations must be managed to ensure that ‘rents don’t zoom up and down’ 
(PS3).  To manage these sensitivities, the council retains responsibility for 
allocation of tenants to houses.  Holding demand risk and managing pupil 
and tenant allocations are thus examples of the public sector holding political 
risks as Bing et al. (2005a) suggest.
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Flexibility and affordability
The nature of PPP creates the following two risks for the procurer in 
terms of the suitability of infrastructure, but mitigating these risks may have 
impacts on the affordability of the project.  
Firstly, in a PPP contract the public sector loses some ownership type 
control over the infrastructure, leading to conflicts between the new private 
sector owners and the users.  Relatively minor but important activities, 
perceived by the public sector as normal use of such buildings, create 
anxiety for the SPV:
The nurses in a ward cannot just go and get a nail and a hammer 
and knock a picture into the wall because it could be that there is 
a wire in there... it’s not their building, it’s ours... It sounds bad 
but actually it is the only way you can make sure these buildings 
are maintained. (E5)
A similar example is given in relation to potential damage to paintwork 
in schools caused by using Blue Tack to display pupils’ art (PS2).  
Secondly, over the long life of PPP contracts, the design of buildings 
may become obsolete, which necessitates a design that enables future 
flexibility of use so that buildings can be adapted to deal with change.  For 
example, the use of space might change between relatively easy to maintain 
office space and relatively expensive living accommodation in communal 
housing or clinical accommodation in hospitals.  As a senior procurer in 
education argues:
The building (a school) becoming obsolete is a real issue for us – so 
that was a risk.  The concept that you have a classroom where it’s 
60 square metres where 30 children sit, and they don’t really move 
away from their desks may become obsolete in the future, so what 
you need is much more flexible space, where you have more break 
out spaces, where you have bigger spaces... we also could try and 
make sure that we have suitable connections to IT to try and take 
account of some of that change, so it’s a big risk for us.  It’s a big 
risk that the schools could become obsolete. (PS2)
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In terms of building or road obsolescence, interviewees also focus on 
alterations that might be needed to satisfy future changes to law.  Non-
discriminatory changes in legislation may be held by the private sector, 
but are likely to be a shared risk.  In relation to buildings, interviewees are 
concerned about potential changes to reflect new requirements in relation 
to environmental impact, and in relation to roads, issues are raised about 
increases to weight limits on the size of heavy goods vehicles.  
Although being locked into a long term contract exacerbates this 
risk, it is not created by the nature of PPP alone, but is also attributable to 
centralised control at department level, exercised in two forms.  Firstly, in 
terms of cost, the Department of Education for example sets an expected 
cost for a given size of school, which ‘we can never exceed’ (PS2).  Secondly, 
in terms of design specifications, the education handbook for example 
establishes clear expectations about school and classroom design, and 
consequently limits the possibility for variations from standard.  Similar 
control occurs in the form of the Highways Agency’s standard roads manual, 
which Edwards et al. (2004) argue reduces the possibility for innovation. 
This multi-volume manual, which is adopted by the Northern Ireland Roads 
Service, establishes quite detailed expectations about both road design and 
quality of maintenance with the effect that:
The one thing I can say about roads is the whole way you build 
roads is very well structured, and it all comes from the Department 
of Transport and the Highways Agency... there is a standard set 
of rules... It is a fairly regulated sector, design, speeds, etc. (PS1)
In terms of suitability for continuing use and the potential costs of 
major re-design at some future date, E5 argues that especially for schools 
and hospitals, it may be cheaper and more effective to pull them down and 
rebuild after thirty years, rather than continuing to maintain them.  This 
may have impacts on the appropriate length of PPP contracts, which should 
not extend, E5 argues, beyond the life of the building.  This contrasts with 
the norm in the roads sector, where it is argued that ‘You cannot perceive 
that it (the road) won’t be required’ (PS1), and where roads are expected 
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to be handed back at the end of the contract with a considerable ongoing 
term of life expectancy.  
To mitigate these risks, public sector interviewees are clear that 
flexibility is an important aspect of the relationship with their private 
sector partners.  While this is not disputed in terms of finding solutions to 
specific problems, financiers have a different perspective about the value of 
flexibility when it applies to amendments to contract specifications, either 
during contract negotiations or after financial close.  
Financiers perceive sectors with high rates of current or potential 
future change as especially risky.  They argue that one of the benefits of 
PPP is that it forces the procurer to specify precisely what is required before 
financial close, thereby reducing costs.  Good advance planning avoids late 
amendments to contracts which tend to be expensive for providers and 
procurers alike.  Two equity investors (E5 and E6) explain that late changes 
are disproportionately expensive to manage in terms of the sequencing of 
construction activities, regardless of the method of financing:
Minor changes really hit the critical path, in the end you will find 
you will overrun on a 300 million project by 20%, you will be 50 
or 60 million overrun because of some relatively minor changes... 
but quite numerous minor changes. (E5)
Moreover, the involvement of senior debt holders and their advisors 
in PPP adds an additional complication to contract amendments whether 
made before or after financial close:
We have to talk to the lenders, the lender then gets his lawyer 
involved... and you almost reinvent the whole thing again... you’ve 
got to go back to the lenders before you can do anything, you’re 
actually not empowered in any way to manage the business in a 
way that normal business is managed – you’re managed by your 
creditors. (E2)
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From the perspective of these investors, the benefit of PPP is that, 
especially after financial close but sometimes during contract negotiations, 
the additional cost of such changes can be estimated.  The high cash cost 
may lead to a perceived beneficial outcome – the proposed change being 
dropped.  But, from the perspective of the procurer, dropping desirable 
changes may have disadvantageous impacts on the usefulness of the building, 
which is a potentially serious problem over very long contracts.  
The inevitable trade-off between flexibility and affordability is 
acknowledged in both public and private sectors.  Public sector interviewees 
stress there is a trade-off between flexibility and cost, which impacts on the 
affordability of projects, and that ultimately flexibility may be sacrificed 
because ‘affordability is key’ (PS4).
At the end of the day have we got something that is affordable? And 
that’s the important thing from my point of view. (PS6)
An equity investor (E2) indicates that evaluating and valuing flexibility 
is ‘the big unknown’, and CE5 explains that when choosing to bid for 
projects, his company tries to avoid procurers with over-ambitious projects 
that their budget cannot meet: ‘We look for clients that we think can afford 
the projects that they want’ (CE5).
Impacts of risk on service users
Impacts of risk on service users normally occur during the operational 
phase, but may arise during construction of, for example, housing if tenants 
need to be decanted, or if construction is taking place in close proximity 
to existing buildings.  
Public sector interviewees in the education and prisons sector identify 
a difference in perception between themselves and some private sector 
partners, in relation to risks that impact on service users, especially pupils and 
prisoners who might be perceived as vulnerable.  In education, PS2 argues 
that designers and financiers are ready to accept that certain problems might 
occur and that the appropriate action is to insure against any associated costs, 
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whereas his concern is that some problems should not occur at all, because 
children are involved.  He provides two such examples:
The first relates to the timing of construction work to ensure that 
children are not faced with taking examinations while noisy building work 
is ongoing:
You can take out insurance policies to protect yourself against 
parents suing you, but that is not the way to deal with it... you end 
up paying some parent a few quid for it, but the reality is you have 
messed up some 16 year old’s chance to do an exam, and all of that 
does for the rest of their life... so money doesn’t cure everything... 
the way to deal with it is to ensure the 16 year old who is doing 
the exam is not disrupted. (PS2)
The second example relates to the design of toilets in a school, where 
the impact on pupils could become evident in the operational phase:
I had an interesting conversation with a designer... We queried 
an element of what they were proposing on the basis of child 
protection and his answer was – don’t worry, my liability insurance 
will cover you if something did happen, and I said you can’t deal 
with child protection like that... if you go to court because some 
child has been upset or abused, the defence that I have in place 
an insurance policy is no defence at all because the child has been 
harmed.  Money doesn’t make the harm right. (PS2)
Thus, even where the risk legally lies with the contractor, the public 
sector may hold associated public relations or reputational risk.  In the event 
that a problem arises, there will be a financial penalty for the contractor, 
but the public relations risk does not transfer to the SPV.  Interestingly, 
the interviewee’s perception is that the construction contractor, who has 
experience of running health and safety on sites, understands the need for 
prevention much better than the designer and financiers, who are further 
removed from practice.  
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In respect of the operations phase of PPP, several interviewees note 
that prisons present complex issues, because in the UK the private sector 
provides the core service, including the prison officers and the custodial 
services, not just peripheral services as is usual in the other social sectors. 
Public sector concern is expressed about the capacity for and quality of prison 
officer training in the privately run prisons, although it is acknowledged that 
some private prisons are operated to good standards.  The risk perceived 
by the procurer is a loss of control over the quality of a service involving 
vulnerable prisoners, especially because the transfer of core services is not 
common elsewhere in Europe:
The models across Europe vary, but in most countries... they use the 
private sector to construct and to maintain the fabric of the facility, 
but they don’t usually provide the custodial operating services. (PS4)
Indeed a financier acknowledged, specifically in relation to prisons, 
that pay inflation over the long term could result in unfavourable changes 
to operating practices:
There is a lot more to the operational side and the performance 
mechanisms, and things that you can’t afford to get wrong, like 
letting prisoners out accidentally... and you are obviously taking a 
risk on the labour force’s remuneration over the next 25 years, that’s 
a pretty big risk... If you start losing money on the contract, you may 
try and cut corners... to manage that asset more efficiently. (SD1)
Furthermore, in the event of unacceptable performance or contractor 
failure, the specialist nature of prison concessions means that it may be 
difficult to find a replacement contractor quickly, increasing risk for both 
the public and private sector.  
The impact of risk factors on users in the roads sector is expressed in 
terms of the availability of the road and its condition, including its condition 
at the end of the contract.  The importance of availability has led to a change 
in the payment mechanism, which in the early UK roads PPP contracts was 
based exclusively on traffic volume.  Current pricing mechanisms, which 
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are intended to incentivise the contractor so that any disruption to the 
travelling public is minimised, are now also based, as in most sectors, on the 
availability of the infrastructure, because from the perspective of the public 
sector, ‘asset availability is a big issue’ (PS1).  The new pricing mechanism 
incentivises the scheduling of repairs outside peak times, and seeks to ensure 
that the road will be maintained in a serviceable state:
The road has to be kept to a serviceable state, fit for purpose to the 
users and if it falls below certain service ability limits, it is deemed 
to be not available and they (the contractors) won’t get paid. (PS1)
Summary
This chapter provides information about each of the six cases and 
some background to the sector in which the PPP is sited.  The chapter 
draws a distinction between the wider PPP expertise of the private sector 
interviewees and the typically narrower experience of the public sector 
interviewees.  It notes that while investors find dealing with inexperienced 
procurers frustrating, it may be the case that knowledgeable procurers exhibit 
independence that is also frustrating for contractors.
Chapter three notes that risks affect behaviour when their consequences 
are personally relevant (Williams et al., 2003), and when they materialise 
(Abednego and Ogunlana, 2006).  The empirics in this chapter, drawn from 
three large and two smaller PPP sectors, confirm these tendencies.  The 
standard contract is generally adhered to carefully by the public sector, and 
interviewees close to a specific project tend to focus on the management of 
risks they retain.  Although the details of PPP risks vary across the five sectors, 
there are commonalities about the significant risks from the perspective of 
the public sector procurers.  This chapter shows that:
•	 Demand risk is a significant risk for the public sector.
•	 Procurers especially focus on the potential costs of paying for services 
that are not required, and the consequent impacts on users elsewhere in 
the system, if there is lack of demand for PPP infrastructure or services.
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•	 Managing demand risk enables the procurer to control political risks 
associated with pupil and tenant allocations to schools and houses.
•	 Building obsolescence is a real concern over long term PPP contracts. 
The flexibility of infrastructure to meet changing service or statutory 
requirements over the long term is described as very important.
•	 Trade-offs between flexibility in contracts and affordability of the unitary 
charge may lead to the sacrifice of infrastructure flexibility.
•	 The public sector is concerned about the potential adverse impacts of 
risk factors on service users, especially vulnerable users.
•	 Private provision of prison services is considered risky in the operational 
phase because of the potential impacts of rising labour costs on the 
quality of prisoner experience.  
While many of these risk perceptions are acknowledged by the financiers, 
they also provide an alternative perspective.  Certain activities within 
buildings add to maintenance bills.  Changes to contract specifications, 
whether before or after financial close, are, they argue, disproportionately 
expensive and such cost drivers should be avoided, even though so doing 
reduces the flexibility of infrastructure use.  
While some private sector partners, such as financiers and designers 
who are remote from the physical activities of the project, may be content 
to insure against the financial costs of risks that crystallise, public sector 
partners and contractors prefer to avoid incidents and the attendant impacts 
on service users and employees.
The mini cases show that multiple parties are involved in financing, 
advising on and delivering a PPP project.  There is thus a complex structure 
surrounding the SPV and the procurer.  The next chapter further examines 
the implications of this structure.  
7transferring risk in PPP
Introduction 
An important rationale for PPP is that risk should be transferred from the 
public to the private sector but as chapter five reports, financiers indicate it 
is important that a wide range of risks are either allocated to subcontractors 
or fully insured.  That is, typically the financiers do not wish to hold these 
risks.  This chapter examines the diffusion of risk through the private sector 
companies and shows that:
•	 The typical organisational structure that surrounds PPP deals creates the 
need to diffuse risk through a network of private sector organisations.
•	 While a wide range of risks are modelled by parties to the deal, some 
risks are perceived as especially problematic because they are less well 
understood or hard to control over the long term life of PPP projects.
•	 PPP organisational structures create costs associated with project 
supports and risk mitigation measures that impact on the economic 
argument for risk transfer, both within the private sector and between 
the public and private sectors.
•	 An advice industry has grown up around PPP involving legal, technical, 
professional indemnity, insurance and financial services.
•	 During the credit crunch, refinancing has changed from an attractive 
and profitable option to a downside risk, and equity is under pressure 
to provide a larger proportion of financing.
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This chapter has four sections which examine:
•	 The diffusion of risk through the organisational structure of the private 
sector companies involved in the PPP deal.
•	 The risk modelling process.
•	 The implications of the diffusing of risk and discussion of some 
implications for risk transfer between the public and private sectors.
•	 The re-financing and sales of investments.
The final section summarises the chapter.    
PPP organisational structure and risk diffusion
Chapter six illustrates how the structural arrangements of PPP have a 
typical format, with four key elements.  A typical PPP structure is illustrated 
in Figure 7.1.
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Figure 7.1 A typical PPP structure
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DBA Construction
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Equity 2
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Holding Company
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Firstly, equity investment is made into the SPV, shown in box 1 of 
Figure 7.1.  Investment may be made by several equity investors.  For 
some their interest is purely in the financial return from the investment 
(hereafter equity investors), but others are also subcontracting companies 
(hereafter contracting equity investors).  These latter investors thereby 
have profit sources both from the construction or facilities management 
contract and from the financial return on their investment.  As indicated 
in chapter two the level of pure equity, as opposed to subordinate debt, is 
deliberately very low:
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In pure equity you are looking at really pinpoint stuff... because 
equity has such a huge demand in terms of returns and its influence 
on a bid. (CE2)
Secondly, the SPV signs a ‘Project Agreement’, a legal contract, with the 
public sector procurer, shown in box 2 of Figure 7.1.  The SPV is responsible 
for delivering the infrastructure and long-term service arrangements. 
Thirdly, the SPV signs a loan agreement to raise senior debt, shown in box 
3.  Senior debt is typically in the ratio of 90% senior debt to 10% equity. 
As such the SPV is:
Very thinly capitalised... you’ve only got 10% equity so when the 
project’s going swimmingly the upside is very strong, but when the 
project starts to go wrong it doesn’t take you long to burn through 
that 10%. (SD5)
Senior debt usually takes the form of either a bank loan or bond, 
the latter being especially cost effective for large projects.  However, bond 
financing pushes the burden onto the end of the payment period, which 
has been especially attractive to the NHS Trusts, because:
They resolve the immediate affordability problems in the short term, 
but all it means is you pushed the costs out for whoever’s paying 
taxes in twenty year’s time. (SD3)
This interviewee suggested that a cynical taxpayer might ask some 
serious questions as to whether index linked bonding is an appropriate way 
to fund a 30 year asset.
Moreover, a contracting equity investor expressed a preference for a 
bank as opposed to a bond partner because:
The bank has a more direct relationship... the credit agreement is 
more relaxed, they’re less demanding... bond holders are much more 
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remote... They tend to want it (information) quicker, they tend to 
want more and they tend to be less flexible. (CE3)
This point was confirmed by a banker, who argued that bondholders 
have no direct interest in the PPP project, only in the bond:
Bond investors are sitting in the Cayman Islands, you’ve got a 
couple of guys in South America, and they’re all over the place, you 
can’t get them together.  They’ve just invested in a fixed rate financial 
instrument, so those bond holders are not really knowledgeable or 
interested in PPP. (SD3)
Fourthly, since it is normally a shell company, the SPV will enter 
into a ‘Design-Build Agreement’ (DBA) with a construction contractor, 
shown in box 4, and contracts with the facilities management providers, 
shown in box 5.  These companies are likely to be related companies to the 
equity investors.  The DBAs are legally binding commitments to build the 
infrastructure and fulfil the service obligations of the project agreement.  Any 
of the contractors, but especially the construction company, may in turn 
have sub-contracting arrangements in place to fulfil their own obligations.
Whereas early Project Agreements were negotiated between the 
procurer and the SPV, the Treasury’s perspective (HM Treasury, 2006) is 
that mistakes were made and lessons learned.  Consequently, public bodies 
now follow standard contracts, although these may have variations to deal 
with regional and sector specific issues.  The standard contract, the current 
version of which is SOPC4, has evolved over time.  It is an important 
technique for controlling all aspects of the contractual relationship, but 
of special importance here it covers the allocation of risk.  Table 5.25 (see 
chapter five) shows that 80% of questionnaire respondents believe that risk 
transfer to the private sector has increased in the last four years and it is the 
perspective of some interviewees that the evolution of the standard contract 
has passed too much risk onto the private sector.  However, others argue 
that while the public sector tries to transfer as much risk as possible there 
is now a more balanced approach.
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Due to the number of private sector companies involved in the 
organisational structure, decisions must be made pre-financial close about 
specifically which of these companies is to hold each risk allocated to the 
private sector.  Crucially the contracting party in the private sector is the SPV, 
but as it is typically a shell company it does not have risk carrying capacity. 
Therefore risk must be held by the equity investors or the senior debt 
holders or must be passed through the web of companies to the contractors 
and subcontractors who actually fulfil the Project Agreement’s obligations. 
Alternatively risk may be allocated to a party that does not wish to carry it, 
in which case that party will seek to mitigate the risk.  Examples include 
inflation and interest rate risks, which are often mitigated by hedging.
In Tables 5.15 to 5.17 financiers typically indicate it was either very 
important or important that a wide range of risks were either allocated 
to subcontractors or fully insured, and in Table 5.21 these two methods 
are identified as the most common means of limiting the financiers’ risk. 
Moreover, in the credit crunch era the senior debt holders appear to have 
become more risk averse:
The risk has increased because of the attitudes of the banks... the 
risk in the deal hasn’t (increased) but the requirement in terms of 
corporate guarantees, bonding requirements in addition that the 
banks will require and the general scrutiny that they will demand... 
has increased the risk. (E5)
While such a risk averse position may be expected from senior debt 
holders, it is also evident, at interview, amongst the equity holders.  A 
contracting equity investor is very clear that his company wishes to pass on 
as much risk as possible:
We don’t want to be responsible for any of it (risk)... We pass on 
all our risks... Either it would go to the contractor, or it would be 
insured, or it would be council risk or (hospital) Trust risk... we 
deal with it as comprehensively as possible on the legal document. 
(CE4)
115transFerring risk in PPP
This may in part be driven by the typical 90:10 debt:equity financing 
ratio.  Under such a funding regime the perception is that there is little 
scope for equity to hold risk:
If you had a lot of risk sitting in there, there’s no way you’d be able 
to do a 90:10 transaction, you’d probably do 70:30, or 80:20, 
so you’re putting in more expensive equity and less cheaper debt.  
You can do 90:10, but it means that most of the risks – financial 
risks – have got to be hedged. (E5)
However, it is also the case that senior debt holders are clear that risks 
should not be held by SPVs because they do not have the capitalisation to 
deal with the PPPs’ risks.  
Rather, in order to protect the position of the senior debt providers, 
there should be:
A pass through of all the material commercial risks, from the SPV 
borrower to the subcontractors. (SD3)
That is, the financiers are interested in passing risk down the web of 
companies to the construction and facilities management contractors.  So, 
the next section examines the models and project supports used to ensure 
that risks do pass through the organisational structure and are retained by 
the contractors, rather than reverting up the supply chain.
Modelling risk 
As the PPP industry has matured, modelling of project risks, as well as 
cash flows, has become the norm.  Banks tend to do their financial modelling 
in house, since this is their core business, although other parties may use 
external advisors’ models.  Models may be generic project finance assessment 
tools or may be more specific to PPP.  Senior debt holders describe their 
models as globally applied throughout the bank, so that all project structures 
must fit the model, whereas several equity investors describe models that have 
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been built up from large databases that essentially capture the organisations’ 
history of PPP experience.  The modelling exercise is described as ‘massive’ 
by a senior debt holder (SD3), and by an equity investor (PE5) as ‘very long 
and huge but not particularly complex’.  
Models are regarded as confidential so that details cannot be provided, 
but interviewees suggest that an illustration of the risk factors considered in 
their models may be obtained by using the Moody’s rating agency website, 
which describes in some detail Moody’s PPP specific ratings methodology 
(Moody’s 2007a and b).  The Moody’s model is not a cash flow model, as 
it focuses on expected losses, but it is widely consulted and highly regarded 
in the industry and as such offers a useful insight into the risk factors likely 
to be considered in the financiers’ models.  
Moody’s rating methodology for PPP projects 
Moody’s publishes separate ratings methodologies for the construction 
and operations phases of PPP projects.  These are intended for use on 
accommodation projects and services that support civil engineering works, 
such as roads, but not for projects with complex operating requirements 
such as waste-to-energy plants or defence.
To determine construction risk, Moody’s adopts an analytical 
framework and a quantitative model designed to incorporate explicitly their 
assumptions about the following elements and their interactions:
•	 The likelihood of construction overrun.
•	 The value of parent guarantees from construction contractors.
•	 The benefit of financial supports, including performance bonds and 
letters of credit (Moody’s, 2007a, p. 1).
The quantitative model uses Monte Carlo simulations to model projects 
on an expected loss basis.  The simulation calculates the credit outcome 
for the assets in the portfolio for a large number of possibilities (Moody’s, 
2007a, p. 9), and combines this within a framework that incorporates aspects 
of construction that cannot be modelled but are likely to be critical to the 
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analysis.  The analytical approach is to describe the elements of construction 
in terms of their default and recovery characteristics.  A final credit rating is 
the result of a large number of simulations overlaid with qualitative factors 
reflecting each project’s unique characteristics (Moody’s, 2007a, p. 3).  
The model assumes that few PPP creditors wish to hold raw 
construction risk, which in credit terms is the expected loss on the stand-
alone project.  Thus the rating methodology examines the nature of the 
raw construction risk, differentiating between standard, medium and 
complex buildings and civil infrastructure projects, and the construction 
risk mitigation package.  The risk mitigation package incorporates one or 
more financial and performance supports: 
•	 Contract supports ensure the contractor absorbs over-run costs, any 
liquidated damages to the public sector and debt servicing costs 
during the over-run period.  The absorption of debt servicing costs is 
especially important as this improves the project’s credit rating.  The 
assessment covers both the contractor’s ability but also willingness to 
pay.  Interestingly, Moody’s note that a contractor offering an unlimited 
guarantee may be more likely to default in the case of a large cost over-
run.
•	 Performance/insurance based supports are essentially insurance policies 
written by multi-line insurers.  The critical feature from the lenders’ 
perspective is that such supports only pay compensation after a claim 
has been assessed and proved eligible, thus introducing the possibility 
of delay and/or non-payment.  The subsequent loss of value to a senior 
debt holder results in a deduction within the model.
•	 Liquid/financial supports commonly take the form of bank letters of 
credit, bank guarantees and demand deposits, on which draw down is 
perceived to be timely and unconditional.  To improve the credit rating 
of the project they must emanate from banks of high quality, and are 
modelled depending on the bank’s rating.
•	 Equity is assumed to be within the range of 8% to 20% of total 
capitalisation.  Due to the additional risk for senior debt, lower levels 
of equity would be evaluated outside the standard model (Moody’s 
2007a, p. 15).
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These supports are designed to shield the SPV and the ultimate lenders 
from cost or time over-runs, and also have the effect of raising the credit 
quality of the project debt (Moody’s, 2007a, p. 6).
Risk in the operating phase is assessed by Moody’s in four steps:
•	 Project risk assessment, including an assessment of the business risk 
of the SPV, the volatility of revenue, the cost structure, the nature 
and harshness of the abatement regime and the likelihood of contract 
termination.
•	 Capital structure – structural enhancements to offset the risks of 
operating at high gearing will be assessed including liquidity support 
and step-in rights.
•	 Recovery on concession termination.
•	 Procurer’s credit quality.
The first two steps form a substantial part of the analysis and are highly 
inter-related, in that a project with a weaker risk assessment would require 
a more robust capital structure for a given rating level (Moody’s, 2007b, 
p. 5).  At step one, the complexity of the SPV’s obligations is separately 
assessed for each of the soft and hard facilities management and life cycle 
obligations.  An adjustment may be made if services are subject to periodic 
benchmarking or market testing.  The model assumes that the SPV is not 
exposed to material interest rate risks, as it is assumed that these have been 
passed to subcontractors or hedged.  The model also examines the ability 
to terminate for Force Majeure, and termination payments in the event of 
default.  At step two, the model calculates three primary credit metrics for 
each transaction, a minimum and an average debt service coverage ratio, 
and a cash break-even ratio, which may cause a change to the project risk 
assessment at step one, as may an assessment of the security provided by 
the step-in rights.
Although interviewees are unwilling to provide details of their own 
models, risk and risk mitigation packages do appear to be common across 
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the industry.  However, despite the emphasis placed on the models by 
interviewees, concerns were also expressed about their usefulness:
The only thing you can guarantee in this business is it won’t happen 
as the model predicts. (E2)
The next section examines some of the risks interviewees identify as 
problematical.
Problematical risks
As indicated in chapter five above, in Tables 5.12 to 5.14 respondents 
indicate that a wide-ranging list of potential risks are either very important 
or important, so that it appears difficult to distinguish between risks. 
Interviewees explain that no risk can be ignored, all possible risks must be 
considered and covered, and that the distinction between the various types 
of risk is more subtle.  This section seeks to explore some of these subtleties.
Some risks are more problematical than others because they are less 
well understood or hard to control.
Construction risk and ground risk we take them because we can 
manage them – that’s our business, we know what we are doing.  
You then move into an area that is a bit grey, insurance risk... It’s 
a market that you can’t really control. (CE2)
The literature review distinguishes between risk and uncertainty, and 
it is the interviewees’ perception that the nature of these problematical 
risks is that they often involve uncontrollable uncertainty, as opposed to 
manageable risk.  One example is the preference for new accommodation 
builds compared to refurbishment projects, which imply carrying the risk 
of latent defects in buildings.  Physical assessment of such risk may be 
impossible and the perception is of a catastrophic experience by a major 
player:
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The refurbishments, the transfer of risk, that’s where Jarvis went 
bust.  They took the risk on a lot of schools with latent defect risk. 
(CE5)
It is interesting to note in this context the comment by E5 in chapter 
six.  He argues that it may be cheaper to pull down and rebuild assets after 
30 years rather than maintain them.  But such preferences have the ability to 
distort capital investment programmes, especially if PPP is the only realistic 
investment mechanism for the procurer.
Many of the problematical risks arise because of the long term nature 
of PPP, and relate either to the pricing of future lifecycle costs, ‘lifecycle is 
a big risk’ (CE7), or predicting costs which may be volatile in nature.  In 
practical terms the solutions involve hedging or insuring against risks which 
adds cost to the unitary charge, or modelling risk to calculate sensitivities 
and ultimately avoiding projects with a high level of uncertainty.  Several 
equity investors noted that PPP contracts allocate them risk that they have 
no expertise to manage so that hedging is essential: 
We hedge almost every risk we can find, and this is to cover 
the entire period of the contract.  The company’s expertise is in 
procuring infrastructure and managing it for the thirty year period 
of the contract. (E6)
This company seeks to avoid ‘taking unnecessary risks like interest 
rate risk or inflation risk’ (E6).  Commodity prices are also often hedged. 
Examples given included the cost of steel for buildings, and the cost of oil 
for roads contracts, because the price of the black top tarmac surface is 
dependent on oil prices.  However, contractors may choose to hold these 
types of risk, in part because of the cost of hedging, which may cause the 
equity investor concern, especially on large projects with relatively long 
construction periods:  
They (the construction contractor) build in an expected inflation 
on pricing and we hope to hell they’ve got it right because if they 
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didn’t then you could end up with your builder in trouble on a 
long contract – that’s a risk. (E1)
General inflation, interest rates and changes in tax, which are 
uncontrollable by the SPV or its related companies, are modelled and 
sensitivities are run:
We’ll run tax at fifty percent or some outrageous rate to see if it 
still works – it’s all you can do... it’s a slight risk on the bank but 
ultimately it’s hitting the profit of the investor. (SD5)
The outcome may be to re-negotiate specific contract clauses, to 
withdraw from the contract in the event of risks that are so significant as 
to be ‘deal breakers’ (CE2), or to mitigate the risk, for example by way of 
interest rate swaps:
We can do interest rate swaps for thirty years that nail down 
interest rates.  So it’s very important for us that it is all completely 
and utterly fixed. (SD4)
While transferring interest rate risk enables the public sector to benefit 
from certainty about the future level of the unitary charge, there is also 
a downside, as SD4 acknowledged, since tying down interest rates may 
make early repayment difficult or expensive, should this prove desirable at 
a later date.  
The credit crunch has created an unexpected situation that appears 
not to have been modelled.  Many contracts enable facilities management 
service prices to be adjusted annually for inflation, but ‘at the moment that 
adjustment is negative’ (CE7), a situation that many contractors did not 
conceive possible.
Insurance costs are described as especially difficult to predict, in relation 
to the insurance based performance supports and changes in law.  To reduce 
insurance costs a cap may be placed on the level of insured liability, so that 
risks above that level rest with the public sector:
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There’s a limit to what insurance you can take, so what we would 
do is translate the limits on insurance that you can get into a cap 
on the liabilities that we would accept through a change of law.  
If the impact is more... then the client takes the balance. (CE7)
Furthermore, the process of transferring risk between the public and 
private sector partners may raise problems.  A contracting equity investor 
argued that because public sector decision making time frames are typically 
longer than in the private sector this can impact on the management of 
these problematical risks because:
Every time the price changes we have got to go back to the 
department and justify the increase and because the department 
takes so long to look at figures and to make their assessment the 
price then has moved again. (CE1)
In relation to interest rate movements the transfer of risk occurs at 
the date of financial close.  However, since interest rates change on a daily 
basis this timing creates uncertainty both for the financiers and the public 
sector.  Prior to financial close the risk of interest rates changing is held by 
the public sector, and changes will impact on the unitary charge: 
Once we’ve gone to financial close then there are no finance risks 
for the public sector, but they take the interest market risks until 
the financial close.  So if the interest markets change literally in the 
few days before we close, final swap rates are a risk that is taken 
by the public sector. (E1)
To try to manage this uncertainty the procurer will instruct bidders 
to assume a given rate of interest charges, which is deemed to create a level 
playing field for all competitors, but generates the necessity to benchmark 
the winning bidder’s actual price on the day of financial close.  To manage 
the public sector’s uncertainty around the ultimate affordability of the 
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project, the financiers believe that the government builds in a contingency 
to the rate it instructs bidders to use.
In summary, risk is passed through the PPP organisational structure 
from the financiers and the SPV to the contracting companies.  Such transfer 
of risk is needed to obtain an investment grade rating for the project, which 
reduces the financiers’ risk.  Some risks are especially problematical to model 
and some are uncontrollable and therefore may be hedged.
The next section considers some implications that follow from this 
passing of risk through the private sector structure.
Implications of risk pass through
This section discusses four implications that follow from the financiers’ 
desire to pass risk through the contract, and then discusses the impact on 
risk transfer between public and private sectors.
Financing a high quality consortium
To make money the financiers must firstly provide finance for the 
winning bid.  Since design and development of projects are perceived to 
be critical to winning contracts, this appears to explain its high ranking 
pre-financial close (see Table 5.18 in chapter five): 
Design and development is what wins a project, so that’s a key risk 
in terms of are you backing the right horse. (SD2)
Secondly, the financiers must support a consortium capable of 
delivering the full project.  Choosing the wrong consortium is a significant 
risk especially for senior debt because, although some banks might be able 
to support competing consortia, the norm at least prior to the credit crunch 
was that each consortium preferred to work with one bank exclusively.  
Who are you backing, who is your consortium made up of, who 
is your contractor, who is your operator, what is their standing, 
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how robust are they financially, can they withstand a downturn 
in the economy, are they going to be around for that 25 year 
contract – nobody can really give you an answer to that but it’s 
your best shot. (SD1)
Interviewees generally confirm the findings from Table 5.28 that 
previous experience of consortium members is likely to influence their 
decision to participate in a consortium.  However, an international 
banking organisation which is publicly owned indicated that it would not 
be appropriate for it to favour organisations with which it had previous 
experience over new comers.
In terms of fulfilling the Project Agreement obligations and/or meeting 
their obligations under the project supports, financiers are particularly 
concerned about the ability of the construction contractor.  While it is widely 
recognised that risk profiles change over the lifetime of each project and 
vary across projects, typically they have a curve shape described as follows: 
Classically the curve looks like a bath, so the risk of failure in the 
early days is quite high... The risk towards the end is quite high 
because it’s coming towards the end of its life. (E1)
A major risk for the financiers is that the construction company 
fails to complete the infrastructure on time.  Therefore at the end of 
construction, risks are generally understood in the market place to reduce 
significantly.  From the perspective of an equity investor (E2), it is useful 
to have the construction company as a co-shareholder, which ensures that 
failure to complete on time and to budget is as painful to the constructor 
as to the equity investor.  Of even greater concern is the possibility that the 
constructor becomes bankrupt during the construction phase, resulting in 
an incomplete building from which there is no income stream: 
‘If the builder goes bust during construction, it’s a disaster’. (SD3)
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The consequence, as a contracting equity investor explained, is a 
preference for large construction companies that are inherently perceived 
as less risky and for companies with good quality experience:
They do look hard at track record, if you have no track record 
you are not likely to get onto the short list – you can only start by 
joining somebody who’s got a track record. (CE3)
Cronyism and a preference for large companies may create barriers to 
entry, which reduce competition.  This may be exacerbated by a propensity 
to avoid some projects because of the potential for loss of reputation, which 
might have long term consequences:
Reputational risk is important to us, so for example would we do 
a prison – probably not, because we’re concerned about prisoner 
escapes, prisoners being beaten up and how that reflects on us... 
some companies are less concerned about it than perhaps we are. 
(CE3)
Advice industry
It is clear that an advice industry has grown up around PPP.  Virtually 
all the responding financiers agreed or strongly agreed at Table 5.29 that they 
are dependent on advice from third party independent advisors for technical, 
insurance, professional indemnity, financial and especially legal advice.  
All parties require legal advice because the nature of PPP is contractual:
It’s an advisor pest that everyone’s got a lawyer, the bank will have 
its own lawyer because of duty of care to the bank, the builder will 
have his lawyer, the SPV will have their lawyer, the council will 
have their lawyer, that’s four, and then you’ll have sub-contractors 
and other investors maybe – four is the norm. (SD4)
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Auditors are widely used to check the financial models, which drive 
decision-making and form the basis for ongoing monitoring.  The purpose 
of this check is to ensure that these models generate financial statements 
that are accurate and IFRS compliant, and that they are not too aggressive, 
for example, in relation to tax assumptions.
In particular, the banks are perceived by other players to add to this 
advice industry:
Banks are particularly risk averse... they leave absolutely nothing 
to chance and because of that negotiations can go on for an 
indeterminable amount of time. (CE7)
...resulting in much ‘to-ing and fro-ing with advisors. (PS1)
Public sector interviewees indicate that substantial reliance is placed 
upon their advisors and one interviewee indicates that ‘we were totally 
guided by our legal consultants’ (PS5).  However, as Table 5.29 shows this 
is not necessarily true of all private sector organisations, and as a contracting 
equity investor argues:
An advisor is an advisor... but what I don’t want an advisor doing 
is charging off and doing his own thing because he believes that he 
is negotiating for the team.  That’s not his job, his job is to negotiate 
to a point where he can tell me this is what we are doing – is it 
acceptable? It is my project and you should never have your advisor 
driving the project. (CE2)
As Table 5.31 shows, most financiers do not expect that seeking 
independent advice will transfer risk to them or serve to mitigate their 
reputation risk in the event of failure.  This is confirmed by contracting 
equity investors, who argue that the financial advisors are very clear that they 
are advising on a financial model that belongs to the construction company 
(CE1), and that seeking redress for poor advice is difficult:
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These days financial advisors’ agreements are horrendous, they 
basically want you to indemnify them for everything that they do 
if it has an impact on a third party.  You then seek to get some 
indemnity from them and they’ll give you probably indemnity 
for negligence, acts of gross negligence or wilful negligence, wilful 
default but try and prove gross negligence – you know when it is 
just a simple mistake it is very, very difficult. (CE2)
Financiers claim that the due diligence work required by private finance 
is beneficial: 
The discipline that is forgotten is that the private sector bring to 
this the due diligence tradition. (E2)
Whether such benefits are achieved in practice, and for whose benefit, 
is beyond the scope of this present work, but interviewees acknowledge 
that the costs of this advice explain part of the high biddings costs that are 
generally associated with PPP.
Monitoring of projects
Monitoring is conducted throughout construction and operation 
phases to ensure that risk is retained by contractors, and not transferred 
back to financiers.  To this end models are continuously updated and a 
range of cover ratios assessed.  As Table 5.32 shows, financiers are very likely 
to become involved in a project that deviates from the financial model by 
less than 10%, and many will even become involved below 5%.  An equity 
investor argued that senior debt holders would move quickly to lock up cash 
to restrict dividend payments in the event that cover ratios fell below their 
expectations (E5) or if forecasts run through the financial model suggest 
that the project company could not afford the maintenance costs:
If the banks perceive that cost was going to be much higher than 
currently forecast... they would then say well everything looks 
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alright to-day but the only way the project company can afford 
the life cycle is if we stop paying equity now and all that money 
will sit in the project... the model is run and these ratios are tested 
before any money is allowed out of the company. (E6)
Construction is deemed to be especially risky.  The Moody’s 
methodology for rating projects examines the willingness as well as the 
ability of contractors to fulfil financial obligations that arise during the 
period between the contractual target date of completion and the ‘sunset’ 
or ‘long-stop’ date at which time the public sector procurer will have the 
right, and may be required to terminate the contract.  Since the consequent 
implications for financiers are likely to be severe if a contractor were to 
default, their rights to step-in to control projects are perceived as critically 
important.  
Step-in rights
Financiers have a direct agreement with the procuring public authority, 
which enables the senior debt provider to step-in to take control of any 
project experiencing difficulties.  That is, the step-in rights are intended to 
allow the lenders to protect their investment and to enable the project to 
be completed thus assuring the income stream.  Many financiers argue that 
they would wish to step in quickly:
The banks need to be able to step in to the situation before the 
council... we want to be able to fix it before (the procurer) does... 
(The procurer) will probably compensate us but we don’t want to 
go down that route. (SD4)
However, chapter two notes the PwC assessment that banks have not 
stepped-in to projects.  This is probably because step-in has a downside in 
that it signals to the market that the project has problems, so that ‘you would 
only use step-in rights as a last resort’ (SD5).  Therefore, the possibility of 
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and circumstances in which contract failure might occur are of significance 
to the financiers:
We obviously don’t want... (the procurer) to be able to terminate 
the contract easily... it would be negotiations around the number 
of breaches that can occur to the contract... that can cause 
termination. (SD4)
In this regard an equity investor argued that there is a clear distinction 
between the roles of senior debt providers, who he believed do not carry 
risk in the event of failure, and equity investors, whom he perceived as 
more active:
Senior debt is very passive, capital equity is very active... I think 
one of the failings of the PPP structure is it doesn’t create active 
management, it doesn’t create active capital, it creates static 
business. (E2)
Thus throughout the project’s lifetime, risks and performance are 
modelled and may trigger action so that risk does not revert through the 
SPV to the financiers.  Interviewees speak of monthly reporting and regular 
meetings especially at critical points in the project, but as is often the case 
with this type of cost in organisations, monitoring costs are not readily 
quantifiable and vary between projects and over time.  
The next section examines the impacts of risk pass through on risk 
transfer from the public to the private sector.
Risk transfer between the public and private sectors 
The rationale behind PPP is that risk should be held by the party best 
able to manage it, with the expectation that risk will be transferred from 
the public to the private sector.  But as the SPV and financiers, possibly 
including equity, have limited risk carrying capacity, essentially risk is being 
diffused amongst multiple private sector organisations.  Such organisations 
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include equity holders, the SPV’s contractors, and the contractors’ parents, 
where they provide performance supports, insurance companies, banks, who 
provide financial supports, and holders of interest rate or inflation swaps etc. 
Many of these arrangements add cost to the PPP project which will 
ultimately be paid by the procurer.  This suggests the need for a careful 
analysis of the nature of the risks to be transferred to the private sector, and 
the likely impact on the cost to the project of the cost of any risk mitigation 
put in place by the private sector as well as the cost of the risk premium 
charged in the unitary payment for risk transfer.  
In essence the financiers argue that risks that the private sector is able 
to manage should be transferred, but that from an economic perspective 
the public sector should retain risks, even if it cannot manage them, if the 
private sector is not able to manage that risk.  An example given to us relates 
to the uninsurable risk of vandalism on housing estates with a poor claims 
history.  This risk the financiers argue should be held by the procurer, the 
housing department of a local authority, even though it cannot control 
vandalism.  Similarly, E1 argues that it does not make economic sense for 
the government to pass open ended pensions liability risk onto the private 
sector, because the pricing of any such risk would be unlikely to be good 
value for the public sector’s money.  In relation to price inflation on power 
costs, a contracting equity investor agreed:
If you push that risk over to me I can’t manage it, I have to price 
for it and you end up over-pricing it and therefore the government 
isn’t getting value for money... The price tag would be ridiculous, 
and the government is better hanging on to it. (CE2)
This economic argument is also recognised at least by some public 
sector players:
If you try and transfer a risk which is inappropriate, you are going 
to get massive premiums to transfer that risk. (PS2)
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In some cases a risk might be controllable in the wider public sector, 
although it is not manageable by the specific procuring entity.  An example 
is provided in relation to planning risk on a school’s project.  Beyond the 
boundary of the school site, the highways department may require pelican 
crossings or other road services before planning permission is granted.  Such 
off site risk will probably stay with the procurer not because the education 
procurer is any better placed to manage such a risk specifically but perhaps 
because of its perceived association with the wider public sector, and the unit 
that is making the demand.  To some extent this may be a valid perspective, 
as one public sector interviewee in the education sector argued:
We may be able to talk to another public sector organisation and 
we obviously would have contacts with the minister... we would 
apply pressure if you like. (PS5)
In essence, although the private and public sectors are often discussed 
in relation to PPP as if they were single contracting entities, in practice risk 
may be held in multiple organisations that may or may not wish to hold 
that risk.  Some risks are not actively managed within the PPP network of 
organisations; they are mitigated beyond the immediate network elsewhere 
in the public or private sectors.  
The next section examines the final aspect of risk transfer which relates 
to exit strategies in terms of refinancing and equity sales of PPP projects.
Refinancing and sales
This section shows that the nature of refinancing and equity sales 
has changed in two ways over the PPP policy’s lifetime, and in particular 
recently because of the credit crunch.  Firstly, refinancing has changed 
from a profitable opportunity to a downside risk.  Secondly, primary equity 
investors now face calls to increase the proportion of equity to debt.  This 
is an unattractive prospect since the secondary market is perceived to be 
less buoyant.  
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At the time the questionnaire responses were received, as Table 5.24 
shows, the main objectives of refinancing and sales were either to increase the 
return, by reducing borrowing costs, or to downsize the equity and increase 
liquidity.  Financiers indicate that with experience of PPP, interest rates 
fell compared to the fixed rates given on the early deals so that refinancing 
became a profitable option:
You refinanced it – basically you could make a big profit, and 
the equity made a big profit out of it, and the banks were happy 
to recycle because they were just given their money back. (CE2)
There is a further incentive to re-finance, as the banking and bonds 
markets mature, to obtain loans and/or fix rates that originally did not cover 
the full lifetime of the project:
As the PPPs become more mature, become more efficient, the 
banking market has become more efficient, the capital market 
has become more efficient, such that you can borrow thirty year 
money against a thirty year project.  In the early deals interest 
rates could not be fixed for thirty years, they could only be fixed 
for maybe ten years. (E5)
Financiers accept that early projects showed significant gains, which 
they attribute to a cautious approach to pricing in an uncertain environment 
that they support:
In the early days nobody knew what they were doing, it was a 
new game in town, the banks weren’t too sure and we weren’t too 
sure and so the equity returns were set at something like 15%, 
17%, you know which were reasonable at the time.  When it 
came to refinancing them five years later, well you could show that 
performance was good. (CE2)
133transFerring risk in PPP
Indeed one interviewee argues that the industry should defend itself 
more robustly:
In order to extract value you need to refinance them... Bringing 
forward cash, bringing forward dividends, and the problem is the 
Government has been embarrassed... when nobody knew how this 
sector was going to work, there are probably some unacceptable 
gains that have been made.  But having said that those early deals 
were pioneering... I’m not really sure why they’re not more robust 
in defending the sector. (SD5)
As chapter two explains, after the Treasury and industry agreed to 
share gains, refinancing occurred on fewer deals and brought less benefit to 
the public sector than expected.  Table 5.23 shows that more than half the 
respondents indicate they have refinanced less than 10% of their projects. 
The financiers confirm the Treasury’s assessment that there are several 
reasons, including the costs of re-financing deals especially when the gain 
must be shared with the public sector, and a maturity in the market leading 
to a fall in the difference between interest rates at financial close and in the 
operating phase.
However, as re-financing reduced over time the secondary market grew, 
enabling sales of investments.  The NAO (2006) has raised the possibility 
that sales could be used to avoid sharing refinancing gains.  But, although 
the secondary market is growing, equity investors are also keen to build a 
reputation for holding their equity interests in PPP projects.  For example, 
one contracting equity investor (CE4) showed interviewers promotional 
literature advertising that it has never sold its equity interest, and an equity 
investor (E1) describes his organisation as a long term equity holder, 
which in normal times chooses not to sell its equity shares in PPP projects. 
However, when pressed, this interviewee acknowledged that the company 
was forced to sell eight such projects at, what the interviewee describes as, 
‘an extraordinary moment in our history’ (E1).
Some contracting equity investors offer an alternative perspective. 
Although their business is construction or facilities management, the PPP 
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structure essentially encourages, if not requires, equity investment from these 
contractors, as it is seen as a commitment to the project by the specialist 
financiers.  Contractors with a long term interest in facilities management 
argued that it is advisable to retain this equity investment since their 
reputation continues to be at stake in the operational phase.  However, 
construction contractors, whose input typically ceases after the construction 
phase, may have an incentive to release funds in order to commit to future 
projects.  In the early days of PPP CE2 argued his company expected to 
sell their equity, but later this changed as they realised they were making a 
good return.  SD5 confirmed this tendency: 
Everybody is trying to get a share of the primary equity... It’s the top 
of the food chain.  The contractors are now realising how valuable 
this equity is and might sit on it for a while, and then sell it. (SD5) 
The credit crunch changed the refinancing and equity sales market. 
Firstly, although the perception is not necessarily shared by senior debt 
lenders, equity and contracting equity investors perceive a lack of willingness 
on the part of banks to lend for the long term.  A typical quote from E5 
suggests a willingness by banks to lend for a maximum of ten years: ‘The 
banks are looking to lend typically seven, eight, no more than ten years’.
SD6 argues that banks will still lend long if conditions are favourable 
but will seek to refinance between seven and ten years into a deal.  The 
impact is that equity investors, and to some extent the public sector, face 
a refinancing risk.  That is, finance will have to be re-negotiated part way 
through the PPP lifecycle: 
The public sector is only willing to share a certain element of it... 
we all hope that in the next seven years the banking markets will 
come back to some degree of normality, but the risk is that they 
may not or they may not at the right time.  So there is a risk there 
that we didn’t have before... we are taking lots of downside risk on 
the ability to be able to refinance in the future. (E5)
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Should it prove impossible to refinance, a cash sweep would be required, 
implying a loss of return for equity investors.  A further impact of the credit 
crunch is that senior debt lenders, who remain in the market, are attempting 
to increase the proportion of equity finance in PPP, to reduce their risk. 
Especially for the contracting equity providers, this is problematic as the 
secondary market is less buoyant, and this is restricting the ability to recycle 
funds (CE7 and CE2).
SD6 argues that at present the competition between the banks is 
not as intense, which may have an impact on the pricing of risk, because 
when competition is intense risk may be mispriced (Keating, 2004).  But 
during the credit crunch era when banks are reluctant to lend, there is more 
likelihood that risk is overpriced.  To the extent that there is over pricing 
of risk in the market, the expectation would be that if senior lending does 
become more competitive then there will be future opportunities for 
beneficial refinancing of projects.  
Summary
Risk transfer from the public to the private sector is a key rationale 
for the use of the PPP method of financing public infrastructure, and the 
justification for the private sector’s higher cost of finance compared to the 
cost of raising public debt.  The Treasury (2003) argues that project risk 
should be held by the party best able to manage it.  But risk allocation is 
a complex issue.  Furthermore, some risks are uncontrollable by either the 
public or private partners, and some risks are allocated to organisations 
that cannot actively manage them in-house and therefore mitigate them by 
various means.  This chapter shows that:
•	 The SPV is thinly capitalised so risk is passed through the PPP network. 
The 90:10 ratio of debt:equity means that financial risks must be hedged.
•	 Multiple private sector companies hold elements of the projects’ risks.
•	 Uncertainties, such as insurance costs and long-term lifecycle costs, are 
difficult to predict and therefore considered risky.
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•	 There is a wide ranging project support system that includes, financial 
and performance project supports, insurance and hedging mechanisms, 
project monitoring, and an advice industry.
•	 Financiers perceive the due diligence work they require brings discipline 
to procurement processes.
•	 Project supports are designed to shield the SPV and ultimate lenders 
from time and budget over runs, but the costs of such measures must 
raise questions about value for money for the procurer.
•	 Contractor failure during the construction phase is considered a 
significant risk, and this perception drives the demand for contract 
supports, and the importance attributed to negotiations around step-in 
rights.
•	 Sectors with high rates of current or potential future change are perceived 
as especially risky.
•	 Interest rate hedges enable a stable unitary charge but may make early 
debt repayment difficult, locking the public sector into the PPP loan 
arrangements.
Financial models are considered to be commercially confidential.  They 
may be either generic to the investing institution or specifically created for 
PPP, but are mainly, though not exclusively, quantitative in nature.  Model 
outcomes may lead financers to renegotiate contract terms pre-financial 
close.  Models are not perceived to deal with the possibility of negative 
interest rates.
The micro-level rationale for using PPP is that it will increase value for 
money in the procurement of public services and related infrastructure.  But 
this depends upon a competitive bidding process.  This chapter shows that:
•	 The complexity of PPP and the associated bidding costs create caution 
amongst financiers, who choose their projects and partners carefully.
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•	 Barriers to entry are created, especially for smaller firms and firms 
without a recognised track record.
•	 Uncertainty is especially unwelcome and may lead to certain projects, 
such as refurbishments, being avoided.  This potentially reduces the 
number of bidders or distorts capital investment programmes.
Prior to the credit crunch bonds were attractive to large PPPs 
because they push costs out to the end of the payment period.  However, 
bondholders are perceived to be remote sources of finance with no direct 
interest in individual projects.  But they demand more information before 
committing to deals.
During the credit crunch the need to refinance projects part way 
through their lifetime is perceived as a new risk, where previously refinancing 
was a profit or liquidity creating opportunity for financiers.  At a time 
when the secondary market is perceived to be less buoyant, restricting 
the possibilities for recycling of equity cash, equity investors feel under 
pressure to provide more equity investment to facilitate deals.  The banks’ 
demands for more scrutiny and guarantees are increasing the risks of other 
organisations in the PPP network.

8conclusions and recommendations
Introduction 
In the early days of PPP, Gallimore et al. (1997) argued that there were 
significant differences between the perceptions of risks in PPP held by the 
construction industry and by other stakeholders, especially the financiers. 
However, since the inception of the PPP policy there has been very little 
research examining the financiers’ perceptions of risks.  This report addresses 
four relevant research questions:
•	 Research question 1: How do financiers perceive the risks associated 
with PPP projects?
•	 Research question 2: How do financiers manage the risks associated 
with PPP projects?
•	 Research question 3: How have changes in the industry affected 
financiers’ perceptions of risks?
•	 Research question 4: How do the financiers’ perceptions of risks differ 
from those of their public sector partners? 
This chapter draws together important issues raised in the literature 
and the empirical findings from the questionnaire survey and the interviews, 
and relates them to each of these four research questions in turn.  Final 
sections provide some limitations and recommendations for future research, 
recommendations for policy makers and a summary.
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Summary of findings
Research question 1: How do financiers perceive the risks associated with 
PPP projects?
The literature review distinguishes between risk and uncertainty, where 
risk involves the possibility of placing a calculable probability on a future 
event occurring (Broadbent et al., 2008), and where uncertainty occurs 
if the outcome of a course of action is indeterminate or subject to doubt 
(HM Treasury, 1997).  Respondents perceive that a wide range of factors 
are important when assessing risks but the importance of risks varies at 
different stages of the PPP.  
The Treasury (2003) argues that risk should be held by the party best 
able to manage it, but Froud (2003) argues that in PPP there is conflation 
of risk and uncertainty.  The Treasury’s position is a simplification that does 
not deal with risks that are beyond the control of the procurer or the SPV, 
its owners and subcontractors.  Examples include inflation and interest 
rates and if it is transferred demand risk.  If such risks are transferred to the 
private sector, they will be mitigated by means of, for example, inflation 
hedges and interest rate swaps or they will attract a high risk premium.  In 
either case the project’s cost to the procurer will increase.  Financiers are 
clear that transferring risk to the private sector is uneconomic if the private 
sector cannot manage it.  But this in turn implies that the procurer may 
need to hold risk that it cannot manage.
The following points summarise the findings about how financiers 
perceive risk:
•	 Risk transfer from the public to the private sector is carried out within 
the framework of standard contracts, even though these may not offer 
an optimal allocation of risk (Quiggin, 2005).
•	 Risk transfer to the private sector has increased over the last four years.
•	 Sectors with high rates of current or potential future change and hard 
to predict uncertainties are especially risky.
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•	 About one quarter of respondents perceive it is possible to transfer 
risks back to the public sector after the project is negotiated or that risk 
transfer may not be agreed until after the contract is awarded.
•	 In terms of overall ranking, design and development was ranked as the 
highest risk in the pre-financial close and construction phases of PPPs. 
Finance risk was ranked as the second highest risk in both these phases 
and in the operations phase.
•	 A significant risk is perceived to be contractor failure during the 
construction phase.  Perceptions about this risk in particular drive 
the demand for contract supports, and the importance attributed to 
negotiations around step-in rights.
•	 After construction, one quarter of respondents perceive that PPP is 
very low risk.
The financiers’ perceptions reported here contradict previous findings 
that risk allocation between PPP partners may be unclear, and that the way 
in which risk profiles change over project lifetimes is not well understood 
(Ng and Loosemoore, 2007).  
Research question 2: How do financiers manage the risks associated with 
PPP projects?
Risks are managed in a number of different ways, which may be 
summarised as follows:
•	 Risks may be avoided by selecting familiar contracts and partners and 
refusing projects with uncertainties, such as refurbishments, or with 
high reputational implications, such as prisons.
•	 Risks are passed through the PPP organisational structure to 
subcontractors.
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•	 Financial and performance contract supports ensure risk does not revert 
to financiers.
•	 Direct agreements and step-in rights empower senior debt holders.
•	 Purchase of insurance cover and hedges.
•	 Modelling to achieve investment grade rating.
•	 Third party advice.
•	 Project monitoring.
This combination of methods results in multiple entities holding 
elements of PPP risk.
Singh and Kalidindi (2006) argue that the private sector may be 
reluctant to carry certain risks.  Interviewees indicate that they choose the 
contracts for which they bid, and the members of the consortium, carefully. 
Thus risks associated with unfamiliar projects or partners are avoided, but 
barriers to market entry may be created.  Risks linked to user choice may 
also be avoided, as is demand risk in four of the five sectors examined here.
PPPs normally adopt a heavily geared financial structure to minimise 
the return required by equity, with the consequence that the thinly 
capitalised SPV has limited risk carrying capability.  The high levels of 
gearing represent a risk to senior debt, and have two implications for risk 
management.  Firstly, risks are passed through the PPP organisational 
structure to the subcontractors.  In order to ensure that risks do not revert 
to financiers, they require financial and performance supports to be provided 
by the subcontractors, ultimately increasing the unitary charge.  Interest 
rate hedges may lock procurers into long term loans.
Secondly, the legal structure of the PPP involves a direct agreement 
between the senior debt holders and the procurer, empowering senior debt 
holders to step-in to the contract in the event of poor contractor performance 
or contractor failure.  The existence of this agreement may introduce delay 
and cost, or limit flexibility, if contract amendments are required.
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The empirics in this study based on five sectors expand Akintoye 
and Chinyio’s (2005) findings in healthcare that transferring risk to 
subcontractors and buying insurance cover are the most prominent strategies 
for managing and mitigating risks.
Risk modelling to identify, assess and price risks is perceived as a major 
and important exercise, even if there is some doubt about its validity.  Models 
are perceived to be commercially confidential, but the outline of the Moody’s 
rating model is in the public domain by registering on the website.  This 
model is substantially quantitative in nature, although qualitative factors 
may cause apparently small adjustments to the outcome of the model to 
achieve an overall rating.  It is likely that the financiers’ models have similar 
characteristics.  This provides indirect confirmation of the pervading power 
of accounting logic with its emphasis on quantification (Broadbent et al., 
2008).  PPP deals are usually structured so that the project obtains an 
investment grading.  If a model outcome signals higher risk, re-negotiation 
and/or sharing of risks with the public sector will be pursued.  
Financiers, and indeed procurers, seek independent third party advice 
from legal, technical, insurance and sometimes financial and professional 
indemnity specialists.  Most respondents agree they are dependent on such 
advice, especially legal advice, although most do not believe that seeking 
advice transfers risk to the advisors.  
Continuous monitoring of performance against the financial models is 
conducted, either in-house or by third party advisors.  Deviations from the 
model of less than 5% and between 5% and 10% will trigger intervention 
by about 40% and 45% of financiers respectively.  Ultimately financiers 
state they will exercise step-in rights, even though such a move signals to 
the market that a project is in distress.  However, PwC (2008) find that 
step-in is infrequent.
Research question 3: How have changes in the PPP industry affected 
financiers’ perceptions of risks?
Before the credit crunch, changes were essentially associated with a 
maturing industry.  Early memories provided by interviewees suggest high 
levels of uncertainty about the risks and the risk-return relationship inherent 
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in PPP at the outset.  As the industry matured, debt products became 
commodified.  Importantly from the financiers’ perspective, a secondary 
market developed enabling exit from investments.  Early exit is intended 
by about 20% of respondents and only two thirds report their intention to 
stay with a PPP till contract end.
Opportunities for profitable refinancing became available as PPPs in 
the operations phase were able to show good performance.  Although the 
majority of survey respondents believe they have not overestimated risks 
historically, opportunities for profitable refinancing do appear to have 
reduced, which might suggest the opposite.  Alternatively, equity sales 
may have replaced refinancing (NAO, 2006).  Amongst the questionnaire 
respondents 28% had sold more than 50% of their projects in the last five 
years as opposed to 11% who had refinanced, which provides some limited 
support for the NAO’s suggestion.  
The private equity and facilities management companies perceive 
a reputation benefit from making a long term commitment to a PPP 
project, whereas the construction companies tended, at least initially, to 
have a shorter term investment horizon.  Contracting equity investors 
have potential streams of profit from both the contracting work and the 
investment, but when appraising projects the main driver for deciding to 
bid is gaining the construction work rather than the financial return on the 
equity investment.  However, there is some evidence that return from the 
investment in PPP is also becoming attractive to construction companies 
over the longer term.  
During the credit crunch, the following changes in the industry are 
essentially imposed by a lack of capacity in the senior debt and bond markets:
•	 Although it is to some extent disputed by the bankers, equity investors 
perceive that not only is there much less senior debt funding available, 
but also that banks are less willing to provide finance for the full lifetime 
of the PPP project.
•	 Perceptions about refinancing have changed.  Where previously it was 
an attractive opportunity, it is perceived as a downside risk for deals 
written during the credit crunch that may need to be refinanced between 
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seven and ten years into the project.  This is essentially a risk for equity 
investors, but could have implications for the public sector and service 
users if refinancing proves impossible or very expensive.
•	 The banks’ margin has increased and there is pressure to increase the 
proportion of equity to debt.  Perceptions about the required level of 
equity vary from 15% to 30%, compared to the previous level of about 
10%.  The required rate of return by equity investors is perceived to be 
rising.  To the extent that these perceptions are accurate, it is possible that 
if international capital markets stabilise, there will be renewed interest 
in refinancing as the market regains competitive pressure.
•	 Whereas the senior debt market is perceived to be in crisis, this is not 
the case with the primary equity market.  However, the secondary 
equity market is perceived to be less buoyant than before the credit 
crunch took effect.  
Research question 4: How do the financiers’ perceptions of risks differ from 
those of their public sector partners? 
Williams et al. (2003) and Abednego and Ogunlana (2006) argue that 
risks affect behaviour when their consequences are personally relevant and 
when they materialise.  The findings of this study confirm those tendencies. 
Private sector respondents are focused on risks that they are contractually 
allocated and need to transfer, whereas public sector interviewees are focused 
on the risks they retain.  In summary:
•	 In four of the five sectors – the exception is roads – the public sector 
interviewees are concerned about the financial consequences of holding 
demand risk, which can result in making unitary payments for unwanted 
facilities.
•	 The nature of political risks associated with PPP projects varies across the 
sectors but the procurers’ concern focuses on the impacts on service users.
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•	 User specificity of infrastructure is a risk factor for financiers (Rodney 
and Gallimore, 2002), but potential building obsolescence most 
concerns the procurers.
•	 Conflicting needs, to reduce cost drivers on the part of financiers and 
to increase flexibility in building use to meet changing operational 
requirements on the part of the procurers, create trade-offs between 
flexibility in and affordability of contracts.
•	 Procurer driven changes to contract specifications during negotiations 
are perceived as undesirable and disproportionately costly by the 
financiers.  Especially the need to obtain agreement from senior debt 
holders causes delay and adds costs.
•	 Whereas the financiers and designers appear content to insure against 
claims arising from incidents such as accidents, there is some evidence 
that contracting equity investors and the public sector are more 
concerned that incidents should be avoided because of the impact on 
service users and employees.
•	 Literature suggests the public sector may be less adept at negotiating 
and managing risks.  While virtually all respondents agree that they are 
reliant on third party advice, there is some evidence that greater reliance 
is placed on such advice in the public sector.  
Limitations and recommendations for future research
This study examines the perceptions of risks in PPPs held by financiers, 
who are key players in the industry.  The perceptions reported are as given 
to the researchers by way of a questionnaire survey and at interview, and 
the findings and inferences drawn from them are thus subject to the well-
recognised limitations of these research techniques.  In the light of such 
limitations, six areas for future research are identified:
•	 A number of interviewees signalled that in their opinion there were 
more opportunities for bonds and pension funds to invest in PPP than 
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the levels of such investments to date.  However, a counter argument 
was made that this may not be the best solution for taxpayers.  Research 
questions might focus on issues such as: (i) the suitability and cost of 
index linked bonding and pension fund investments for financing public 
infrastructure assets; (ii) whether there are barriers to such investments 
and if so whether these can, or should, be reduced or removed; and (iii) 
the impact of remote investors on other network players and the public 
authority, especially in terms of the demands made for documentation 
during the negotiation and monitoring processes, and the operations 
phase of the projects.  
•	 The significant cost associated with using third party advice in PPPs has 
always been controversial, and the fixed element of much of the costs is 
one factor that renders PPPs unsuitable for small projects.  However, this 
research also identifies that considerable reliance is placed on such advice 
in both sectors, but especially in the public sector, where unbiased and 
independent advice is needed to protect the public interest (Bloomfield, 
2006).  However across a range of projects, advisors may act for both 
the public authority and one or more members of the private sector 
PPP network, raising questions about whether such advice is, or can be, 
unbiased and independent in practice.  Therefore future research might 
explore the roles, incentives and any potential conflicts of interest of third 
party advisors in PPP project negotiation and monitoring processes.
•	 The perceptions of industry insiders that risk allocation is clear and risk 
profiling well understood do not necessarily negate Ng and Loosemore’s 
(2007) contrary arguments that: (i) risk allocation is difficult because 
of the technical, legal, political and economic complexity of PPP; and, 
(ii) the way risk profiles change over the duration of projects is not well 
known.  Industry insiders could present an over confident assessment of 
their own abilities.  Risk transfer is at the heart of PPP and risk pricing 
is often critical to the VFM case for using PPP to finance a project. 
The finding here that some one quarter of respondents perceive it is 
possible to transfer risk back to the public sector after financial close or 
that risk transfer may not be agreed until after the contract is awarded, 
raises questions about the accuracy and reliability of risk pricing in bids. 
Therefore, research comparing assumptions made in business cases about 
148 PubliC Private PartnershiP FinanCiers’ PerCePtions oF risks
risk transfer and the costs of holding risks with actual outturns would be 
useful to policy makers, procurers and service providers, if the necessary 
documents could be made available.  In addition, longitudinal research 
that focused on how risk profiles change over time on different projects 
would be useful, as would evidence about whether or not interest rate 
hedging locks the public sector into unfavourable loan arrangements.
•	 This research has explored public sector perceptions of risks through a 
small number of interviews only.  Previous research, albeit of limited 
volume, has examined perceptions of risks and risk management in the 
public sector, but this study indicates a further area where research would 
be valuable.  The study shows that risks affect behaviour in PPP when 
their consequences are personally relevant and when they materialise. 
So that demand risk and the future flexibility of infrastructure to meet 
demand are significant risks for the public sector, about which there is 
little research.  Research on the costs and benefits associated with the 
trade-offs between affordability and flexibility would be valuable.  
•	 The management of demand risk has received little attention in the 
literature because it is normally retained, except in roads, by the public 
sector.  This research shows that demand management is becoming 
an issue of concern for public authorities faced with the prospect of 
insufficient demand to cover the PPP unitary charge.  This research 
also shows some evidence of sector level planning to address demand 
management problems by channelling demand into PPP facilities, 
but it is an issue for further research as to how such planning can be 
implemented especially in politically sensitive areas such as education, 
hospitals and housing.
•	 While it is largely outside the remit of this project, interviewees have 
flagged the differing attitudes of PPP partners to the impacts of risk 
on service users and to the mitigation of such risks.  Whether and if so 
how, PPP changes the management of risk impact on service users is a 
final area for future research.  
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Recommendations for policy makers
•	 A macro-level review of the PPP policy.  While they deny over pricing 
the risks of early projects, PPP financiers discussed a maturing industry 
in which commodification of finance products had taken place as they 
began to understand the risk-return inherent in PPP projects.  That is, 
there is an understanding amongst the financiers that PPP has gone 
through an early stage of learning in which some lessons have been 
learned.  At a macro level our recommendation is now that an extensive 
review of the PPP policy should be conducted to compliment the 
reviews of individual projects that have been undertaken by the NAO 
in particular.   Where the reviews of projects have led to changes in 
procedures, for example the re-writing of the standard contract, a review 
of the policy might similarly lead to the resolution of a number of issues 
we outline in further recommendations below and to new guidance.
•	 A systemic review of the accuracy of risk pricing and of risk transfer.  The 
finding of this research is that some one quarter of respondents perceives 
it is possible to transfer risk back to the public sector after financial 
close or that risk transfer may not be agreed until after the contract is 
awarded.  While a minority of respondents, 25% is a large minority 
especially given that the respondents, who are financiers, might be 
expected to be reluctant to admit this for two reasons.  Firstly, such an 
admission might reflect adversely on the value to the public sector of 
the PPP deals, and secondly, their focus is likely to be on risks that they 
have assumed rather than those that rest elsewhere.  Such a finding is a 
matter of concern given that the low capitalisation of the SPVs inevitably 
means that failed projects can leave the public sector without recourse 
but with an ongoing obligation to provide services.  Thus there is a need 
to assess systemically across a large number of projects the reliability of 
risk pricing in PPP contracts and the practice of risk transfer compared 
to the assumptions in the ‘Business Case’.
•	 A macro-level review of the need for and procurement of risk mitigation 
measures.  This study shows that multiple private sector companies put 
in place for each individual PPP project risk mitigation measures to 
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reduce or remove their exposure to risks such as inflation, and interest 
rate rises.  Such measures ultimately add cost to the public authority and 
the tax payer.  Policy makers should consider at a macro level whether 
government actually does need to pay to mitigate risks of this nature, 
or whether the public sector should hold such risks.  Furthermore, if it 
is determined that such risk mitigation is required by government then 
policy makers should consider how best to purchase it.  Can economies 
of scale be achieved by government directly acquiring such risk mitigation 
across a range of PPP projects rather than paying for each individual 
project through the middlemen of multiple private sector contractors?
•	 The reduction of bidding costs to encourage new entrants.  Public and 
private sector partners need to consider how high bidding costs can be 
reduced to encourage new entrants to the PPP market and more bidders 
for individual projects.  This research shows that high bidding costs lead 
bidders to select carefully the projects they will bid for and to work with 
known and trusted partners.  This potentially reduces the competition for 
individual projects and creates barriers to entry to the PPP marketplace.
•	 A review by procurers of their policies on the use of third party advice and its 
value for money.  This research shows that just over half of the financiers 
believe that the costs of monitoring projects by third party agents is 
increasing and that considerable reliance is placed upon third party advice, 
especially in the public sector.  The size of consultancy fees has been an 
area of controversy and with public sector budgets set to be cut a review 
of such costs would be timely.
•	 Greater transparency of contract details to enable scrutiny of PPP both at 
policy and individual project level.  More contract details should be released 
into the public domain to enable independent assessment of risk pricing 
and its VFM, and to compare expected versus actual risk transfer.  The 
findings of this study lead us to repeat the many calls already made for 
greater transparency, and in particular to repeat the Shaoul et al. (2008) 
argument that all public authorities should routinely publish their business 
cases after financial close, and that there should be an agreed time period 
after financial close beyond which commercial confidentiality should not 
be used as a rationale for non-disclosure.  
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Summary 
A complex network of organisations surrounds the two main partners 
to a PPP contract – the procurer and the SPV.  Within this network, risk 
passes from the SPV which is the signatory to the legal contract with the 
procurer.  Much of this risk is transferred by means of additional legal 
contracts, to subcontractors who are responsible for construction and 
operations.  However, within the network risks may be allocated to parties 
who cannot control them or do not wish to hold them, in which case 
they will be mitigated by various means, including hedges and swaps and 
frequently insurance.  Such risks are thus dispersed around the private sector, 
beyond the immediate PPP network.  
Senior debt holders have a powerful position within this network. 
The outcome of the modelling processes essentially needs to create an 
investment grade rating for the project, so that it can be financed.  Contracts 
and risk allocations may be re-designed or re-negotiated to achieve this 
outcome.  Subcontractors must provide financial and performance supports, 
essentially to protect the interests of the financiers against poor subcontractor 
performance or contractor failure.  Crucially debt servicing costs are covered 
by these supports during any time over-runs on the target completion dates 
for a project.  This is especially important as debt servicing supports improve 
the project’s credit rating.  The credit rating assessments will cover both the 
contractor’s ability and willingness to pay in the event of problems.
Risk and risk transfer are central elements of PPP.  By focusing on the 
financiers’ perceptions of risks and risk management, the report shows that 
risk is widely dispersed in the private sector by contractual means.  Given 
the size and longevity of these PPP contracts, there has been an inevitable 
rise of a PPP advice industry.  
This research report contributes to an understanding of how PPP 
operates in practice.  It shows that while the private sector is often described 
in relation to PPP as if it were a single entity, in practice risks transferred 
from the public sector are dispersed amongst multiple organisations both 
within an immediate PPP network and beyond.  This dispersion of risks 
adds cost to the unitary charge raising questions about whether VFM is 
achieved for the procurer, and ultimately the taxpayer.  
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APPendix 1
General types of risk in PPP projects
Risk Description
Availability risk The risk that the quantum of the service provided is less than 
that required under a contract.
Business risk The risk that an organisation cannot meet its business 
imperatives.
Construction 
risk
The risk that the construction of physical assets is not completed 
on time, to budget and to specification.
Decant risk The risk arising in accommodation projects relating to the need 
to decant staff/ clients from one site to another.
Demand risk The risk that demand for a service does not match the levels 
planned, projected or assumed.  As the demand for a service 
may be partially controllable by the public body concerned, the 
risk to the public sector may be less than that perceived by the 
private sector.
Design risk The risk that design cannot deliver the services at the required 
performance or quality standards.
Economic risk Where the project outcomes are sensitive to economic 
influences.  For example, where actual inflation differs from 
assumed inflation rates.
Environment 
risk
Where the nature of the project has a major impact on its 
adjacent area and there is a strong likelihood of objection from 
the general public.
Funding risk Where project delays or changes in scope occur as a result of the 
availability of funding.
Legislative risk The risk that changes in legislation increase costs.  This can be 
sub-divided into general risks such as changes in corporate tax 
rates and specific ones which may affect a particular project.
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General types of risk in PPP projects (Cont.)
Risk Description
Maintenance 
risk
The risk that the costs of keeping the assets in good 
condition vary from budget.
Occupancy risk The risk that a property will remain untenanted – a form of 
demand risk.
Operational risk The risk that operating costs vary from budget, that 
performance standards slip or that service cannot be 
provided.
Planning risk The risk that the implementation of a project fails to 
adhere to the terms of planning permission or that detailed 
planning cannot be obtained, or if obtained, can only be 
implemented at costs greater than in the original budget.
Policy risk The risk of changes of policy direction not involving 
legislation.
Procurement 
risk
Where a contractor is engaged, risk can arise from the 
contract between the two parties, the capabilities of the 
contractor, and when a dispute occurs.
Project 
intelligence risk
Where the quality of initial project intelligence (e.g.  
preliminary site investigation) is likely to impact on the 
likelihood of unforeseen problems occurring.
Reputational 
Risk.
The risk that there, will be an undermining of customer/ 
media perception of the organisations ability to fulfill its 
business requirements e.g. adverse publicity concerning an 
operational problem.
Residual Value 
risk
The risk relating to the uncertainty of the value of physical 
assets at the end of the contract.
Technology risk The risk that changes in technology result in services being 
provided using non-optimal technology.
Volume risk The risk that actual usage of the service varies from the level 
forecast.
Source: HM Treasury, 2003, The Greenbook: Appraisal and evaluation in central government, 
pp. 82-83, HMSO: London.
APPendix 2
Hierarchy of nvivo codes for interview analysis 
We coded the interview information initially by whether the content related 
to the PPP industry or to projects.  Within these two broad categories layers 
of data coding were developed as set out below.  
Industry level codes
Level 1 Industry Information of a generic nature about the PPP industry, such as 
the size/structure and governance of PPP.
Below this first level data was collected around three categories: the public 
and private sector players and sectoral information.
Level 2 Public sector Information of a generic nature about the public sector players, 
including information about their roles/networks/governance 
relationships.
This level was also sub-divided into the three areas of the UK in which our 
cases were located. 
Level 3 Eng Information specifically about PPPs in England
Level 3 Scot Information specifically about PPPs in Scotland
Level 3 NI Information specifically about PPPs in N. Ireland
Level 2 Private sector players General information about the size of the market/the 
major players.
This level was further sub-divided to separate information collected about 
three significant players and general operations and management issues.
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Level 3 F Financiers
Level 3 A Agents
Level 3 C Construction
Level 3 O Operation/management
Level 2 Sectorial information Information about contrasts between sectors.
This level was then sub-divided to capture data about the specific sectors in 
which our case studies were located.
Level 3 H Housing
Level 3 E Education
Level 3 Hos Hospitals
Level 3 R Roads
Level 3 P Prisons
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Project level codes
Level 1 Projects Information of a generic nature about PPP projects.
Below this first level data was collected around three categories: project risk, 
financiers and other players.
Level 2 Project risk Generic information about project risk.
This level was sub-divided into types of risk and issues around risk 
transfer between players.
Level 3 Risk Information about the types of risk in PPPs, which was sub-
divided into:
Level 4 General risks common to all sectors
Level 4 Sector specific risk
Level 3 Risk transfer Information about risk transfer, including issues about contractual 
risk allocation between partners and perceptions about risk holding 
after financial close.
Level 2 Financiers Generic information about financiers’ perceptions of risk. 
Information was sub-divided and coded by the type of financier.
Level 3 B Bond financiers
Level 3 SD Senior debt financiers
Level 3 E Equity financiers and providers of sub-debt
Under each of these categories the financiers’ perceptions of risk were coded 
into six areas, with the last two further sub-divided to capture issues about 
which many financiers spoke at some length.
Level 4 P Perceptions of risk
Level 4 F Choice of finance
Level 4 RA Risk assessment
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Level 4 R Refinancing and sales
Level 4 H Hedging
Level 5 IS Interest Swaps
Level 5 I Inflation
Level 4 M Management risk
Level 5 INS Insurance
Level 5 PA Professional advice
Level 2 Other players Information about players’ (other than financiers) perceptions of 
risk, and then coded by type.
Level 3 O Private sector operators
Level 3 U Public sector procurers at unit level
Level 3 H Public sector players in hierarchy above unit
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Public private partnerships (PPP) are used extensively in the provision of public 
services. Who actually bears the risk in such schemes?  This new research 
report looks at PPP schemes from a new and different viewpoint by examining 
financiers’ perceptions of risks and then comparing them to the perceptions of 
their public sector partners.
The report explains the complex network used in PPP schemes and investigates 
how financiers perceive the risks associated with PPP; how financiers manage 
these risks; how changes in the PPP industry, including the impact of the credit 
crunch, have affected financiers’ perceptions of risks; and how financiers’ 
perceptions of risks differ from those of their public sector partners.  
A clear understanding of how risks are dispersed and managed is essential to 
inform future policy development, especially at a time when the intention of the 
new government and the impact of public spending cuts on PPP is uncertain.  The 
intention with PPP is that risks should be held by the party best able to manage 
them, and that the transfer of risk is priced into any PPP contract, yet one of the 
key findings of this research is that it is possible to transfer risk back to the public 
sector after contracts have been settled.  The impact of this on value for money 
to the public sector and ultimately taxpayers needs to be assessed.
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